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S A R A H  C .  H A A N  
Shareholder Proposal Settlements and the Private 
Ordering of Public Elections 
abstract . Reform of campaign finance disclosure has stalled in Congress and at various 
federal agencies, but it is steadily unfolding in a firm-by-firm program of private ordering. To-
day, much of what is publicly known about how individual public companies spend money to 
influence federal, state, and local elections—and particularly what is known about corporate 
“dark money”—comes from disclosures that conform to privately negotiated contracts. 
 The primary mechanism for this new transparency is the settlement of the shareholder pro-
posal, in which a shareholder trades its rights under SEC Rule 14a-8—and potentially the rights 
of other shareholders—for a privately negotiated social policy commitment by corporate man-
agement. Settlements of campaign finance disclosure proposals are memorialized in detailed pri-
vate agreements that set the frequency, format, and substance of disclosure reports; are enforced 
by private actors; and typically are not available to other shareholders, corporate stakeholders, or 
the public. Proposal settlements are producing a body of private disclosure law that increases 
corporate transparency to advance First Amendment values and is exempt from First Amend-
ment scrutiny. The disclosure standards themselves are a mixed bag: effective at filling some 
gaps in public campaign finance disclosure law, but inadequate to make corporate electoral 
spending transparent in advance of elections. 
 As a form of private electoral regulation, the proposal settlement mechanism raises issues of 
democratic transparency, participation, accountability, and enforcement. This Article challenges 
the characterization of proposal settlements as “voluntary” corporate self-regulation, provides a 
framework for understanding settlement-related agency costs, and shows how settlement sub-
verts the traditional justifications for the shareholder proposal itself. Solutions that address the 
democratic and corporate governance problems of settlement largely overlap, suggesting a path 
forward. 
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introduction 
Tobacco giant Altria Group, Inc.’s website includes links to reports of the 
company’s political expenditures and describes them as “voluntary disclo-
sures.”
1
 Dominion Resources, Inc., one of the largest utilities in the United 
States, states on its website that it is “pleased to provide a voluntary report” of 
its political payments and provides a link to a report.
2
 Both companies, howev-
er, publicly disclose their campaign finance expenditures pursuant to a private 
agreement with an investor that specifies the format, frequency, and substance 
of the disclosure.
3
 The disclosure reports are “voluntary” only in the sense that 
they are not mandated by public law;
4
 they are mandated by private contracts 
in which the firms committed to detailed disclosure standards in exchange for 
something of value from an investor—withdrawal of a shareholder proposal 




1. Disclosures & Transparency, ALTRIA, http://www.altria.com/About-Altria/Government 
-Affairs/disclosures-transparency/Pages/default.aspx [http://perma.cc/FR33-9JPD] (“The 
use of company resources for political and public policy activities can be an important issue 
for shareholders. As such, Altria makes the following voluntary disclosures regarding these 
activities.”). 
2. Political Contributions, DOMINION, http://www.dom.com/corporate/investors/governance
/political-contributions [http://perma.cc/FPF7-8E58]. 
3. Documents memorializing the January 2010 agreement between Altria Group, Inc. and the 
Office of the New York City Comptroller are on file with the author. Altria’s current annual 
disclosures adhere to the commitments outlined in the 2010 letter. See ALTRIA, supra note 1. 
A March 2007 letter from Dominion Resources, Inc. to Trillium Asset Management memo-
rializing their agreement is on file with the author. See Dominion Resources - Disclosure of Po-
litical Contributions (2006-2007), TRILLIUM ASSET MGMT., http://www.trilliuminvest.com
/shareholder-proposal/political-contributions-8 [http://perma.cc/6U59-XZBV] (providing 
the text of the proposal with the notation “Outcome: Successfully Withdrawn”). Dominion’s 
current annual disclosures adhere to the commitments outlined in the 2007 letter, and ex-
ceed them in some regards. See Political Contributions, supra note 2. 
4. U.S. companies are not required by campaign finance laws to disclose their campaign fi-
nance expenditures directly to the public, nor are they required by federal securities law to 
report those expenditures to shareholders or the market. See 52 U.S.C. §§ 30104, 30112 
(2012) (creating a framework in which campaign finance information is reported to the Fed-
eral Election Commission (FEC), which itself communicates the information to the public); 
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending, 101 
GEO. L.J. 923, 925 (2013) (explaining that federal securities regulation currently does not re-
quire reporting companies to disclose their political spending to investors, and arguing that 
it should); infra notes 151-155 and accompanying text (describing how the most common 
categories of corporate campaign finance expenditures are disclosed to the FEC by third-
party intermediaries). 
5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2016). 
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The shareholder proposal settlement has become increasingly popular as a 
tool for negotiating private rules for corporations on matters that are, by long 
tradition, subjects of public regulation.
6
 Corporate campaign finance disclosure 
stands at the vanguard of this trend.
7
 Although reform of campaign finance 
disclosure has stalled in Congress and at various federal agencies, disclosure re-
form is steadily unfolding in a firm-by-firm program of private ordering. To-
day, much of what is publicly known about how large, publicly held companies 
spend money to influence federal, state, and local elections and ballot proposals 




6. Researchers have documented growth in the number of social and environmental share-
holder proposals made by investors in U.S. public companies since the late 1990s, as well as 
an increase in the number and proportion of social and environmental proposals that have 
settled. See Rob Bauer et al., Who Withdraws Shareholder Proposals and Does It Matter? An 
Analysis of Sponsor Identity and Pay Practices, 23 CORP. GOVERNANCE: 472, 477 tbl.1 (2015) 
(showing a small but steady rise in the number of corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
proposals “filed” from 1997 to 2009, and a more significant increase in the proportion of 
CSR proposals that were withdrawn); Lisa M. Fairfax, Making the Corporation Safe for 
Shareholder Democracy, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 53, 88-89 (2008) (describing the growth in social 
and environmental proposal activism); Kose John & April Klein, Shareholder Proposals and 
Corporate Governance 14-15 (N.Y. Univ. Stern Dep’t of Fin. Working Paper Series 1998,  
FIN-98-046, 1995), http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/finance/docs/WP/1998/pdf/wpa98046.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/L7UU-TU33] (identifying 165 “social change” proposals at S&P 500 firms 
in the year from July 1, 1991 to June 30, 1992); Key Characteristics of Prominent Shareholder-
Sponsored Proposals on Environmental and Social Topics, 2005-2011, INV. RESP. RES. CTR. INST. 
9 (Feb. 2013), http://irrcinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/FINAL-Ernst-Report 
-Feb-20131.pdf [http://perma.cc/G957-YQLS] (“During 2005-2011, the proportion of 
shareholder-sponsored resolutions on [environmental and social] topics grew by a third, 
from about 30% to 40% of all shareholder proposals going to a vote.”). Compare Randall S. 
Thomas & James F. Cotter, Shareholder Proposals in the New Millennium: Shareholder Support, 
Board Response, and Market Reaction, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 368, 381, 382-83 tbl.4 (2007) (counting 
403 social and environmental shareholder proposals that went to a vote at U.S. public com-
panies in the three-year period from 2002 to 2004), with Limor Bernstock & Enver Fitch, 
United States 2015: Proxy Season Review—Environmental and Social Issues, INSTITUTIONAL 
SHAREHOLDER SERVS. 3 (Sept. 8, 2015) [hereinafter ISS 2015 Proxy Season Review] (on file 
with author) (counting 209 social and environmental proposals that went to a vote in 2015 
alone). 
7. Proxy Preview reported that ninety-nine shareholder proposals on corporate political  
activity were submitted in the 2016 proxy season (which began in 2015), making it the  
single largest category of social and environmental proposals that year. See Record Number  
of Climate and Corporate Political Spending Resolutions Dominate 2016 Shareholder Votes,  
PROXY PREVIEW 1 (Mar. 8, 2016), http://www.proxypreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016
/03/proxy_preview_release_record_number_climate_corporate_political_spending_resolu 
tions_dominate_2016_shareholder_votes_20160308.pdf [http://perma.cc/VSU9-V3M2]. 
8. For example, corporate payments to non-disclosing 501(c) nonprofits (a form of indirect 
outside spending) are reported exclusively in corporations’ “voluntary” reports. For a primer 
on dark money spending in elections, see Dark Money Basics, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., 
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than one hundred such agreements exist, most with Standard and Poor’s 
(S&P) 500 companies, although the precise number is difficult to determine 
due to the secrecy that pervades settlement.
9
 
The phenomenon of the shareholder proposal settlement springs from the 
shareholder proposal, a mechanism through which shareholders can put quali-
fying proposals up for a full shareholder vote. In order to facilitate a sharehold-
er vote on proposed resolutions at the annual shareholder meeting, securities 
law requires a company to publish in its own proxy statement any qualifying 
resolution submitted by a shareholder. If the company can reach a private deal 
with the shareholder to withdraw the proposal, however, then the company can 
avoid including the proposal in its proxy materials. 
While shareholders may submit proposals on a wide range of topics, recent 
years have seen notable growth in social and environmental proposals. Inves-
tors submitted more shareholder proposals on social and environmental sub-
jects in 2015 than in any previous year: 474 in total, according to Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS).
10
 Forty percent of these were withdrawn before 
they went to a shareholder vote, suggesting that, in a single year, nearly 200 
were negotiated to a private agreement.
11
 The overall effect of proposal settle-
 
http://www.opensecrets.org/dark-money/dark-money-basics.php [http://perma.cc/5LRN 
-78X7]. In Wisconsin, corporations’ direct candidate contributions in state elections also are 
subject only to “voluntary” reporting, following the passage of a new campaign finance law 
in 2016. See Daniel Bice, Law Allows Political Parties To Hide Sources of Corporate  
Donations, MILWAUKEE WIS. J. SENTINEL (Jan. 8, 2016), http://www.jsonline.com/watchdog
/noquarter/law-allows-political-parties-to-hide-sources-of-corporate-donations-b99647830 
z1-364591981.html [http://perma.cc/3CFP-BKWZ]. 
9. The Center for Political Accountability (CPA), a Washington, D.C. nonprofit, has reported 
the existence of 141 investor-firm agreements with major U.S. companies that address  
the companies’ political spending and campaign finance disclosure practices. See Bruce  
Freed, Experts Give Votes of Confidence for Corporate Political Disclosure Effort, SPOTLIGHT ON  
CPA (Ctr. for Political Accountability, Washington, D.C.), Sept. 2015, at 1, http://files
.politicalaccountability.net/news/cpa-newsletters/September_2015_Newsletter.pdf [http://
perma.cc/9XSP-QE2Y]. 
10. ISS 2015 Proxy Season Review, supra note 6, at 3. Two sources for general information about 
social and environmental shareholder proposals are the annual proxy season reviews pub-
lished by ISS and the annual Proxy Preview published by the Sustainable Investments Insti-
tute (Si2) and Proxy Impact. However, for reasons discussed more fully infra note 55 and ac-
companying text, there are good reasons to suspect that these reports undercount social and 
environmental shareholder proposals that are settled. Thus, it is likely that the number of 
social and environmental shareholder proposals in 2015 exceeded 474. 
11. See ISS 2015 Proxy Season Review, supra note 6, at 3, 7. Shareholder proposals are generally 
withdrawn because the parties have reached a settlement, but there are some circumstances 
in which a shareholder might withdraw a proposal for other reasons. See id. at 8 (noting that 
“every year proponents drop a few resolutions only after it becomes clear that they are likely 
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ments is greater than their annual number suggests. Settlements commit firms 
to long-term practices that can continue years into the future, and the compa-
nies targeted for private deal making tend to be the largest S&P 500 companies, 
which have vast operations subject to the new rules and significant influence 
over their industries. 
In addition to campaign finance and lobbying disclosure, social and envi-












 the use of pesticides,
17
 the use of genetically modified organisms 
 
to lose challenges at the SEC” and identifying five of 474 social and environmental proposals 
in 2015 as having been withdrawn on that basis, all concerning the CEO pay ratio). ISS 
separately breaks out “omitted” proposals—those that the SEC has allowed a company to ex-
clude from the proxy in a no-action letter. Id. 
12. See, e.g., Shareholder Advocacy Highlights, TRILLIUM ASSET MGMT. 1 (Dec. 31,  
2015), http://www.trilliuminvest.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Shareholder-Advocacy 
-Highlights-12.31.15.pdf [http://perma.cc/EPG4-WRSY] (“Trillium recently withdrew our 
proposal at Hologic following the company’s commitment to set company-wide greenhouse 
gas reduction targets in 2016.”). 
13. See, e.g., EOG Resources—Methane Emissions—2016, TRILLIUM ASSET MGMT., http://www
.trilliuminvest.com/shareholder-proposal/eog-resources-methane-emissions-2016 [http://
perma.cc/TF27-URL7] (providing the text of a 2016 proposal at EOG Resources that was 
“[s]uccessfully withdrawn subject to the company’s commitment to disclose its methane 
emissions rate, its LDAR program, and to include methane issues in its 2016 proxy materi-
als”). 
14. See, e.g., Letter from Danielle Fugere, President, As You Sow, to Gerald A. Morton, Gen. 
Counsel, Carrizo Oil & Gas, Inc. (Feb. 26, 2016), http://www.asyousow.org/wp-content
/uploads/2016/02/EXECUTED-LTR-As-You-Sow-Carrizo-re-withdrawal.pdf [http://
perma.cc/9DF6-CE9U] (memorializing a 2016 settlement agreement with Carrizo Oil & 
Gas, Inc. addressing fracking disclosure). 
15. See, e.g., Shareholder Resolution History, WALDEN ASSET MGMT., http://www
.waldenassetmgmt.com/investing-for-Change/shareholder_resolution_history [http://
perma.cc/WR57-HAHS] (listing 2012 proposals at Qualcomm and Sysco requiring disclo-
sure on “water risk in supply chain” that were “[w]ithdrawn with agreement”). 
16. See, e.g., WhiteWave—Palm Oil Impacts—2016, TRILLIUM ASSET MGMT., http://www
.trilliuminvest.com/shareholder-proposal/whitewave-palm-oil-impacts-2016 [http://
perma.cc/ZC55-3V8B] (providing the text of a 2016 proposal at The WhiteWave Foods Co. 
that was “[s]uccessfully withdrawn subject to the company’s commitment to sustainably 
and responsibly source palm oil”). 
17. See, e.g., The Hain Celestial Group—Pesticide Disclosure and Policies (2014), TRILLIUM  
ASSET MGMT., http://www.trilliuminvest.com/shareholder-proposal/hain-celestial-group 
-pesticide-disclosure-policies-2015 [http://perma.cc/RWE6-8S6A] (providing the text of a 
2014 proposal to the Hain Celestial Group that was “[s]uccessfully withdrawn following a 
commitment from the company to include information on their pesticide use in their next 
Corporate Sustainability Report”). 






 corporate board diversity,
20
 discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation,
21
 data privacy and security,
22
 fair employment and 
labor issues,
23
 fair housing and fair lending laws,
24
 the use of nanomaterials,
25
 
recycling and waste management,
26




18. See, e.g., Shareholder Resolution History, supra note 15 (listing a 2002 proposal to Tricon Glob-
al Restaurants demanding a report on the impacts of genetically engineered food that was 
“[w]ithdrawn with agreement”). 
19. See, e.g., Nordstrom—Human Rights—2016, TRILLIUM ASSET MGMT., http://www
.trilliuminvest.com/shareholder-proposal/nordstrom-human-rights-2016 [http://perma.cc
/J5LZ-4SGZ] (providing the text of a 2016 proposal at Nordstrom that was “[s]uccessfully 
withdrawn following the company’s commitment to disclose the progress it has made to 
curtail human rights violations in its supply chain by the end of the second quarter of 
2016”). 
20. See, e.g., Shareholder Advocacy Highlights, supra note 12, at 3 (“We are delighted that we were 
able to successfully withdraw a proposal at Palo Alto Networks following a commitment to 
update its governance documents to encourage board diversity.”). 
21. See, e.g., First Republic Bank—LGBT—2016, TRILLIUM ASSET MGMT., http://www
.trilliuminvest.com/shareholder-proposal/15462 [http://perma.cc/EB7W-68ZL] (providing 
the text of a 2016 proposal at First Republic Bank that was “[s]uccessfully withdrawn fol-
lowing the company’s amendment to its [Equal Employment Opportunity] policy to include 
sexual orientation and gender identity”). 
22. See, e.g., Priceline Group—Privacy and Data Security (2015), TRILLIUM ASSET  
MGMT., http://www.trilliuminvest.com/shareholder-proposal/priceline-group-privacy-data 
-security-2015 [http://perma.cc/25CZ-RHKA] (providing the text of a 2015 proposal at 
Priceline Group that was “[s]uccessfully withdrawn after the company committed to update 
its Board’s Audit Committee charter and proxy materials to include responsibility regarding 
regulatory, legislative, and reputational privacy and data security risks that confront the 
company”). 
23. See, e.g., First Republic Bank—LGBT—2016, supra note 21. 
24. See, e.g., Shareholder Resolution History, supra note 15 (listing 2001 proposals to Citigroup and 
Lehman Brothers requiring steps to “prevent predatory lending” that were “[w]ithdrawn 
with agreement”). 
25. See, e.g., Letter from Danielle R. Fugere, President & Gen. Counsel, As You Sow, to  
Richard Emmett, Senior Vice President, Corp. Sec’y & Gen. Counsel, Dunkin’ Brands  
Grp. (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.asyousow.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/dunkin-2015 
-nanomaterials-withdrawal.pdf [http://perma.cc/PQ4Q-25V8] (memorializing a 2015 set-
tlement agreement with Dunkin’ Brands Group regarding the use of titanium dioxide in 
powdered sugar in donuts). 
26. See, e.g., Shareholder Resolution History, supra note 15 (listing a 2010 proposal at PepsiCo on 
“beverage container recovery and recycling” that was “[w]ithdrawn with agreement”). 
27. See, e.g., Letter from Danielle Fugere, President, As You Sow, to Jill Granat, Gen.  
Counsel & Corp. Sec’y, Rest. Brands Int’l Inc. (Mar. 10, 2016), http://www.asyousow.org 
/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Restaurant-Brands-As-You-Sow-Withdrawal-Agreement 
-Signed-20160309.pdf [http://perma.cc/GY4L-M2ZW] (finalizing a 2016 settlement 
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bee and pollinator welfare.
28
 Many proposal settlements commit firms to in-
formation gathering, analysis, and public disclosure, producing private infor-
mation-forcing rules that are not subject to First Amendment scrutiny. 
The aim of this Article is to analyze an emerging practice that deserves 
greater recognition from the legal academy and policymakers. It uses the pri-
vate ordering of corporate campaign finance disclosure as a case study on social 
and environmental proposal settlements and assesses the implications of this 
form of private ordering for both corporate governance and public elections.
29
 
Above all, settlements of social and environmental shareholder proposals 
lack transparency: the process plays out completely behind closed doors, with 
no notice to or participation by most shareholders, other corporate stakehold-
ers, or the public. The resulting agreements are not publicly filed and are rarely 
available to those other than the parties who negotiated them. 
Because shareholder proposals can be negotiated away behind closed doors, 
they give both shareholders and managers incentives to act opportunistically, 
generating agency costs. Conflicts of interest may arise in the settlement pro-
cess between shareholder proponents and other shareholders; between officers 
and the board; and, at institutional investors, between fund managers and 
fund beneficiaries. The settlement process creates information asymmetries 
that benefit shareholder proponents at the expense of other shareholders. Ul-
timately, proposal settlements undercut the economic and noneconomic justifi-
cations for the shareholder proposal mechanism itself. 
Private disclosure law is also fragile. One of the important findings of this 
Article is that companies have often failed to comply with settlement agree-
ments on campaign finance disclosure. Enforcement of social and environmen-
tal proposal settlements suffers from several problems: a shareholder propo-
nent may be unwilling to undertake the costs of monitoring and enforcement 
after a deal is struck; federal securities regulation impedes enforcement; and 
changes in shareholding or corporate structure can effectively terminate a set-
tlement without notice to the public. The fragility of proposal settlements sug-
 
agreement with Restaurant Brands International regarding disclosures about antibiotic use 
in the meat supply chain). 
28. See, e.g., As You Sow—General Mills Shareholder Resolution Withdrawal, AS YOU  
SOW (2015), http://www.asyousow.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/AYS-General-Mills 
-Shareholder-Resolution-Withdrawal_20150626.pdf [http://perma.cc/6749-DQU5] (an-
nouncing a 2015 settlement agreement with General Mills regarding disclosures about polli-
nator decline and the protection of pollinators from exposure to pesticides). 
29. Campaign finance disclosure agreements provide an excellent case study on private social 
and environmental standard setting because they constitute one of the largest subcategories 
of investor activism on social and environmental policy. See ISS 2015 Proxy Season Review, 
supra note 6, at 1. 
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gests that the overall costs of maintaining a firm-by-firm program of private 
ordering may be greater than shareholder activists like to admit. It also tends 
both to reduce the value of the deals and to fuel mistrust between shareholders 
and managers. 
Of course, the reform of campaign finance disclosure through private or-
dering invokes unique concerns that go beyond those raised by garden-variety 
social and environmental proposals. Campaign finance disclosure reform im-
pacts electoral integrity and, ultimately, the legitimacy of our political process. 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,
30
 which insulated corporate inde-
pendent expenditures from substantive regulation by the state, left disclosure 
regulation at the core of the state’s remaining authority to regulate democratic 
elections. This Article documents the privatization of disclosure rulemaking, a 
shift that further minimizes the state’s role in regulating democracy, empower-
ing corporate managers and a subset of shareholders at the potential expense of 
the citizenry. 
This Article finds that, although standard setting through private mecha-
nisms has generated some improvements upon public campaign finance disclo-
sure law, it has mostly produced disclosure standards that are mutually benefi-
cial to the private actors who participate in the private standard setting. For 
example, the emerging trend in privately negotiated campaign finance disclo-
sure favors year-end reporting of electoral expenditures, months after Novem-
ber elections. The emerging disclosure standards fail to fill important gaps in 
public campaign finance disclosure law and may serve to channel corporate 
electoral spending toward state and local elections. 
The analysis in this Article is informed by original source material. Proposal 
settlements that set campaign finance disclosure standards come in different 
forms—some are exchanges of emails followed by a withdrawal letter, and oth-
ers are multi-page contracts signed by both parties. Very few are publicly avail-
able. Ultimately, forty-two settlement agreements that set corporate campaign 
finance disclosure standards at companies between 2009 and 2015 were ob-
tained and reviewed for this Article. Some public pension fund agreements 
were obtained through a request under New York’s Freedom of Information 
Law, while others were obtained through direct requests to settling sharehold-
ers and to a third party. Often, in exchange for settlement agreements, I prom-
ised not to quote the agreements with attribution. Where possible, I reviewed 
the terms of the settlement agreements themselves and compared them to the 
companies’ subsequent public disclosures. 
 
30. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I introduces the proposal settlement 
and explains how settlements make private law. Part II analyzes the settlement 
of shareholder proposals as an agency problem for public companies and ar-
gues that settlement subverts the traditional economic and noneconomic justi-
fications for the shareholder proposal mechanism. It also explains why settle-
ment may be emerging as a more common resolution of proposals addressing 
social and environmental issues than of proposals dealing with corporate gov-
ernance. 
Part III analyzes campaign finance disclosure settlements as private election 
lawmaking and draws some preliminary conclusions about the quality of cor-
porate disclosures that have been produced by this private law regime. This 
Part challenges the idea that corporate policies wrought through settlement are 
“voluntary” corporate self-regulation. Recognizing the proposal settlement as a 
process created and governed by federal securities regulation, Part III considers 
how effectively settlement promotes democratic transparency, participation, ac-
countability, and enforcement in the regulation of electoral transparency. 
Lastly, Part IV shows that from both a democratic perspective and a corpo-
rate governance perspective, proposal settlements must be made more trans-
parent and enforceable. It suggests how this could be accomplished, but finds 
that most securities law reforms would be half-measures. Proposal settlements 
will never facilitate broad participation of corporate stakeholders or the public, 
suggesting that democratic concerns cannot be fully mitigated. On the capital 
markets side, the high cost of firm-by-firm private ordering to achieve fragile 
policy reforms is inefficient, and the cost is imposed only upon a subset of in-
vestors. In light of these considerations, the inadequacy of privatizing corporate 
campaign finance disclosure presents a strong case for public law reform, in-
cluding an SEC disclosure mandate. Although this Article uses campaign fi-
nance disclosure as a case study, the theoretical and practical implications of its 
analysis can be applied to many other areas of the law in which “voluntary” 
corporate self-regulation plays an expanding role. 
i .  the market-based movement to reform corporate 
campaign finance disclosure 
In a market-based movement, a group of loosely coordinated institutional 
investors has waged a firm-by-firm program to reform corporate campaign fi-
nance disclosure, making significant use of the shareholder proposal settle-
ment. In the background, federal securities regulation has created the condi-
tions for settlement, has struck the balance of power between the settling 
parties, and has regulated the proposal process in ways that affect the substance 
of the resulting disclosures. The settlement agreements—detailed disclosure 
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standards that are not subject to First Amendment scrutiny—constitute an im-
portant body of private law. 
A. The Shareholder Proposal 
Under state corporate law, a shareholder may bring an appropriate matter 
to a full vote of the shareholders at the corporation’s annual meeting.
31
 Since 
1942, federal securities regulation has enhanced this mechanism by requiring a 
company to include an eligible shareholder’s proposal in its proxy statement,
32
 
which is sent to all of the company’s shareholders in advance of the annual 
shareholder meeting.
33
 This regulation, embodied in SEC Rule 14a-8, shifts the 
cost of communicating the proposal from the shareholder proponent to the 
company, and formalizes the processes of shareholder voice.
34
 
The academic literature generally divides shareholder proposals into a cor-
porate governance category and a social and environmental category. According 
to this approach, corporate governance proposals address the governance of the 
firm, including matters such as proxy access,
35
 shareholder voting, and poison 
pills.
36
 Social and environmental proposals, in contrast, seek to reform corpo-
rate social and environmental policies on a range of topics that involve third-
party interests, including consumer product safety, environmental impacts, la-




31. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (2016). 
32. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2016). A company’s proxy statement provides information on matters 
that will be decided by a shareholder vote. See generally id. § 240.14a-3 (outlining infor-
mation requirements in solicitations to security holders). 
33. Id. § 240.14a-8. 
34. As described in more detail below, the investor must meet certain eligibility requirements to 
qualify for inclusion on the proxy statement, and the proposal itself must satisfy standards 
set by the SEC. See Bonnie G. Buchanan et al., Shareholder Proposal Rules and Practice: Evi-
dence from a Comparison of the United States and United Kingdom, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 739, 763 
(2012) (discussing “the growing significance of shareholder proposals as a governance con-
trol tool”); infra note 177 and accompanying text. 
35. “Proxy access” refers to the right of shareholders in public companies to have their nominees 
to the board of directors included in the company’s proxy statement and on its proxy ballots. 
See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Insignificance of Proxy Access, 97 VA. L. REV. 
1347, 1349-50 (2011). 
36. The term “poison pill” describes a shareholder rights plan adopted as a takeover defense. See 
generally THERESE H. MAYNARD, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROB-
LEMS 541-603 (3d ed. 2013) (providing cases and background on poison pills). 
37. Political spending proposals may have elements of both corporate governance proposals and 
social and environmental proposals because they often include board oversight requirements 
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marily have focused on informational solutions to social and environmental 
problems, demanding that firms engage in information gathering, analysis, 




Importantly, most shareholder proposals—and virtually all social and envi-
ronmental proposals—are precatory, which means that they are recommenda-
tions and are not binding on management. However, as explained at greater 
length in Part II, there is significant pressure on management to implement 
winning proposals. 
Rule 14a-8 allows a company to exclude a shareholder proposal based on 
several specified grounds with the approval of the SEC’s Division of Corpora-
tion Finance in what is called a “no-action letter.”
39
 The rule has permitted 
shareholders to bring social and environmental proposals only since the 1970s, 
when language allowing the automatic exclusion of proposals “promoting gen-
eral economic, political, racial, religious, social or similar causes” was first re-




in addition to public disclosure. Thus, there has been some inconsistency in the categoriza-
tion of political spending proposals in the academic literature. Most often, however, the 
business law and finance literatures have categorized political spending proposals as “social” 
or “social issue” proposals. 
38. See Fairfax, supra note 6, at 93-94 (discussing the shift in favor of social and environmental 
proposals demanding corporate reporting and disclosure). 
39. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1)-(13) (2016) (listing exclusions). Rule 14a-8 requires a com-
pany to submit to the SEC its reasons for excluding a shareholder proposal from its  
proxy. See id. § 240.14a-8(j). The SEC responds with a no-action letter expressing an  
“informal view” about whether the company may properly exclude the proposal. See Div. of 
Corp. Fin., Informal Procedures Regarding Shareholder Proposals, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE  
COMMISSION (Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8 
-informal-procedures.htm [http://perma.cc/2LW5-FLDV]. Although no-action letters are 
not binding upon the SEC or the parties, companies typically comply with them. 
40. Rule 14a-8 was specifically amended in 1952 to allow companies to exclude a proposal made 
“primarily for the purpose of promoting general economic, political, racial, religious, social 
or similar causes.” General Rules and Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 Fed. 
Reg. 11,431, 11,433 (Dec. 18, 1952) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(1) (1963)). This lan-
guage was revised in 1972 to reach any proposal “that action be taken with respect to any 
matter, including a general economic, political, racial, religious, social, or similar cause, that 
is not significantly related to the business of the issuer.” General Rules and Regulations, Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934, 37 Fed. Reg. 23,178, 23,179 (Oct. 31, 1972) (codified at 17 
C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(2) (1973)). In 1976, the SEC eliminated this language altogether in 
favor of the “ordinary business” exclusion. General Rules and Regulations, Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 41 Fed. Reg. 52,994, 53,000 (Dec. 3, 1976) (codified at 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.14a-8(c)(5) (1977)). For a history of the SEC’s evolution on social and environmental 
proposals, see Fairfax, supra note 6, at 86 nn.179-80. In an important law review article in 
1999, Cynthia A. Williams argued that the SEC should mandate disclosure of companies’ 
 
the yale law journal 126:262  2016 
274 
day, the ordinary business exclusion allows a company to exclude a proposal 
addressing “a matter relating to the company’s ordinary business operations.”
41
 
Through its application of the ordinary business exclusion in no-action letters, 
the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance essentially determines which kinds 
of social and environmental matters are subject to shareholder oversight. The 
SEC has stated that a shareholder proposal “transcend[s]” a company’s ordi-
nary business if it “raise[s] policy issues so significant that it would be appro-
priate for a shareholder vote.”
42
 In the last few decades, the SEC has increasing-
ly been asked to judge specific social and environmental reforms as it has 
policed companies’ use of the ordinary business exclusion.
43
 
A typical shareholder proposal contains two parts: a resolution, commonly 
written in the form of a policy or standard, which shareholders are asked to ap-
 
social and environmental information, but the SEC has done little to embrace corporate so-
cial transparency, and it remains primarily a domain of private ordering. See Cynthia A. Wil-
liams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. 
REV. 1197, 1199 (1999). 
41. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(7) (2016). 
42. Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, 63 Fed. Reg. 29,106, 29,108 (May 28, 
1998). The latest battle over the ordinary business exclusion concluded in 2015. In advance 
of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.’s 2014 shareholder meeting, one of its investors had  
submitted a proposal demanding board oversight and public reporting relating to Wal-
Mart’s sale of firearms. Wal-Mart sought and obtained a no-action letter from the SEC on  
the grounds that the proposal addressed the company’s ordinary business operations, and 
the Third Circuit resolved subsequent litigation in Wal-Mart’s favor. See Trinity Wall St. v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 323 (3d Cir. 2015), cert. dismissed, 136 S. Ct. 499 (2015); SEC 
Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14H (Oct. 22, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb14h.htm 
[http://perma.cc/4AJ3-932D]; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Revitalizing SEC Rule 14a-8’s 
Ordinary Business Exemption: Preventing Shareholder Micromanagement by Proposal (UCLA 
Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 16-06,  
2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2750153 [http://perma.cc
/D8VM-DGQW] (critiquing the Trinity decision and proposing an alternative test in apply-
ing the ordinary business exclusion). 
43. For example, in 2012, the SEC issued a no-action letter to AT&T, Inc., in which it treated 
two proposals received by the company—one addressing electoral expenditures and the oth-
er lobbying expenditures—as “substantially duplicative.” AT&T Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 
2012 WL 748855 (Mar. 1, 2012). The SEC allowed AT&T, Inc. to exclude a lobbying proposal 
from its proxy on that basis. See id.; see also Wellpoint, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2013 WL 
838391 (Feb. 20, 2013) (treating campaign finance proposal and lobbying proposal as “sub-
stantially duplicative”). In 2013, the SEC recognized that lobbying expenditures and elec-
toral expenditures are different, facilitating a rapid rise in the number of separate lobbying 
proposals that have been brought, settled, and voted on. See, e.g., Letter from Ted Yu, Senior 
Special Counsel, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to Thomas S. Moffatt, CVS Caremark Corp., 
2013 WL 178208 (Mar. 15, 2013). 
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prove, and an explanatory statement in support of the resolution.
44
 A nonprofit 
organization, the Center for Political Accountability (CPA), offers a proposal 
template that addresses corporate campaign finance disclosure;
45
 the template 
is widely used.
46
 The template reduces costs for the shareholder proponent and 
helps make policies consistent across companies.
47
 The CPA has taken a lead-
ing role in coordinating shareholder activism on campaign finance disclosure, 
identifying corporate targets, promoting its proposal template directly to insti-
tutional investors, and providing information and advice to shareholder pro-




44. Throughout this Article, I adopt the SEC’s convention and use the term “shareholder pro-
posal” to mean both the resolution and the statement in support. 
45. The CPA’s template demands semi-annual reporting of:  
[p]olicies and procedures for making, with corporate funds or assets, contribu-
tions and expenditures (direct or indirect) to (a) participate or intervene in any 
political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public 
office, or (b) influence the general public, or any segment thereof, with respect to 
an election or referendum”; and “[m]onetary and non-monetary contributions 
and expenditures (direct and indirect) used in the manner described [above], in-
cluding: [t]he identity of the recipient as well as the amount paid to each; and . . . 
[t]he title(s) of the person(s) in the Company responsible for decision-making.  
  CPA 2015 Shareholder Proposal Template, CTR. FOR POL. ACCOUNTABILITY (2015) (on file with 
the author). 
46. In 2014, the Sustainable Investments Institute reported that forty-nine of fifty-two share-
holder proposals on electoral spending disclosure that year had followed the CPA template. 
See Heidi Welsh, Mid-Year Review: Corporate Political Activity Proposals in the 2014 Proxy Sea-
son, SUSTAINABLE INVS. INST. 15 (Aug. 28, 2014), http://si2news.files.wordpress.com/2014/08
/si2-2014-proxy-season-mid-year-review-corporate-political-activity-excerpt.pdf [http://
perma.cc/9S3E-SV4B]. 
47. The CPA’s annual Index of Corporate Political Disclosure and Accountability promotes more 
detailed disclosure standards. These include semi-annual reporting of corporate expendi-
tures on a “dedicated political disclosure web page found through search or accessible within 
three mouse-clicks from [the] homepage,” archiving of reports “at least for the past five 
years,” and disclosing several categories of information that are subject to mandatory disclo-
sure under campaign finance laws, including contributions to candidates, parties, and com-
mittees, payments to 527 groups such as Super PACs, and direct independent expenditures. 
The 2014 CPA-Zicklin Index of Corporate Political Disclosure and Accountability, CTR. FOR POL. 
ACCOUNTABILITY 28 (Sept. 24, 2014) [hereinafter 2014 CPA-Zicklin Index], http://files
.politicalaccountability.net/2014_CPA-Zicklin_Index_PDF.pdf [http://perma.cc/9VGG 
-4G5D]. The Index also promotes disclosure of “payments made to influence the outcome of 
ballot measures, including recipient names and amounts given.” Id. 
48. As we shall see in Part III, the CPA also takes a leading role in monitoring firm compliance 
with settlement agreements. Shareholder activism on other social and environmental sub-
jects is often coordinated by other nonprofit organizations. For example, the Investor  
Environmental Health Network coordinates institutional activism on toxic substances,  
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this way, the nonprofit CPA absorbs many of the costs of activism that would 
otherwise be borne by individual shareholders. 
The proposal process begins when an investor prepares a formal sharehold-
er proposal for inclusion in a public company’s annual proxy statement. This is 
often done simply by customizing the CPA’s template. Although the academic 
literature typically describes shareholders “filing” proposals, proposals are not 
filed with the SEC or another governmental agency, but instead are delivered to 
the firm’s principal executive office.
49
 Upon receipt, the company must deter-
mine whether the proposal complies with the many procedural requirements of 
Rule 14a-8 and, if it does not, must allow the shareholder proponent an oppor-
tunity to cure certain defects.
50
 Thus, from the earliest stages of the process, 
corporate management oversees the submission process, identifying excludable 
proposals and communicating with shareholders. 
Although shareholder proposals have generally promoted progressive social 
and environmental policies, this political imbalance has started to change. In 
2015, an investor-sponsored proposal at Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan Chase 
demanded that the companies adopt a policy to “exert maximum influence over 
the political process to control government and further the self-interest of the 
corporation.”
51




such as pesticides. See INV. ENVTL. HEALTH NETWORK, http://iehn.org/home.php [http://
perma.cc/WMT3-XQAP]. 
49. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(e)(2) (2016). 
50. For example, a shareholder must include with the proposal a statement that it intends to 
continue ownership of its shares through the date of the meeting at which the vote would 
occur. See id. § 240.14a-8(b). If a shareholder fails to include this statement, it must remedy 
the deficiency within fourteen days of notification from the company. See id. § 240.14a-8(f). 
Failure to remedy this and other procedural deficiencies allows the company to exclude the 
proposal and treat it as a nullity. Id. 
51. The proposals at Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan Chase were slightly different and requested 
that the companies’ boards of directors adopt several policy principles. For example, the 
Goldman Sachs proposal included this principle: “A corporation should maximize share-
holder value, regardless of the consequences such conduct may have on natural persons of 
any local, state or national jurisdictions.” Letter from Sanford J. Lewis to the Sec. & Exch. 
Commission (Jan. 26, 2015), attached as an exhibit to Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., SEC No-
Action Letter, 2014 WL 7406246 (Feb. 13, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf 
-noaction/14a-8/2015/johnharrington021315-14a8.pdf [http://perma.cc/4F3C-CK6A]; 
JPMorgan Chase & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2015 WL 737682 (Feb.  
18, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2015/harringtoninvest
mentsjp021815-14a8.pdf [http://perma.cc/9YXJ-BKNU]; ISS 2015 Proxy Season Review, su-
pra note 6, at 12. ISS described these proposals as “ironic.” ISS 2015 Proxy Season Review, su-
pra note 6, at 12. Both proposals were excluded from the companies’ proxy statements as re-
lating to the companies’ “ordinary business.” 
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and Apple and Google each received two proposals filed by skeptics of climate 
change.
53
 The emergence of pro-business social and environmental proposals 
suggests that, in the future, the proposal process may become a more highly 
contested arena for the reform of corporate social and environmental policies.
54
 
B. Study of Proposal Settlements 
Settlement of a proposal ensures that the proposal will not find its way into 
the public record. Withdrawn proposals are not filed with the SEC. There is no 
registry or collection of proposals that have been settled, no list of companies 
that have settled proposals, and no central repository of settlement agree-
ments.
55
 The lack of transparency around proposal settlements creates signifi-
cant challenges for their study.
56
 As one consequence, it is not even possible to 
 
52. ISS 2015 Proxy Season Review, supra note 16, at 16. The proposal went to a vote and received 
4.8% shareholder support. Id. 
53. Id. at 21. 
54. See Heidi Welsh & Michael Passoff, Proxy Preview 2016, PROXY PREVIEW 59-60 (Feb.  
17, 2016), http://www.proxypreview.org/download-proxy-preview-2016 [http://perma.cc
/5EAV-XF2Y] (identifying ten proposals from “politically conservative groups” in the 2016 
proxy season). 
55. The CPA maintains some settlement-related documents for settlements that utilized its pro-
posal template. Separately, the Society of Corporate Secretaries maintains a shareholder 
proposal database for its members, but it does not contain a comprehensive collection of 
proposals received by U.S. public companies. A number of organizations, such as Institu-
tional Shareholder Services (ISS) and the Sustainable Investments Institute, publish proxy 
season reports that tally withdrawn shareholder proposals. Proxy season reviews provide 
only rough estimates of the number of settlements in a given year. This is because, if a pro-
posal is not published in the proxy statement, third-party organizations learn of it only if the 
shareholder proponent or the target company tells them about it, or if it is referenced in a 
no-action letter request to the SEC. For this reason, proxy season reports of withdrawn 
shareholder proposals may undercount the true number of withdrawn proposals. 
56. In a 2016 blog post, a retail investor and proponent of shareholder proposals, James 
McRitchie, explained this concisely:  
[D]uring the past year I reached agreements with several companies to withdraw 
proxy access proposals, based on agreements reached with companies. In most 
cases, few would ever know because the companies usually put out a press release 
announcing their recently adopted bylaws and credit is never given to a share-
holder proposal for prompting such action.  
  James McRitchie, Who Withdraws Shareholder Proposals?, CORP. GOVERNANCE (Jan. 21, 
2016), http://www.corpgov.net/2016/01/who-withdraws-shareholder-proposals [http://
perma.cc/QN9E-8J9K]. 
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state with certainty the number of social and environmental shareholder pro-
posals that were submitted in any particular year.
57
 
In background interviews for this Article,
58
 representatives of investor ac-
tivists described their execution of detailed written agreements with public 
companies to settle shareholder proposals on campaign finance disclosure. I set 
out to collect these agreements and, through requests to settlement participants 
and third parties (and one request to a particular investor under New York’s 
Freedom of Information Law), gathered primary documents
59
 that pertained to 
approximately 120 companies and dated as far back as 2005.
60
 A number of set-
tlement participants declined to provide agreements and expressed the view 
that written transparency agreements between a shareholder and a public com-
pany are private documents. Ultimately, I documented forty-two settlement 
agreements made between 2009 and 2015. Only agreements that memorialized 
a specific disclosure commitment in exchange for the withdrawal of a share-
holder proposal were included in this set.
61
  
These agreements do not constitute a representative sampling of agree-
ments from that period; they are simply all of the agreements I was able to ob-
 
57. For example, ISS put the total number of shareholder proposals submitted for shareholder 
meetings held in 2015 at 474. ISS 2015 Proxy Season Review, supra note 6, at 3. Proxy Preview 
counted 433 social and environmental proposals submitted as of February 17, 2015. See Heidi 
Welsh & Michael Passoff, Proxy Preview 2015, PROXY PREVIEW 8 (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www
.proxypreview.org/download-proxy-preview-2015 [http://perma.cc/76TU-CFYZ]. 
58. Interviews of representatives of institutional investors, public companies, and third-party 
organizations were conducted between August and October of 2015, subject to agreement 
that the interviewees’ statements were not for attribution. 
59. Most documents were obtained from the CPA, which maintains a partial archive of proposal 
settlement documents; other documents were obtained from institutional investors and the 
internet. These included press releases issued by deal participants, proxy statements and re-
quests for no-action letters on SEC.gov, proposals and proposal responses, negotiation doc-
uments, draft policies, and agreements. 
60. Agreements and related materials that were voluntarily contributed by deal participants and 
third parties were obtained for research purposes only and are not quoted for attribution 
herein. 
61. The reduction of documents relating to approximately 120 companies to a set of forty-two 
settlement agreements should not be understood to mean that only forty-two settlements 
occurred from 2009 to 2015. Evidence from the documents, the public record, and back-
ground interviews suggest that many more proposal settlements were reached during this 
time. However, I was able to obtain only incomplete documentation of these other settle-
ments. For an example of a contract between an investor and a company that settled a share-
holder proposal by setting campaign finance disclosure standards, see Letter from Evan  
S. Jacobson, Special Counsel, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to Ronald O. Mueller, at Ex. A  
(Mar. 5, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2014/asyousow03
0514-14a8.pdf [http://perma.cc/KSF5-CMGC].  
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tain. In order to obtain agreements, I often promised not to attribute specific 
language or details from the agreements to particular companies and investors. 
I found that settlement participants hesitated to share settlement agreements, 
even for academic research purposes, without such a promise; some investors 
declined to make agreements and related documents available for my research 
even with such a promise. 
The forty-two agreements set campaign finance disclosure standards at for-
ty-one public companies
62
 across a range of sectors and industries.
63
 Four of 
the forty-two agreements were memorialized in one document with signature 
lines for each party. Many other agreements took the form of a memorandum 
of understanding or a letter on the company’s letterhead summarizing the deal, 
accompanied by a withdrawal letter from the investor, also sometimes summa-
rizing the deal.
64
 The documents revealed that investors and companies hag-
gled over minute details of disclosure policies; in some cases, there was evi-
dence of significant back-and-forth negotiation.
65
 Together, the forty-two 
agreements constitute a body of private disclosure law that forces information 
about corporate electoral spending into the public domain. 
C. Standard Setting Through Private Settlement 
Rule 14a-8 does not address the withdrawal of proposals or regulate settle-
ments.
66
 Nonetheless, settlement of proposals has become a common practice. 
 
62. In the case of one company, two agreements with two different investors, several years apart, 
were obtained. 
63. Agreements involved eight companies in the consumer staples sector; six in the consumer 
discretionary sector; five each in the materials and financials sectors; four each in the energy 
and health care sectors; three in the technology sector; and two each in the utilities, indus-
trials, and communications sectors. 
64. In some cases, the parties memorialized their deals through email correspondence, and also 
used email to notify withdrawal. 
65. For example, emails related to a 2010 agreement between an S&P 500 company and a public 
pension fund reveal that the company initially sought to disclose payments to trade associa-
tions “in which it pays dues or makes other payments in excess of $100,000 per year,” and 
that the pension fund successfully negotiated this payment threshold down to $50,000. 
Email exchanges between [company] and [investor] (Mar. 21-23, 2010) (on file with the au-
thor). 
66. The SEC has amended Rule 14a-8 numerous times since 1942 without addressing settle-
ment. It is, however, aware of the practice. In 1982, in a proposed rulemaking, the SEC 
acknowledged that proposals were sometimes “withdrawn after consultation between the 
proponent and the issuer’s management.” See Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, 47 Fed. Reg. 
47,420 (proposed Oct. 26, 1982); see also Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, 
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Settlement negotiations take place during the window of time before the proxy 
statement is published, typically over several months, through correspondence 
and phone conferences in which the shareholder proponent and the target firm 
haggle over details of a firm policy change. Participation is generally limited to 
representatives of the investor and representatives of the firm. In a few cases, 
the nonprofit CPA has participated directly in negotiations that led to a cam-
paign finance disclosure settlement between an investor and a firm. The tenor 
of the negotiations is generally not antagonistic, and the parties are not com-
pletely at arms-length. A company’s shareholders and managers are part of the 
same corporate enterprise and, in theory and often in practice, are oriented to-
ward the same basic goal of maximizing firm value. 
If the parties reach an agreement to settle the proposal, it is memorialized 
in writing, and may be as formal as a contract signed by both parties or as in-
formal as an exchange of emails. Campaign finance disclosure is a complicated 
subject and the settlements reviewed for this Article were lengthy and detailed, 
often borrowing defined terms from federal campaign finance law or the Inter-
nal Revenue Code. The typical settlement of a political spending proposal re-
quires the company to make annual or semiannual disclosures of at least some 
of its election-related expenditures on its public website.
67
 
Most shareholder proposals on political spending have been submitted by 
institutional investors.
68




62 Fed. Reg. 50,682, 50,702 (proposed Sept. 26, 1997) (“We understand that in some in-
stances management has made concessions to shareholders in return for the withdrawal of a 
proposal.”). 
67. For an example of a company’s public website disclosures, see Political Activities  
Disclosure, CONAGRA FOODS, http://www.conagrafoods.com/investor-relations/corporate 
-governance/political-activity-disclosure [http://perma.cc/XW3Y-HEXU], which displays 
ConAgra Foods, Inc.’s public webpage for political spending disclosures. ConAgra’s disclo-
sure commitment was made in a 2015 proposal settlement with a City of Philadelphia pen-
sion fund. ConAgra’s disclosure webpage provides information about its contributions to 
state and federal candidates and political committees, its independent expenditures, its 
payments “to participate in State ballot initiatives,” and the activities of its Separate Segre-
gated Fund, the ConAgra Foods Good Government Association, which is a federal PAC 
funded by its employees. Id. 
68. Institutional investors include pension funds, mutual funds, banks, insurance companies, 
and hedge funds and are distinguishable from retail, mom-and-pop investors. See generally 
Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7-
9 (1987). 
69. SRI funds seek to advance socially and environmentally beneficial outcomes through their 
investment activities, most commonly by selecting an investment portfolio with the use of 
“ethical or ‘values-based’” metrics. See Virginia Harper Ho, “Enlightened Shareholder Value”: 
Corporate Governance Beyond the Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, 36 J. CORP. L. 59, 82 (2010). 
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lowed by public pension funds, are among the most active investors submitting 
such proposals.
70
 Unions have submitted proposals on campaign finance dis-
closure roughly half as often as public pension funds.
71
 An analysis of share-
holder proposals on corporate political activity submitted between 2007 and 
2013 found that the most active institutional investors were the New York City 
Pension Funds (fifty-two proposals), the New York State Common Retirement 
Fund (forty-four proposals), Trillium Asset Management (twenty-nine pro-
posals), Walden Asset Management (twenty-three proposals), Northstar Asset 
Management (twenty proposals), and the American Federation of State, Coun-
ty, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) Pension Plan (nineteen proposals).
72
 




Negotiated standards have required disclosure of information such as a 
company’s contributions to support or oppose candidates in state elections;
74
 
its payments in connection with state and local ballot initiatives; and its direct 
and indirect independent expenditures in both federal and state elections, in-
cluding payments to 501(c) nonprofit organizations, which would not other-
wise be disclosed under public law requirements.
75
 Some agreements have em-
 
70. Geeyoung Min & Hye Young You, Political Origins of Shareholder Activism: Corporate  
Political Spending and Shareholder Proposals 15 tbl.1 (Va. Law & Econ. Research Paper No.  
15, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2601181 [http://perma.cc
/DH4P-FGJ5] (noting that between 2007 and 2013, private investment funds sponsored 164 
shareholder proposals on corporate political activity, followed by public pension funds with 
129 shareholder proposals on the subject). 
71. Id. 
72. Id. app. B, tbl.6 (providing data in a chart entitled “Top Five Shareholders in Terms of 
Number of Proposal[s] Submitted”). 
73. The layer of intermediation between fund investors and fund managers, and the fiduciary 
obligations of fund advisers, introduce agency considerations to proposal settlements that 
are addressed in Part II. 
74. Election law distinguishes between “contributions” and “independent expenditures,” and 
private campaign finance disclosure standards have adopted the distinction. In broad terms, 
a “contribution” is a donation to a candidate or party committee, while an “independent ex-
penditure” is a payment for a political communication that has not been coordinated with a 
candidate or party committee. Under federal law, corporations are prohibited from making 
contributions in federal elections, 52 U.S.C. § 30118 (2012), but may make direct and indirect 
independent expenditures. In practice, businesses very rarely make direct independent ex-
penditures. Businesses mainly engage in election-related spending through indirect inde-
pendent expenditures, primarily by making donations to Super PACs and 501(c) nonprofit 
organizations. See Sarah C. Haan, Opaque Transparency: Outside Spending and Disclosure in 
Privately-Held Business Entities in 2012 and Beyond, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 1149, 1158-60 (2014). 
75. As described more fully in Section III.C, the agreements typically commit companies to dis-
close limited information about payments to 501(c) nonprofits. Under the agreements, 
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ployed reporting thresholds; for example, one company agreed to report only 
“a cumulative total for all contributions and expenditures related to state or lo-
cal-level recipients . . . if such amount equals or exceeds $100.”
76
 
The agreements have included specific provisions addressing, among other 
things, when the first disclosure report will be posted, how frequently disclo-
sures will be updated, whether the party affiliations of recipients will be dis-
closed, the use of hyperlinks to federal and state agency websites, the posting of 
the company’s political spending and disclosure policies on its website, disclo-
sure of the company’s “rationale and strategy” for engaging in the political pro-
cess,
77
 disclosure of “[t]he basic decision making process” for expenditure deci-
sions,
78




Agreements have also committed firms to implement corporate governance 
practices that relate to political spending and disclosure, such as board over-
sight of political spending
80




many companies report only payments to 501(c) nonprofits that are deemed non-deductible 
under section 162(e)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, as reported to the companies by the 
nonprofits themselves, and many companies further limit their disclosures by employing a 
high-dollar reporting threshold. 26 U.S.C. § 162(e)(1) (2012); see infra Section III.C. 
76. Letter from [company] to [investor] 1 (Jan. 19, 2011) (on file with author). Reporting 
thresholds for candidate contributions vary state by state and many are lower than $100; the 
parties apparently sought to use this provision to standardize the company’s reporting obli-
gations across states and to impose a higher threshold than some states employ. 
77. Letter from [company] to [investor] (Jan. 20, 2012) (on file with author). 
78. Letter from [company] to [investor] (Jan. 15, 2010) (on file with author). 
79. See, e.g., Letter from [company] to [investor] (Mar. 27, 2009) (on file with author) (memo-
rializing an agreement to identify publicly company employees with decisional authority 
over corporate political contributions). Investor activists who use the term “political spend-
ing” to describe the subject of their activism generally exclude lobbying disclosure and over-
sight, and the CPA’s advocacy efforts have not extended to lobbying disclosure. Some cam-
paign finance disclosure settlement agreements have addressed lobbying disclosure, 
however. 
80. See, e.g., Letter from [company] to [investor] (Mar. 22, 2013) (on file with author) (memo-
rializing the company’s commitment to “revise our Governance Committee Charter to refer-
ence that the Governance Committee [of the Board of Directors] exercises oversight over 
political activities, including political fundraising and contributions”). The CPA considers 
board oversight essential to its work on corporate political spending and promotes board 
oversight through its proposal template, its CPA-Zicklin Index of Corporate Political  
Disclosure and Accountability, and its advocacy work. See The 2015 CPA-Zicklin Index of  
Corporate Political Disclosure and Accountability, CTR. FOR POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY (Oct.  
8, 2015) [hereinafter 2015 CPA-Zicklin Index], http://files.politicalaccountability.net/index
/CPA-Zicklin_Index_Final_with_links.pdf [http://perma.cc/7UF7-VT4Q]. 
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Some agreements have committed firm management to internal analyses of the 
company’s political spending without a disclosure element; these agreements 
have sometimes specified that management will have future, private discus-
sions about findings or practices with the shareholder proponent.
82
 
In exchange for the company’s written commitment to specific disclosure 
practices, the investor formally withdraws the shareholder proposal.
83
 The 
agreement may state that the company’s commitment is expressly “conditioned 
on” or “in consideration for” the withdrawal. The investor may agree to more 
than the simple withdrawal of the proposal; for example, one agreement speci-
fied that “[Investor] may make a public statement regarding [Company’s] 
adoption of the policy, citing the respectful and constructive dialog that led to 
this resolution. [Investor] will give [Company] an opportunity to review its 
public statement before publication.”
84
 
A shareholder’s withdrawal of a proposal means that other shareholders 
and the public will likely never see it. A withdrawn proposal is not published in 
the company’s proxy statement nor submitted for a shareholder vote, and there 
will be no trace of it on EDGAR, the SEC’s database of public company fil-
ings.
85
 Settlement agreements also typically remain private. In only two identi-
 
81. See, e.g., Letter from [company] to [investor] (Dec. 22, 2010) (on file with author) (memo-
rializing an agreement to amend the company’s Code of Conduct to require senior manage-
ment approval of political spending). 
82. See, e.g., Letter from [company] to [investor] (Nov. 3, 2009) (“We would also envision, and 
welcome, periodic meetings with you throughout each year in order for us to update each 
other on developments in the area of political contributions and related activities.”). 
83. It is possible that shareholders could agree to other things, or additional things, to obtain a 
company’s commitment to disclosure. For example, an institutional investor could agree 
both to withdraw a shareholder proposal and to support management’s position in a share-
holder vote on another subject. However, my research turned up no evidence of additional 
shareholder commitments beyond withdrawing a proposal. See infra Part II on conflicts of 
interest and opportunism. 
84. This 2009 agreement was provided to the author with use restrictions and is on file with the 
author. Another of the forty-two agreements reviewed for this analysis specified that settle-
ment-related communication between the investor and the company would remain confi-
dential. This confidentiality provision was likely designed to address Regulation Fair Disclo-
sure (Reg. FD), which prohibits a company from selectively disclosing material nonpublic 
information but exempts “person[s] who expressly agree[] to maintain the disclosed infor-
mation in confidence.” General Rule Regarding Selective Disclosure, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 243.100(b)(2)(ii) (2016); see also Joseph W. Yockey, On the Role and Regulation of Private 
Negotiations in Governance, 61 S.C. L. REV. 171, 205-14 (2009) (exploring the role of Reg. FD 
in private negotiations between activist investors and corporate management). 
85. Some investors, like Trillium Asset Management, have published withdrawn shareholder 
proposals on their websites. See, e.g., Shareholder Proposals, TRILLIUM ASSET MGMT., http://
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fied instances has a party to a deal posted a campaign finance proposal settle-
ment agreement on the internet.
86
 In rare cases, copies of private agreements 
between investors and firms can be uncovered on the SEC’s website, as exhibits 
to withdrawn requests for no-action letters.
87
 Because the agreement docu-
ments are private, the terms of the agreement—and indeed the agreement’s 
very existence—may not be known to the company’s other shareholders, to 
other corporate stakeholders, or to the public. Some investors, however, have a 
practice of issuing a press release or posting information about a settlement on 
the internet. In such cases, it is common for the investor to describe the settle-




Settlement agreements on corporate campaign finance disclosure have be-
come commonplace at large, publicly held U.S. companies. The CPA has re-




86. See Letter from J. Stephen Gilbert, Senior Vice President & Sec’y, Valero Energy, to Patrick 
Doherty, Office of the State Comptroller of N.Y., Div. of Corp. Governance (Jan. 6,  
2015), http://www.osc.state.ny.us/press/releases/feb15/valero_agreement_political_disclos 
ure.pdf [http://perma.cc/EX6K-U8GD] (proposal settlement agreement between Valero 
Energy and the NYSCRF); The Dow Chemical Company Shareholder Resolution Withdrawal 
with As You Sow, AS YOU SOW (2014), http://www.asyousow.org/wp-content/uploads/2014 
/03/dow2014gmos_withdrawal.pdf [http://perma.cc/P398-BG2N] (proposal settlement 
agreement between The Dow Chemical Co., signed by Amy E. Wilson, Assistant Corporate 
Secretary and Managing Counsel on February 28, 2014, and As You Sow, signed by Danielle 
R. Fugere, President and General Counsel on March 3, 2014). 
87. For example, a March 9, 2015 agreement between the AFSCME Employees Pension Plan and 
Celgene Corp. can be found as an exhibit to a letter submitted by Celgene Corp. to the SEC 
to withdraw its request for a no-action letter. The agreement required Celgene Corp. to “dis-
close . . . all payments (dues and any other contributions) used for lobbying by trade associ-
ations (as reported to Celgene by the trade association as the non-deductible portion of 
those payments) for any U.S.-based trade association to which Celgene contributes $50,000 
or more annually, beginning with calendar year 2014.” Letter from Richard H. Bagger, Sen-
ior Vice President, Celgene Corp., to Charles Jurgonis, Plan Sec’y, AFSCME Emps.  
Pension Plan (Mar. 9, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2015
/afscmeemployees031015-14a8.pdf [http://perma.cc/SYT3-MKKA]. 
88. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the N.Y. State Comptroller, DiNapoli: Five Fortune  
500 Companies Reach Agreements on Corporate Political Spending (Mar. 23, 2016), 
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/press/releases/mar16/032316b.htm [http://perma.cc/BMF9 
-Y7VX] (quoting New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli, who stated that 
“[t]hese companies should be commended for agreeing to voluntarily disclose their political 
expenditures”). 
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finance disclosure practices at a major U.S. company.
89
 ISS reported that at 
least eleven proposals on political spending disclosure were withdrawn at U.S. 
companies in 2014.
90
 That year was the most successful year yet for political 
spending proposals that reached a shareholder vote: proposals at H&R Block, 
Dean Foods, and Smith & Wesson received majority shareholder support in 
2014.
91
 Perhaps in reaction to this success, in 2015, twenty public companies 
were reported to settle proposals on campaign finance disclosure.
92
 Thus, in 
the two years from 2014 to 2015, at least thirty-one proposal settlements set 
campaign finance disclosure standards at U.S. public companies.
93
 
A growing academic literature, primarily in the area of environmental law, 




89. See Freed, supra note 9; see also Bruce F. Freed & Charles E.M. Kolb, Companies that  
Favor Political Disclosure, WASH. POST (Dec. 29, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost 
.com/opinions/bruce-f-freed-and-charles-em-kolb-us-companies-shine-sunlight-on-dark 
-money/2014/12/29/f46da050-8d25-11e4-9e8d-0c687bc18da4_story.html [http://perma.cc
/E2ZE-V4GM] (“129 U.S. companies—including more than half of the S&P 100 Index—
have adopted political spending disclosure policies as a result of agreements with sharehold-
ers.”). 
90. See Limor Bernstock et al., 2014 Proxy Season Review: Environmental and Social Issues, INSTI-
TUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVS. 42 (Nov. 5, 2014) (on file with author) (identifying ten 
companies with withdrawn proposals in 2014); Welsh, supra note 46, at 15-16 (identifying 
ten companies that reached campaign finance disclosure deals that led to the withdrawal of 
shareholder proposals in 2014). In addition, in 2014, Dow Chemical reached a campaign fi-
nance disclosure agreement with a group of investors to settle a shareholder proposal that 
had asked the company to completely refrain from political spending. See Bernstock et al., 
supra, at 44; As You Sow, supra note 86. 
91. See Bernstock et al., supra note 90, at 5, 11. In addition, lobbying disclosure proposals won 
majority shareholder support in votes at Valero and Lorillard in 2014. Id. 
92. In an appendix, ISS identified sixteen companies as having withdrawn proposals on political 
spending disclosure in 2015: Allscripts Healthcare, Cerner, Delta Airlines, Eastman Chemi-
cal, EOG Resources, FMC Corp., Frontier Commission, Intuit, Kansas City South, McGraw 
Hill Financial, MeadWestvaco, Public Service Entertainment, Starwood Hotels, Thermo 
Fisher, U.S. Steel, Wyndham Worldwide. Bernstock & Fitch, supra note 6, app. I, at 36-37. 
Other sources suggest proposal settlements occurred in 2015 at Cardinal Health, Cisco Sys-
tems, ConAgra, Symantec, and Valero Energy. 
93. The New York State Common Retirement Fund has reported proposal settlements on polit-
ical spending disclosure with twenty-six companies since 2011. See Press Release, Office of 
the N.Y. State Comptroller, DiNapoli: Five Major Companies Adopt Pension Fund’s Call for 
Transparency on Political Contributions (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.osc.state.ny.us/press
/releases/feb15/020415.htm [http://perma.cc/4CLM-VQDC]. Trillium Asset Management 
has reported twenty-four such settlements since 2006. See Shareholder Proposals, supra note 
85.  
94. See, e.g., Sarah E. Light & Eric W. Orts, Parallels in Public and Private Environmental Govern-
ance, 5 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 1 (2015); Sarah E. Light & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Pri-
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Michael P. Vandenbergh has described a “shadow law of second-order agree-
ments” between private actors—contracts between nongovernmental entities 
that are created in response to the existence or absence of agency regulation—
and has argued that such agreements comprise part of the regulatory regime 
itself.
95
 Private agreements between investors and firms that establish public 
disclosure standards are an example of such a regulatory regime. Campaign fi-
nance disclosure settlements exemplify how individual firm commitments to 
enact a standardized set of transparency rules constitute a program of private 
law. 
i i .  agency problems in proposal settlements 
Proposal settlements impose potential agency costs on target firms. This 
Part offers a framework for thinking about the costs to the firm of setting social 
and environmental policies through proposal settlements, and it shows how 
proposal settlements undercut the traditional justifications for the shareholder 
proposal mechanism. Because firms set social and environmental policies 
differently from the way that they establish rules of governance, social and en-
vironmental settlements and the policies they produce are significantly less 
transparent to other corporate stakeholders than governance settlements are. 
This difference may explain why social and environmental settlements have 
begun to outpace governance settlements. The difference in transparency 
makes social and environmental settlements more vulnerable to shareholder 
and manager opportunism and may incentivize both sides to settle for social 
and environmental policies that are minimally socially beneficial and/or mini-
mally value increasing. It also means that information about governance re-
forms is impounded swiftly into stock prices, while information about social 
and environmental policy reforms is not. 
 
vate Environmental Governance, in ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION MAKING, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Lee Paddock & Robert Glicksman eds., forthcoming 2016), http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2645953 [http://perma.cc/P5BD-BGNL]; see 
also David P. Baron, Private Politics, 12 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 31 (2003) (sketching out 
models of private conflict and resolution); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Govern-
ance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 547 (2000) (observing that “private participation in governance” 
has been “barely noticed by the public, acknowledged by politicians, or scrutinized by schol-
ars”). 
95. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2030-
34 (2005). 
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A. The Theory of the Shareholder Proposal 
In a popular theory of the firm, the shareholders’ role as residual claimants 
justifies the firm’s focus on shareholder value maximization. Because share-
holders are entitled to the residuum, they are uniquely incentivized to maxim-
ize the value of the firm for all claimants.
96
 Moreover, because shareholders 
hold diversified portfolios, they are more tolerant of risk at the firm level than a 
particular firm’s management.
97
 Both of these factors justify shareholder moni-
toring of firm performance and, in appropriate circumstances, shareholder 
course-correction through electing directors and voting on shareholder pro-
posals.
98
 The shareholder proposal mechanism is thus a key tool for sharehold-
ers to influence the firm.
99
 
Rule 14a-8 facilitates the shareholder’s use of this tool by shifting some of 
the cost of the proposal onto the firm itself.
100
 Because the benefit of share-
holder influence is enjoyed by the whole firm, the theory goes, it makes sense 
to spread the cost of shareholder proposals to the whole firm. This assumes 
that at least some shareholders make value-increasing proposals that are adopt-
ed by management, and that the net benefit to the firm of all proposal activi-
ty—including proposals that fail—exceeds the aggregate costs imposed by Rule 
14a-8. Not surprisingly, academic treatment of Rule 14a-8 has focused on 
whether the rule strikes the right balance between facilitating value-increasing 
shareholder activism and discouraging the waste of corporate resources on 
shareholder speech that is not cost-justified. 
 
96. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPO-
RATE LAW 67-68 (1991). 
97. See id. at 29-30. 
98. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 
601, 627 (2006) (“[S]hareholder voting is properly understood not as an integral aspect of 
the corporate decisionmaking structure, but rather as an accountability device of last resort 
to be used sparingly, at best.”); Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 
62 VAND. L. REV. 129, 130 (2009) (arguing that corporate law should treat voting “as a 
means of error correction for decisions”). 
99. See Fairfax, supra note 6, at 61 (arguing that the shareholder proposal process “represents a 
critical component of shareholder activism”); Virginia Harper Ho, Risk-Related Activism: 
The Business Case for Monitoring Nonfinancial Risk, 41 J. CORP. L. 647, 658 (2016) (describing 
the shareholder proposal as one of “shareholders’ primary tools to effect corporate change”). 
100. See, e.g., Thomas & Cotter, supra note 6 (describing shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8 
as “a tax on all shareholders to facilitate the voice of all shareholder proposals’ proponents”). 
The costs that are shifted from the shareholder proponent to the firm are the costs of pub-
lishing the proposal and distributing it to all of the company’s shareholders. 
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Although the shareholder proposal mechanism has generated a large vol-
ume of academic commentary over the years,
101
 the settlement of proposals has 
attracted little academic attention.
102
 Evidence suggests that the practice was 
 
101. The academic literature on shareholder proposals divides into three categories. The early 
legal literature, which developed through the 1980s, was largely theoretical, focusing pri-
marily on the purpose of the proposal mechanism in the theory of the firm. See, e.g., George 
W. Dent, Jr., Response, Proxy Regulation in Search of a Purpose: A Reply to Professor Ryan, 23 
GA. L. REV. 815 (1989); George W. Dent, Jr., SEC Rule 14a-8: A Study in Regulatory Failure, 
30 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 1 (1985); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corpo-
rate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395 (1983); Frank D. Emerson & Franklin C. Latcham, The SEC 
Proxy Proposal Rule: The Corporation Gadfly, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 807 (1952); Timothy L. 
Feagans, SEC Rule 14a-8: New Restrictions on Corporate Democracy?, 33 BUFF. L. REV. 225 
(1984); Henry G. Manne, Shareholder Social Proposals Viewed by an Opponent, 24 STAN. L. 
REV. 481 (1972); Patrick J. Ryan, Rule 14a-8, Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and Corporate 
Democracy, 23 GA. L. REV. 97 (1988); Donald E. Schwartz & Elliott J. Weiss, An Assessment of 
the SEC Shareholder Proposal Rule, 65 GEO. L.J. 635 (1977); Leila N. Sadat-Keeling, Com-
ment, The 1983 Amendments to Shareholder Proposal Rule 14a-8: A Retreat from Corporate De-
mocracy?, 59 TUL. L. REV. 161 (1984). 
    A second category of legal literature has used empirical data about shareholder pro-
posals to measure and assess their influence on firm valuation and management decision 
making. See, e.g., Buchanan et al., supra note 34; Elizabeth Glass Geltman & Andrew E. 
Skroback, Environmental Activism and the Ethical Investor, 22 J. CORP. L. 465 (1997); Alan R. 
Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Failed Experiment in Merit Regulation, 45 ALA. L. 
REV. 879 (1994); Paul Rose, Shareholder Proposals in the Market for Corporate Influence, 66 
FLA. L. REV. 2179 (2014) (reviewing empirical trends in shareholder proposals). Finally, a 
number of studies in the finance literature have investigated shareholder proposals, typically 
ignoring but sometimes including social and environmental proposals. See, e.g., Buchanan et 
al., supra note 34 (detailing an empirical study of proposals that went to a vote at U.S. and 
U.K. companies from 2000 to 2006); Cuñat et al., The Vote Is Cast: The Effect of Corporate 
Governance on Shareholder Value, 67 J. FIN. 1943 (2012) (detailing an empirical study of al-
most four thousand corporate governance proposals from 1997 to 2007); Ertimur et al., 
Board of Directors’ Responsiveness to Shareholders: Evidence from Shareholder Proposals, 16 J. 
CORP. FIN. 53 (2010) (detailing an empirical study of 620 majority-vote shareholder pro-
posals at U.S. companies between 1997 and 2004); Lilli A. Gordon & John Pound, Infor-
mation, Ownership Structure, and Shareholder Voting: Evidence from Shareholder-Sponsored Cor-
porate Governance Proposals, 48 J. FIN. 697 (1993) (detailing an empirical study of 266 
corporate governance proposals from the 1990 proxy season); Andrew K. Prevost & Ramesh 
P. Rao, Of What Value Are Shareholder Proposals Sponsored by Public Pension Funds?, 73 J. BUS. 
177 (2000) (detailing an empirical study of corporate governance proposals sponsored by 
public pension funds from 1988 to 1994, excluding withdrawn proposals); Luc Renneboog 
& Peter G. Szilagyi, The Role of Shareholder Proposals in Corporate Governance, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 
167 (2011). These studies have generally drawn conclusions about proposal activity and its 
influence on corporate management by studying only proposals that were published in the 
proxy statement and/or went to a vote. 
102. A few works of legal scholarship have acknowledged the practice of proposal settlement, or 
something similar. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institu-
tional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 828 (1992) (“[M]any companies have adopted 
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rare until recently, but settlements occurred at least as far back as the 1970s.
103
 
The most significant academic treatment of proposal settlements was authored 
by Roberta Romano in 2001 and focused on what she called “nonproxy activ-
ism” concerning traditional matters of corporate governance.
104
 Romano did 
not address social and environmental settlements, which were not then occur-
ring in the significant numbers of today. The scope of what she considered 
“nonproxy activism” went well beyond settlements and included, for example, 
a fund’s announcement that a company was on its target list.
105
 The practice in 
which an investor trades its rights under Rule 14a-8—as well as the rights of 
other shareholders to vote for the proposal or to engage management through 
competing or similar proposals—in exchange for social policy reform is an in-
novation in shareholder activism. It reflects formalized steps that are deter-
mined by federal securities law and that lead to the adoption of a written 
agreement outlining both parties’ obligations. On this basis, it should be dis-
tinguished from informal, nonproxy activism. 
In theory, if a shareholder proposal were self-evidently value increasing and 
cost justified, management would simply adopt it. There would be no need for 
the publication of the proposal in the proxy and a vote of the shareholders at 
the annual meeting. The idea that management will at least sometimes imme-
 
proposals voluntarily, to avoid a vote that they might lose.”); Fairfax, supra note 6, at 90 
(withdrawal of a proposal “signals that corporate managers and shareholders have reached 
consensus regarding the best method to address issues raised by a particular proposal”); 
Palmiter, supra note 101, at 884 n.19 (referencing investors’ use of Rule 14a-8 “to reach nego-
tiated agreements with management without formally submitting proposals”); Yockey, su-
pra note 84, at 176 (noting that around the time that institutional investors make informal 
overtures to a target company, they “will often submit a formal shareholder proposal on the 
issues they seek to address during the jawboning process”). 
103. See Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 101, at 647 (identifying twenty-seven settled social and 
environmental proposals in the 1975-76 proxy season). 
104. See Roberta Romano, Less Is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mecha-
nism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 174, 180-81, 209-19 (2001) (discussing the 
stock price effects of various forms of “nonproxy activism” regarding traditional governance 
issues). A small number of articles in the finance literature have analyzed withdrawn share-
holder proposals. See Bauer et al., supra note 6 (studying withdrawn proposals from 1997 to 
2009); N.K. Chidambaran & Tracie Woidtke, The Role of Negotiations in Corporate Govern-
ance: Evidence from Withdrawn Shareholder-Initiated Proposals 1-2 (N.Y. Univ. Ctr. for Law  
& Bus., Working Paper #CLB-99-012, 1999), http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract
_id=209808 [http://perma.cc/MG7T-MJD2] (studying withdrawn shareholder proposals 
from 1989 to 1995); see also Michael P. Smith, Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: 
Evidence from CalPERS, 51 J. FIN. 227, 241 (1996) (studying corporate governance activism at 
fifty-one firms targeted by CalPERS from 1987 to 1993, which included twenty-six cases 
where the company “either adopted the resolution or settled the first year targeted”). 
105. Romano, supra note 104. 
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diately recognize and adopt a value-increasing proposal suggests that “infor-
mal” shareholder engagement, in which a shareholder communicates directly 
with management outside formal channels of governance, can be superior to 
“formal” shareholder engagement, which imposes greater costs on the firm. On 
this basis, informal engagement should be valued by investors and encouraged 
by rules. 
However, the existence of the shareholder proposal mechanism suggests 
that informal engagement sometimes fails—that management may occasionally 
decline to adopt a value-increasing and cost-justified proposal. Corporate man-
agers might reject a good proposal because they have poor business judgment, 
in which case shareholders should consider replacing them. Short of replacing 
the board, the shareholder proposal mechanism gives a shareholder the power 
to suggest course-correction to the board in a public forum, and it gives the 
body of shareholders the power to ratify that suggestion with a vote. This is a 
potentially powerful warning shot in the board’s direction. 
Shareholder proposals potentially serve three other important functions: 
checking the actions of conflicted directors, facilitating shareholder democracy, 
and promoting the beneficial disclosure and use of information. 
Conflicts of Interest. One justification for the shareholder proposal is that 
managers and shareholders sometimes have conflicting interests. There is good 
reason to believe that corporate political spending involves at least one major 
conflict of interest between shareholders and managers. As has long been rec-
ognized in the law and economics literature, diversified investors are interested 
not only in enhancing the value of a particular firm, but also in establishing 
rules that reduce the costs of gain-producing transactions across all firms.
106
 
Corporate managers, however, are incentivized to adopt whatever practices will 
maximize their own firm’s value. Thus, if managers can engage in political 
spending to achieve value-increasing outcomes for the firm, they will do so; 
but diversified shareholders, who recognize that an arms race of political 
spending across firms is costly to them in the aggregate, would prefer rules that 
discourage political spending. By increasing the costs of political spending, dis-
 
106. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
1416, 1441 (1989) (“A person who holds a diversified portfolio has an investment in the 
economy as a whole and therefore wants whatever social or private governance rules maxim-
ize the value of all firms put together.”); Fairfax, supra note 6, at 84 (“Diversified sharehold-
ers worry about the impact of a specific corporation’s policies on the broader society and 
market because those policies affect the value of the portfolio of shares such investors 
hold.”). 
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closure likely discourages it.
107
 For this reason, it is reasonable for diversified 
investors to favor campaign finance disclosure on purely economic grounds.
108
 
Since investors and managers have potentially conflicting interests regarding 
political disclosure, the shareholder proposal mechanism can serve an im-
portant role in promoting policies that are value-maximizing for diversified 
shareholders but might otherwise be rejected by corporate managers. 
Shareholder Democracy. The shareholder proposal mechanism gives 
shareholders what amounts to a right to weigh in and influence manage-
ment.
109
 This right is exercised first by the shareholder who makes the pro-
posal, and then by the body of shareholders who vote on it. Indeed, in the 
1950s, the shareholder proposal rule was sometimes labeled the shareholder’s 
“bill of rights.”
110
 More recently, scholars have pointed to the shareholder pro-
posal as a mechanism for the exercise of shareholders’ expressive interests in 
the corporation, particularly in connection with political spending.
111
 In this 
view, shareholders’ proposal and voting rights have significance that derives 
from their essential role in the corporation, and is independent from the eco-
nomic monitoring function that contractarian theorists assign to them. The 
idea that shareholders have a right to weigh in on a subset of important matters 
is reinforced by the SEC’s position that a proper shareholder proposal is one 
that “raises significant policy issues” that are “appropriate for a shareholder 
vote.”
112
 By this logic, some matters are simply important enough that share-
 
107. Disclosure also likely reduces the possibility that corporate managers will use a company’s 
political spending to advance their personal or political agendas. 
108. Other potential economic reasons exist for shareholders to favor campaign finance disclo-
sure, of course. These include risk monitoring and the reduction of abusive spending prac-
tices by corporate managers. 
109. Note that this right is an interesting amalgam of federal law (the right to force the corpora-
tion to publish a qualifying proposal in the proxy and distribute it to shareholders) and state 
law (the underlying right to bring appropriate matters to a shareholder vote). 
110. See, e.g., David C. Bayne et al., Proxy Regulation and the Rule-Making Process: The 1954 
Amendments, 40 VA. L. REV. 387, 388 (1954) (“[O]f special significance in this area of proxy 
regulation is the shareholder proposal rule, sometimes described as the shareholders’ bill of 
rights.” (footnote omitted)). 
111. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 83, 95-96 (2010). But see Michael D. Guttentag, On Requiring Public Compa-
nies To Disclose Political Spending, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 593, 617-19 (2014) (summariz-
ing and critiquing arguments to this effect). 
112. SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14E (Oct. 27, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal
/cfslb14e.htm [http://perma.cc/628J-ACTD]; see also Palmiter, supra note 101, at 884-85 
(arguing that Rule 14a-8 “offers a singular mechanism for investors to shape particular firms 
and the body politic to define the American corporation”). 
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holders should get a say, even if they are not in the role of ultimate decision 
maker. 
Information. An additional justification for the proposal mechanism is that 
Rule 14a-8 gives shareholders the right to “demand and receive from the man-
agement a public justification of its action.”
113
 This suggests that the share-
holder proposal involves something more than the promotion of value-
increasing proposals or the exercise of shareholders’ expressive rights. It sug-
gests that shareholders learn something of value from management’s public 
justification—the “statement of opposition” it will publish in the proxy, urging 
shareholders to vote against the proposal—and that management’s response to 
a proposal can function as an indicator of management quality.
114
 In addition, 
by facilitating information gathering, analysis, and dissemination, the proposal 




Regardless of which theory we adopt to justify the shareholder proposal, its 
ends are only served when a qualifying proposal leads to publication in the 
proxy and a shareholder vote. If proposal activism is justified by a conflict of 
interest between diversified investors and corporate managers, this will be evi-
dent only when diversified investors express their preferences as a group in the 
shareholder vote.
116
 If the role of shareholders as residual claimants justifies the 
use of the proposal mechanism as course correction, settlement prevents share-
holders from voting as an interest group. And, at companies where the board 
plays little role in proposal settlement, it compromises shareholders’ ability to 
convey their views to the board at all. Settlement prevents the exercise of the 
proposal vote as a right of shareholding or as the communication of sharehold-
 
113. Milton V. Freeman, An Estimate of the Practical Consequences of the Stockholder’s Proposal Rule, 
34 U. DET. L.J. 549, 557 (1957). 
114. See also Fairfax, supra note 6, at 91-92 (noting that the publication of social and environmen-
tal proposals in proxy statements “force[s] corporations to, at least rhetorically, address so-
cial issues”). Some scholars have also argued that Rule 14a-8 is justified as a means to dis-
courage deceptive proxy solicitations. Under this theory, management acts deceptively if it 
knows of a shareholder proposal that will be made at the meeting, but omits any mention of 
the proposal in the proxy statement. See Palmiter, supra note 101, at 893. 
115. Cf. Buchanan et al., supra note 34, at 783 (“Even though U.S. shareholder proposals are not 
binding, the process of putting the proposal to a vote in front of all shareholders can facili-
tate information aggregation and dissemination.”). 
116. Not all investors are diversified. Note also that the stakes for diversified investors may be 
high, since diversified investors cannot use exit to express their preference for disclosure be-
cause political spending is an economy-wide practice and few companies have adopted full 
disclosure. 




 It also prevents information aggregation through 
the public proposal process. If a purpose of the mechanism is to force man-
agement to publicly defend its policies and practices, this purpose is thwarted 
when proposals can be negotiated away in secrecy. Thus, in virtually all cases, 
the private settlement of a proposal undercuts the basic justifications for the 
shareholder proposal framework under Rule 14a-8. 
B. Proposal Settlements and Agency Costs 
The academic literature has tended to treat proposal settlements as a form 
of beneficial, informal shareholder activism. However, this view gets some im-
portant facts wrong. Current settlement practices generate few of the benefits 
of informal engagement while potentially imposing agency costs on the firm. 
Essentially, a range of potential conflicts of interest arise when a shareholder 
proposal can be settled in a way that keeps the details of the settlement—
indeed, the very existence of the settlement—secret from other corporate stake-
holders. Proposal settlements should thus be distinguished from other forms of 
“nonproxy” or informal activism that are largely harmless to the firm and to the 
interests of firm stakeholders. 
1. Management’s Incentives To Settle 
Why might corporate management commit the company to new social or 
environmental practices in exchange for the withdrawal of a shareholder pro-
posal, particularly if management would otherwise oppose the proposal? One 
reason is the corporate law norm that treats shareholder engagement as posi-
tive and encourages companies to be responsive to investors.
118
 Recent legal 
and market developments—such as the movement toward majority voting in 
director elections, the “say on pay” regime that went into effect in 2011, new 
limits on broker voting, the proxy access movement, and the rise of hedge fund 




117. It also prevents the proposal process from serving “as a vehicle for shareholders to organize 
and educate themselves” and to “build coalitions with other investors.” Fairfax, supra note 6, 
at 92. 
118. See, e.g., Justin Fox, How Shareholders Are Ruining American Business, ATLANTIC  
(July/Aug. 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/07/stop-spoiling-the
-shareholders/309381 [http://perma.cc/2ESC-CDJF] (discussing the ascendance of the 
“simple doctrine that the job of a chief executive is to keep shareholders happy”). 
119. For a description of developments in corporate law and practice since the early 2000s that 
have empowered shareholders, see Fairfax, supra note 6, at 61-78, 90-91 (“As managers feel 
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a climate of rising shareholder empowerment, managers may simply agree to 
accommodate shareholders’ desire for more transparency if they can do so at 
minimal cost to the firm. 
A second reason is that companies fear such proposals will succeed. Over 
the past fifteen years, the percentage of shareholder support for social and envi-
ronmental proposals that reach a vote has climbed steadily, from an average of 
7.6% in 2000 to 20.1% in 2015.
120
 Some categories of social and environmental 
proposals, including campaign finance and lobbying disclosure, have enjoyed 
much greater success.
121
 In 2014, campaign finance or lobbying proposals won 
more than 50% support at six companies, and votes at fifteen other companies 
achieved 40% to 50% shareholder support.
122
 In late 2015, the Department of 
Labor revised its guidance to expressly permit fiduciaries of private sector re-
tirement plans covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA) to take the social and environmental benefits of an investment into 
account in investment decisions.
123
 This is likely to further increase shareholder 
support for popular social and environmental proposals that go to a vote. In 
light of these trends, it is reasonable for corporate management to conclude 
that social and environmental proposals pose a real threat at the shareholder 
ballot box. 
Although social and environmental shareholder proposals are precatory, 
there is pressure on management to implement a proposal if it goes to a vote 
and is approved by more than 50% of shareholders. Among other things, ISS 
guidelines recommend a case-by-case vote on individual directors or even an 
 
greater pressure to negotiate with traditional shareholders on corporate governance issues, 
they also experience pressure to be more cooperative on these social issues.” (footnote omit-
ted)); and Yockey, supra note 84, at 181-97. 
120. ISS 2015 Proxy Season Review, supra note 6, at 5 fig.4; see also Key Characteristics of Prominent 
Shareholder-Sponsored Proposals on Environmental and Social Topics, 2005-2011, supra note 6, at 
9 (showing that the total average support for social and environmental proposals that went 
to a vote rose from 10% in 2005 to 21% in 2011). 
121. See Key Characteristics of Prominent Shareholder-Sponsored Proposals on Environmental and So-
cial Topics, 2005-2011, supra note 6, at 10 (reporting total average voting support for pro-
posals on specific social and environmental topics from 2005 to 2011). 
122. ISS 2015 Proxy Season Review, supra note 6, at 5 & fig.5. Two campaign finance disclosure 
proposals, three lobbying disclosure proposals, and one hybrid proposal won in 2014. Id. 
Among the proposals that received 40% to 50% support, eight addressed campaign finance, 
four addressed lobbying, and three were “hybrid” proposals addressing both. Id. 
123. Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Fiduciary Standard Under ERISA in Considering Eco-
nomically Targeted Investments, 29 C.F.R. § 2509 (2016). 
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entire board if the board fails to implement a winning shareholder proposal.
124
 
The threat of such an outcome may push management to view private settle-
ment as a lower-risk alternative, and one that affords management greater con-
trol over the substance of the policy than it would have if it were forced to im-
plement a winning proposal. 
A third possibility is that managers prefer to negotiate shareholder pro-
posals away to avoid “negative publicity or reputational damage” for the com-
pany, its directors, or its executives.
125
 Social and environmental shareholder 
proposals generally highlight specific societal harms caused by corporate activi-
ty, information the company would likely prefer to suppress. Investors’ cri-
tiques are particularly credible when they are published in a proxy statement 
because false statements are actionable as securities fraud. It is even possible 
that the publication of a proposal in the proxy, or a successful or near-
successful vote on a proposal, could result in a stock price effect.
126
 A company 
may conclude that it is cheaper to suppress a proposal through settlement than 
to debate its own investor about harms the company may have visited upon 
communities, customers, or employees. 
Shareholder proposals may pose particular risks for corporate leaders. An 
intriguing 2012 study found that in both the United States and the United 
Kingdom, shareholder proposals that went to a vote were associated with high-
er CEO turnover rates afterward.
127
 A firm with many shareholder proposals in 
 
124. See, e.g., United States Summary Proxy Voting Guidelines: 2015 Benchmark Policy  
Recommendations, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVS. 14, Recommendation 2.2.1 (Dec. 22, 
2014), http://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/1_2015-us-summary-voting-guidelines 
-updated.pdf [http://perma.cc/9YER-U36T] (recommending a case-by-case vote on indi-
vidual directors, committee members, or the entire board of directors if “[t]he board failed 
to act on a shareholder proposal that received the support of a majority of the shares cast in 
the previous year”); see also Chidambaran & Woidtke, supra note 104, at 1-2; Ertimur et al., 
supra note 101, at 54 (finding that a firm’s implementation of a winning governance-related 
proposal was associated with a one-fifth reduction in the probability of director turnover 
and noting that “[p]roxy voting services, governance rating agencies and shareholder activ-
ists explicitly screen firms and directors based on their responsiveness to [proposals that re-
ceive a majority vote]”). 
125. Bauer et al., supra note 6, at 474; see also Palmiter, supra note 101, at 884 (noting that “the 
embarrassment of a shareholder rebuff ” may lead managers to “negotiate settlements”); 
Yockey, supra note 84, at 183 (discussing the reputational risks of shareholder proposals). 
126. Research on stock price effects of shareholder proposals has focused exclusively on corporate 
governance proposals, or has lumped all types of proposals together. For a good summary of 
the literature on the stock price effects of shareholder proposals, see Rose, supra note 101, at 
2189-97. 
127. See Buchanan et al., supra note 34, at 796 (analyzing both corporate governance and social 
and environmental proposals). 
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its proxy statement may appear to analysts and investors to have significant in-
vestor dissatisfaction. In a recent study, Lee Harris examined “tactical settle-
ments” of contested board elections.
128
 Although such settlements do not es-
tablish firm policies,
129
 they shed light on both the incentives at play in 
investor-firm settlements and the consequences of settlement for firm govern-
ance. Harris analyzed data from 190 contested board elections from 2006 to 
2009 and found that incumbent boards with poor performance, as measured 
by stock price returns, were more likely to settle. Such settlements, Harris con-
cludes, permit underperforming managers to keep their jobs by compromising 
the ability of shareholders to discipline management through a vote.
130
 Similar 
motives may prompt managers to negotiate shareholder proposals away. For 




In addition, management may perceive litigation risk in opposing share-
holder proposals. When a shareholder proposal is included in the proxy state-
ment, corporate management generally publishes a “statement in opposition” 
to the proposal, often including in this statement specific factual assertions 
about the company’s political spending activities.
132
 If these factual statements 
are later determined to have been materially false or misleading, the company 
 
128. Lee Harris, Corporate Elections and Tactical Settlements, 39 J. CORP. L. 221, 224 (2014). 
129. Settlements of contested board elections generally involve an agreement by the challenger to 
drop the proxy contest in exchange for one or more board seats or other corporate resources. 
See id. 
130. Id. at 248. 
131. Settlement may also allow management to avoid “distraction, mental strife, and possible 
embarrassment.” John G. Matsusaka, Oguzhan Ozbas & Irene Yi, Opportunistic Proposals by 
Union Shareholders 8 (U.S.C. Gould Sch. of L. Ctr. for L. and Soc. Sci., Research Paper Series 
No. CLASS15-25, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2666064 
[http://perma.cc/L4DP-8UB9]. 
132. Rule 14a-8 limits the text of a shareholder proposal in the proxy to five hundred words, but 
provides no word limit on management’s response. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2016). 
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may face liability under Rule 14a-9.
133
 At least one company, Aetna, has been 
sued on this basis.
134
 
Finally, the settlement of shareholder proposals raises the possibility of op-
portunistic behavior by firm managers, who may agree to some of a proposal’s 
demands in exchange for the shareholder’s support in a vote on some other 
matter. Conflicts of interest are compounded when a firm’s practices allow its 
officers to settle social and environmental shareholder proposals with minimal 
(or no) board involvement. Settlement practices vary from firm to firm, but 
board approval of settlements typically is not required. Thus, if senior man-
agement believes that a proposal reveals information or raises a subject that 
could cause friction with the board, and if the firm’s practices allow it to negoti-
ate the proposal away, the firm’s officers may settle a proposal that merited 
greater board attention. In this way, settlement can divert shareholder concerns 
away from scrutiny by the board. 
2. Investors’ Incentives To Settle 
Why might an investor agree to withdraw a social or environmental pro-
posal in exchange for a company’s partial adoption of the demanded reforms? 
One reason is that, from the point of view of the socially responsible investor, 
settlement may actually be preferable to a vote because of the limits that securi-
ties regulation places on proposals. The Rule 14a-8 regime itself, which was not 
designed to facilitate social and environmental policy reforms, may actually 
channel social and environmental activism toward settlement. One example is 
Rule 14a-8’s word cap on shareholder proposals. The rule limits proposals to 
five hundred words, a length that is too short to articulate complex standards 
and that nearly forecloses the use of defined terms. A shareholder who wants 
the corporation to adopt a detailed rule must utilize a settlement agreement. 
Part III discusses this idea in greater detail. 
 
133. Id. § 240.14a-9. For example, in its 2015 proxy statement, FedEx published a “Board of Di-
rectors’ Statement in Opposition” to a shareholder proposal on campaign finance disclosure. 
In that statement, FedEx asserted that the company “does not make corporate contributions 
to groups organized under section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code, other than member-
ship dues, event sponsorships, and contributions to the organizational committees of the 
Democratic and Republican national party conventions and the annual conferences of the 
Democratic and Republican Governors Associations.” FedEx Corp., 2015 Annual Meeting of 
Stockholders (Schedule 14A), at 72 (Sept. 28, 2015). If this statement were false at the time it 
was made, it would open FedEx up to potential liability under Rule 14a-9. 
134. In 2013, Aetna became embroiled in a shareholder’s securities fraud lawsuit on this basis. See 
Complaint at 9-10, Silberstein v. Aetna, Inc. (No. 13-cv-8759) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2013), 2013 
WL 6632470. 
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Another possibility, however, is that shareholder proponents may extract 
private benefits from settlements. This can happen in a number of ways. First, 
a socially responsible investment fund’s reputation is enhanced when it can 
claim to have changed a corporation’s social or environmental policies. In fact, 
SRI funds commonly advertise their proposal settlements without divulging 
the details of the deal.
135
 This reputational benefit helps recruit new clients to 
the fund and bolsters the fund’s negotiating clout with other corporations. 
Some investors outsource their shareholder proposal activity to consultants or 
lawyers who must justify the fees they charge. The funds and their consultants 
know that the likely outcome of a shareholder vote on a social and environmen-
tal proposal is failure. Although voting trends reveal growing support for such 
proposals, most do not win 50% or more of the shareholder vote. Thus, funds 
and their consultants may perceive that the reputational benefit of settling a 
proposal for a small policy gain—a reputational benefit which the proponent 
alone will enjoy—is greater than the investor’s pro rata share of the benefits the 
whole firm will enjoy if the proposal goes to a vote.
136
 The shareholder propo-
nent’s choice to extract a private benefit by settling the proposal deprives the 
corporation’s other shareholders of a vote on a potentially socially beneficial or 
value-increasing proposal (or the chance to defeat it).
137
 
The shareholder proponent will enjoy reputational benefits even if the 
company eventually stops complying with the deal. Thus, a shareholder pro-
ponent not only has a motive to settle for watered-down social and environ-
mental policies, but has little incentive to monitor the company’s compliance or 
to enforce the settlement. Essentially, the shareholder proponent may walk 
away from the deal with an enhanced reputation at the expense of others—
fellow shareholders or third parties who stood to gain from policy reforms. 
 
135. SRI funds and public pension funds sometimes issue press releases to announce settlements, 
and many provide summary reports on their shareholder activism. These press releases and 
reports rarely provide details of the agreements struck. For an example, see The 2016 Proxy 
Season: Your Final Exam, CLEAN YIELD ASSET MGMT. (2016), http://www.cleanyield.com
/2016-proxy-season-final-exam [http://perma.co/2GPM-TCNP], which identifies with-
drawn political spending disclosure proposals in 2016 at Corning, Inc., Lincoln National, 
and Southern Company; notes “agreement reached”; and provides no details about the 
terms of the agreement. 
136. The fund or fund manager, rather than the beneficiaries of the fund, enjoys the reputational 
benefit, highlighting the potential divergence of interests between fund managers and fund 
beneficiaries. For a thoughtful discussion of the agency costs of fund intermediation, see 
Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors 
and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 889-95 (2013). 
137. See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, The Future of Shareholder Democracy, 84 IND. L.J. 1259, 1296 (2009) 
(discussing the possibility that shareholder empowerment “may confer power on sharehold-
ers whose interests diverge from those of the broader shareholder class”). 
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Second, shareholders may bring a proposal solely for the purpose of bar-
gaining it away, or to put pressure on management to accede to a different de-
mand.
138
 A proposal that highlights societal harms caused by the company may 
be a powerful bargaining chip for a shareholder, particularly if corporate man-
agement fears negative publicity or already stands in a weakened position. 
Lastly, proposal settlements also create informational asymmetries. In the 
process of negotiating a social or environmental proposal, for example, a 
shareholder proponent may learn information that the firm’s management con-
siders non-material, but that is nonetheless of interest to some shareholders. 
Shareholder proponents obtain information about management quality during 
the negotiation process that may be valuable in its own right. Shareholder press 
releases that announce a withdrawn proposal typically commend corporate 
management for its responsiveness to shareholder concerns; depending on the 
negotiations and their outcome, such signals of management quality may be 
misleading. Finally, in the typical case, only the shareholder proponent is in a 
position to evaluate whether a firm has complied with an agreement—
information that also bears on management quality. 
Importantly, one shareholder’s settlement of a proposal potentially com-
promises other shareholders’ rights and interests under Rule 14a-8 and state 
corporate law. First, settlement cuts off the participation of other shareholders 
in the policy reform by preventing a shareholder vote. For all of the reasons 
outlined above in Section II.A, this defeats the economic and noneconomic rea-
sons to provide a proposal mechanism in the first place. In addition, a de facto 
“first in time” rule exists for shareholder proposals: after a company receives its 
first proposal on a topic in advance of an upcoming shareholder meeting, Rule 
14a-8 allows it to exclude all subsequent proposals on the same or a substantial-
ly similar topic.
139
 Thus a shareholder who submits the first proposal on a sub-
ject occupies the field, requiring latecomers to withdraw or have their proposals 
 
138. For an exposition on the risks of activist shareholder self-dealing, see Iman Anabtawi & 
Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1255 (2008). For a dis-
cussion of opportunistic governance proposals by shareholders, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 
The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 884-86 (2005); for a reply, 
see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 1735, 1756 (2006). 
139. In 2015, Walden Asset Management withdrew a shareholder proposal on political spending 
disclosures that it had submitted to Express Scripts “because a similar resolution was on  
the ballot.” Research & Engagement Brief, Second Quarter 2015, WALDEN ASSET MGMT. 1  
(2015), http://waldenassetmgmt.com/LiteratureRetrieve.aspx?ID=181906 [http://perma.cc
/Z6HG-2WLB]. In other words, another investor had beaten it to the punch. Note, howev-
er, that despite the withdrawal, “the company agreed to continue discussion and to consider 
the request.” Id. 
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formally excluded. If the lead shareholder goes on to settle the proposal, a late-
comer’s ability to renew a proposal is greatly compromised; many of the set-
tlements reviewed for this Article were finalized just days before the proxy was 
published. The matter is further complicated by a provision of Rule 14a-8 that 
allows a company to exclude a proposal it has “substantially implemented.”
140
 
Simply by settling a campaign finance disclosure proposal, for example, a 
shareholder potentially triggers the “substantially implemented” provision of 
the rule for follow-on proposals seeking broader disclosure. 
Since settlement defeats the purposes of the shareholder proposal mecha-
nism and imposes potential agency costs on the firm, it follows that settlements 
should be rare. Yet settlements are not rare; and, as the next Section explains, 
social and environmental settlements constitute a slowly growing category. 
C. Social and Environmental Settlements Versus Governance Settlements 
A subset of institutional investors have specialized in campaign finance dis-
closure activism, pursuing the same set of reforms at multiple companies. 
These investors appear to play the role of “social policy intermediaries,” a varia-
tion on the role of “governance intermediaries” in agency capitalism, according 
to a compelling theory advanced by Ronald Gilson and Jeffrey Gordon.
141
 In 
Gilson and Gordon’s theory, governance intermediaries assume the costs to de-
velop business strategy proposals at a firm and to convince rationally reticent 
institutional investors to support them.
142
 In the theory, governance intermedi-
aries are specialists who “potentiate institutional voice.”
143
 Here, activist share-
holders tee up social policy reforms at low cost to other shareholders.
144
 But 
shareholder activists do not profit from social activism in the same way that 
hedge funds profit from governance activism. A hedge fund achieves gains by 
spearheading governance and business strategy reforms that raise the target 
firm’s stock price, thus increasing the value of the hedge fund’s own stock. So-
cial and environmental reforms, in contrast, often have little effect on stock 
prices. Settlement may look particularly attractive to the proponent of a social 
or environmental proposal because settlement minimizes costs that are poorly 
offset by far-off or hard-to-quantify social or environmental gains. 
 
140. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(10) (2016). 
141. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 136, at 867. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. Shareholder proponents save costs themselves by relying on nonprofit organizations such as 
the CPA for proposal templates, monitoring services, and other assistance. 
shareholder proposal settlements  
301 
Settlements that set social or environmental standards have become more 
common than settlements on governance issues. At the same time, social and 
environmental policy changes are less transparent to shareholders than corpo-
rate governance changes. In both 2014 and 2015, investors submitted more 
shareholder proposals on social and environmental topics than they did on 
corporate governance topics (excluding executive compensation proposals from 
the calculation).
145
 However, corporate governance topics were more likely to 
go to a vote.
146
 In other words, there appears to be more behind-the-scenes 




Most changes to a firm’s governance are made as amendments to the certifi-
cate of incorporation or the bylaws; the former require shareholder approval, 
and both kinds of amendments are publicly disclosed in filings to the SEC.
148
 
Thus, if a shareholder brings a proposal for a governance change and it is set-
tled in a deal between management and the shareholder, management either 
ends up submitting the agreed-upon amendment for shareholder approval, or 
it must file the amendment with the SEC within four business days. Either 
way, the governance change is transparent to shareholders and the market, and 
the value of the change is swiftly impounded into the stock price. 
 
145. ISS 2015 Proxy Season Review, supra note 6, at 3 (reporting that in 2015, 45% of proposals ad-
dressed social and environmental policy, 43% addressed governance issues, and 12% ad-
dressed executive compensation). 
146. Id. (reporting that in 2015, 40% of social and environmental proposals were withdrawn, 
while only 10% of governance proposals and 16% of executive compensation proposals were 
withdrawn); see also Bauer et al., supra note 6, at 473 (finding that between 1997 and 2009, 
corporate social responsibility proposals were withdrawn more often than corporate govern-
ance proposals); Chidambaran & Woidtke, supra note 104, at 25 tbl.3 (reporting that from 
1989 to 1991, 10.4% of corporate governance proposals were withdrawn, compared to 28.5% 
of “social issue” proposals, while from 1993-1995, 17.6% of corporate governance proposals 
were withdrawn, compared to 43.5% of “social issue” proposals). 
147. ISS’s numbers suggest that the highest rates of withdrawal of shareholder proposals on so-
cial and environmental matters in 2015 were for proposals concerning a company’s employ-
ment policies on sexual orientation (95% withdrawn), its policies on board diversity (79% 
withdrawn), and its policies on data privacy and security (73% withdrawn). ISS 2015 Proxy 
Season Review, supra note 6, at 8 fig.9. 
148. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, OMB NO. 3235-0060, FORM 8-K, at 17, http://
www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf [http://perma.cc/5WWJ-RYJL] (requiring the dis-
closure of amendments to articles of incorporation or bylaws and the amendments to be 
filed as exhibits pursuant to Item 601 of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.601 (2002)). See 
generally Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date; 
Correction, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,370 (Aug. 10, 2004). 
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Social and environmental proposals are generally not brought in the form 
of amendments to the certificate of incorporation or the bylaws. This stems 
from concerns about encroaching upon the board’s authority to manage the 
corporation under state law. Instead, social and environmental standards are 
typically established in the sort of downstream corporate policies that are not 
available to shareholders and the public. Some firms publish social and envi-
ronmental policy documents on their public websites, but others do not. Thus, 
new social and environmental policies can be set in a settlement and imple-
mented without ex ante or ex post transparency to shareholders—and therefore 
without enhancing the allocative efficiency of stock prices. That is, when in-
formation about a new social policy is not communicated to the market, inves-
tors cannot price the policy change into the stock, and the market itself fails to 
allocate capital in a way that captures the economic significance of policy re-
forms (or a lack of policy reforms) at particular companies across the economy. 
The lack of transparency also makes social and environmental proposals more 
vulnerable than governance proposals to opportunism, conflicts of interest, and 
information asymmetries, with the result that they may involve greater costs to 
the firm. 
No good reason justifies these different transparency outcomes. Critics may 
argue that matters of corporate governance address the shareholder’s corporate 
contract, while social and environmental policies do not. Yet both types of pro-
posals implicate a shareholder’s rights and interests as a shareholder. If a matter 
is both “appropriate for a shareholder vote” and opposed by management, it 
should not be diverted to private deal making. For example, once a shareholder 
avails itself of the proposal mechanism on campaign finance disclosure, another 
shareholder cannot bring the same or a substantially related proposal at the 
same meeting. And depending on how the proposal process concludes, com-
peting shareholders may have to wait years to renew a proposal. The mere fact 
that other shareholders’ interests are affected by the acts of the original share-
holder proponent suggests that transparency is needed. As already discussed, 
settlement itself disenfranchises shareholders by preventing a vote from taking 
place; this subverts a privilege of shareholding, much in the way that allowing 
management to unilaterally alter the corporate contract would. In short, once 
the SEC has determined that a subject matter transcends a company’s ordinary 
business and is appropriate for subsidized discussion in the proxy, shareholders 
have a stake in learning about side deals on the matter. 
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i i i . private disclosure reform and electoral integrity 
A. The Trend Toward Private Ordering 
There is strong agreement among election law scholars and political scien-
tists that existing campaign finance disclosure laws do not produce electoral 
transparency.
149
 Even Justice Anthony Kennedy, who authored the majority 
opinion in Citizens United that strongly endorsed campaign finance disclosure, 




Corporate electoral spending is particularly opaque under existing disclo-
sure law. Corporations are only rarely required by public law to disclose any-
thing about their electoral spending, and virtually all mandatory disclosures of 
corporate electoral spending are made not by the corporations themselves, but 
by the recipients of corporations’ funds, such as “Super PACs.”
151
 Corporate 
payments to politically active 501(c) nonprofits, including trade associations 
and social welfare organizations, are generally not reported by those organiza-
tions, and thus are not transparent; these are commonly referred to as “dark 
money” payments.
152
 In the 2012 federal election, an estimated $310 million—
roughly 29% of reported outside spending—came from dark money organiza-
tions.
153
 The proportion of this spending that originated from corporate treas-
uries is unknown.
154
 Evidence suggests that undisclosed spending will play an 
even greater role in the 2016 federal election. By the end of January 2016, dark-
 
149. See, e.g., RICHARD L. HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED: CAMPAIGN MONEY, THE SUPREME COURT, 
AND THE DISTORTION OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS (2016); Richard Briffault, Updating Disclosure 
for the New Era of Independent Spending, 27 J.L. & POL. 683, 685 (2012) (“[O]ur laws fail to 
provide for effective reporting of the campaign finance activities of independent commit-
tees.”). 
150. Marcia Coyle, Justice Anthony Kennedy Loathes the Term “Swing Vote,” NAT’L L.J. ONLINE  
(Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202740827841/Justice-Anthony 
-Kennedy-Loathes-the-Term-Swing-Vote [http://perma.cc/T4EN-LYVH]. 
151. Corporations are rarely required to disclose their own electoral expenditures because they 
rarely engage in the types of spending that require such reporting. Mostly, corporations seek 
to influence elections through donations to outside spending groups. See Haan, supra note 
74, at 1158-60. 
152. See Linda Sugin, Politics, Disclosure, and State Law Solutions for 501(c)(4) Organizations, 91 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 895 (2016) (describing and analyzing the “dark money problem”). 
153. Haan, supra note 74, at 1151. 
154. Id. In addition, as much as $100 million in unreported outside spending on “issue ads” also 
came from unknown sources. Id. The numbers address only spending on federal elections in 
2012 and exclude “dark money” spending on state and local elections. 
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money groups had already spent $213 million on political ads in the 2016 elec-
tion cycle, nearly double the amount spent over the same period by the cam-
paigns themselves and by Super PACs.
155
 An August 2016 analysis found that 
the volume of television and cable ads purchased by dark money groups has 
been increasing, although the proportion of ads from dark money groups in 
the 2016 election has declined relative to Super PACs.
156
 
Corporate campaign finance is also opaque because the little information 
that is disclosed is highly fragmented. Under existing public law, there is no 
one place to find all disclosures of a corporation’s electoral expenditures across 
jurisdictions. To obtain information about a company’s electoral spending in all 
elections, one must review disclosure reports on the FEC’s website as well as on 
the websites of election regulators in all fifty states. This makes it costly and 
time-consuming for the public, or for investors, to understand corporate politi-
cal spending on a firm-by-firm basis. 
Private ordering has emerged as a potential solution to campaign finance 
problems caused or exacerbated by Citizens United. In 2012, two opposing can-
didates in a Massachusetts Senate race, Scott Brown and Elizabeth Warren, 
used a self-enforcing contract to limit outside spending in the election.
157
 The 
contract, which required each candidate to donate 50% of the total outside 
spending that benefitted his or her campaign to charity, successfully reduced 
the amount of outside money spent in the race.
158
 However, the success of the 
Brown-Warren contract has not led to widespread adoption by candidates of 
self-enforcing contracts as a private regulatory tool. 
Private disclosure reform has taken off more briskly. Since at least the 
1990s, shareholder activists have sought greater transparency of corporate elec-
 
155. Bill Allison, Dark Money Dominates Political Ad Spending, BLOOMBERG POL. (Jan.  
28, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-01-28/dark-money-dominates 
-political-ad-spending [http://perma.cc/R86Z-XCNZ]. Approximately $161 million of this 
amount was spent on “targeted issues” ads with the remaining $52.5 million funding ads 
that specifically mentioned a candidate for federal office. Id. 
156. Wesleyan Media Project/Center for Responsive Politics Special Report: Outside Group Activity, 
2000-2016, WESLEYAN MEDIA PROJECT (Aug. 24, 2016), http://mediaproject.wesleyan.edu
/blog/disclosure-report [http://perma.cc/M4AV-R45T] (“[E]ven though the majority of 
spending by groups may be full disclosure, the total volume of spending that is undisclosed 
has been rising.”). 
157. See generally Ganesh Sitaraman, Contracting Around Citizens United, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 755 
(2014). 
158. See id. at 786-88. Similar contracts have been proposed in more than a dozen elections, but 
few have been signed. See People’s Pledge, COMMON CAUSE, http://www.commoncause.org
/issues/money-in-politics/peoples-pledge [http://perma.cc/2JEX-XUQL]. 
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toral expenditures through corporate governance mechanisms.
159
 So-called 
“voluntary” corporate disclosure has become an important source of infor-
mation about corporate activity in general, and shareholder activists have 
sought increased corporate disclosure across a range of subjects.
160
 
The CPA has documented a steady rise in the number of S&P 500 compa-
nies making disclosures, and commentators have suggested that their purpose 
is to inform voters about the sources of campaign finance.
161
 In 2015, Justice 
Kennedy discussed campaign finance disclosure in a dissent in Williams-Yulee v. 
Florida Bar, suggesting that internet disclosure can be particularly effective 
“[w]hether as a result of disclosure laws or a candidate’s voluntary decision to 
make the campaign transparent.”
162
 The implication is that, if mandatory cam-
paign finance law has left gaps in electoral transparency, voluntary disclosures 
can fill them in. 
 
159. Activists have been making political spending proposals for several decades; John and Klein 
identified seven proposals demanding “[i]nformation on political donations” in the 1991-92 
proxy season. John & Klein, supra note 6, at 48 tbl.2. 
160. In 2013, a small number of companies began disclosing on their websites payments made to 
nonprofit policy development organizations, such as the American Legislative Exchange 
Council (ALEC), even though lobbying disclosure laws do not require disclosure of such 
payments. See, e.g., Transparency, GOOGLE (Dec. 23, 2013), http://web.archive.org/web
/20131223181556/http://www.google.com/publicpolicy/transparency.html [http://perma.cc
/N36W-DLG4] (noting Google’s membership in ALEC but not providing payment infor-
mation). That same year, several major telecommunications companies committed to pub-
lishing disclosures of law enforcement agency requests for customer information. See Marcy 
Gordon, AT&T Says It Will Publish Info on Data Requests, USA TODAY (Dec. 
 20, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/12/20/att-says-it-will 
-publish-reports-on-data-requests/4146519 [http://perma.cc/WWM4-L3SW]. Microsoft’s 
public website, for example, features a Transparency Hub with links to ten categories of dis-
closure that are not mandated by public law. See Our Commitment to Transparency, MI-
CROSOFT, http://www.microsoft.com/about/csr/transparencyhub [http://perma.cc/AUM4 
-E235]. 
161. See, e.g., David Saleh Rauf, More Election Spending in Light, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS NEWS, 
Jan. 8, 2016, at A3 (noting a “growing trend” in which businesses “voluntarily” reveal infor-
mation about political spending “to ensure that shareholders and the public know how cor-
porate funds are being spent on politics”). 
162. 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1684 (2015) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Kennedy’s 
statement is perplexing because a candidate does not control the transparency of outside 
spending groups that support or oppose the candidate’s election. Other private actors, such 
as the heads of 501(c) nonprofits, possess the power to decide to “make the campaign trans-
parent.” Id. 
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B. The Promise of Private Law 
Disclosure is an essential means of regulating elections in the public inter-
est.
163
 The Supreme Court has long recognized strong state interests in pre-
serving electoral integrity by “promoting transparency and accountability in 
the electoral process.”
164
 The Court has connected disclosure to electoral integ-
rity for nearly a century and has endorsed citizen interests in using disclosure 
to monitor the political process and to learn and understand how the political 
process works.
165
 Disclosure advances constitutional values, the Supreme Court 
 
163. See Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 199 (2010) (noting that public disclosure helps cure inade-
quacies in monitoring and enforcement by regulatory authorities and “promotes transparen-
cy and accountability in the electoral process to an extent others cannot”); Citizens United v. 
Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 368 (2010); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-68 (1976) 
(per curiam); Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 548 (1934) (“Congress reached the 
conclusion that public disclosure of political contributions, together with the names of con-
tributors and other details, would tend to prevent the corrupt use of money to affect elec-
tions. The verity of this conclusion reasonably cannot be denied.”); see also United States v. 
Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954) (stating that the purpose of lobbying disclosure is “to 
maintain the integrity of a basic governmental process”); Briffault, supra note 149, at 690 
(noting that Doe v. Reed “connected the integrity and voter information concerns in pointing 
to an overarching public interest in monitoring and understanding the workings of the po-
litical process”). 
164. Doe, 561 U.S. at 198; Briffault, supra note 149, at 689-90. 
165. See, e.g., McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 136-37 (2003) (discussing inter-
ests in regulating elections to protect the integrity of the political process); Burson v. Free-
man, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992) (noting that “a State has a compelling interest in protecting 
voters from confusion and undue influence”); id. at 211 (recognizing an individual’s “right to 
cast a ballot in an election free from the taint of intimidation and fraud”); Eu v. San Francis-
co Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231 (1989) (“A State indisputably has a 
compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its election process.”); Anderson v. Cele-
brezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983) (“We have recognized that, ‘as a practical matter, there 
must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort 
of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.’” (quoting Storer v. 
Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974))); id. at 796 (“There can be no question about the legitima-
cy of the State’s interest in fostering informed and educated expressions of the popular will 
in a general election.”); Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Right To Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 
210-11 (1982) (affirming the state’s interest in regulating elections to protect the integrity of 
the electoral process); Cal. Med. Ass’n v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 453 U.S. 182, 201 (1981) 
(same); United States v. Int’l Union United Auto., Aircraft & Agric. Implement Workers, 352 
U.S. 567, 570 (1957) (“[W]hat is involved here is the integrity of our electoral process, and, 
not less, the responsibility of the individual citizen for the successful functioning of that pro-
cess.”); id. at 575 (discussing the interest of Congress in regulating elections to “sustain the 
active, alert responsibility of the individual citizen in a democracy for the wise conduct of 
government”); Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 545 (noting that Congress “undoubtedly” has the 
power to legislate to “safeguard” a federal election “from the improper use of money to in-
fluence the result . . . as it possesses every other power essential to preserve the departments 
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has written, “by opening the basic processes of our federal election system to 
public view.”
166
 Thus, citizens have a significant democratic interest in ensuring 
that corporate campaign finance disclosure is effective at helping voters under-
stand the role of corporate donors in financing public elections. 
Given the significant citizen interests at stake in disclosure regulation, we 
might ask whether private ordering can reform campaign finance disclosure in 
a way that advances democratic values. Jody Freeman has argued that private 
lawmaking should be “harness[ed] . . . to serve public goals.”
167
 Within the 
context of the firm, Lisa M. Fairfax has written that shareholders can, and do, 
use shareholder activism to advance the interests of other corporate stakehold-
ers, such as employees and consumers.
168
 Private ordering might be justified as 
a method of electoral regulation if it can effectively promote citizen interests in 
transparency by helping voters monitor and understand the ways in which 
companies spend money to influence elections. 
Private campaign finance disclosure law has an edge over public law be-
cause it can serve a purpose that is forbidden to public law: it can seek to reduce 
corporate political speech. The state may not intentionally chill political 
speech—the First Amendment forbids this—and thus a legislature or govern-
ment agency may not use mandatory disclosure for the purpose of reducing 
corporate political spending. However, there is no reason why private investors 
cannot use investor-firm agreements to suppress spending. Indeed, a number 
of shareholder proposals have openly sought to do so by asking shareholders to 
vote in favor of policies prohibiting political spending altogether.
169
 There are 
 
and institutions of the general government from impairment or destruction, whether threat-
ened by force or by corruption”); id. at 548 (affirming Congress’s conclusion that “public 
disclosure of political contributions, together with . . . other details, would tend to prevent 
the corrupt use of money to affect elections”). 
166. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 82. 
167. Freeman, supra note 94, at 549. 
168. See Fairfax, supra note 6, at 57. 
169. See, e.g., Starbucks Corp., Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 (Schedule 14A), at 57 (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/Archives
/edgar/data/829224/000119312513024028/d455402ddef14a.htm [http://perma.cc/Z6YU 
-8X46] (proposing, on behalf of Harrington Investments, Inc., that “the board of directors 
adopt a policy prohibiting the use of corporate funds for any political election or campaign, 
including direct or indirect contributions or to candidates, and corporate expenditures for 
electioneering communications, as well as prohibiting the establishment of a Starbucks po-
litical action committee”). This proposal received almost 4% shareholder support at Star-
bucks’s 2013 annual shareholder meeting, and Harrington Investments submitted it again in 
2014. See Starbucks Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (March 20, 2013), http://www
.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/829224/000082922413000019/sbux-32213x8xk.htm [http://
perma.cc/KF5L-F2P9] (reporting voting results); Starbucks Corp., Proxy Statement Pursu-
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economic, expressive, and democratic reasons that investors might seek to curb 
corporate electoral spending—either directly or through disclosure require-
ments—and private ordering appears to be the only constitutionally permissi-
ble way to pursue these purposes. 
In addition, disclosure standards set through private ordering are not sub-
ject to the First Amendment scrutiny that applies to the content of public law 
disclosure mandates. The emerging private disclosure standards described in 
this Part require reporting of information that would almost certainly pass con-
stitutional muster under Buckley v. Valeo and its progeny, such as the dollar 
amounts of candidate contributions and independent expenditures.
170
 But the 
emerging standards also seek to fill some gaps in public disclosure law, by re-
quiring disclosure of information that has not traditionally been compelled by 
public election law; as a result, these disclosure mandates have never been test-
ed in a First Amendment challenge. The primary example is disclosure of dark 
money payments to 501(c) nonprofit organizations. Other, untested categories 
of information subject to the private disclosure rules include a company’s ra-
tionale for engaging in political spending and a company’s decision-making 
process for electoral expenditures. Although citizens might find such infor-
mation useful in evaluating candidates for public office, courts increasingly 
have shown a willingness to cut back public law disclosure mandates aimed at 
corporations on First Amendment grounds.
171
 Private disclosure law appears to 
be the path of least resistance toward these forms of socially beneficial disclo-
sure. 
The emerging private disclosure standards at companies settling sharehold-
er proposals improve upon public campaign finance disclosure in at least two 
regards: they require companies to publish a single report of electoral expendi-
tures across multiple jurisdictions, and they require disclosure of spending 
without temporal limitations. 
 
ant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Schedule 14A), at 48 (Jan. 24, 
2014), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/829224/000120677414000304/starbucks
_def14a.htm [http://perma.cc/2798-XRBK] (propounding a similar proposal). The 2014 
proposal received less than 3% support, falling short of the 6% voting support required by 
Rule 14a-8 for the proposal to be submitted for a third consecutive year. See Starbucks 
Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Mar. 19, 2014) http://www.sec.gov/Archives
/edgar/data/829224/000082922414000011/sbux-3252014x8xk.htm [http://perma.cc/YUS3 
-FNZV] (reporting voting results). 
170. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66-68 (discussing governmental interests served by campaign finance 
disclosure). 
171. See, e.g., Nat’l Assoc. of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (concluding that a 
disclosure mandate in the Conflict Minerals Rule violated the First Amendment). 
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Public election law tends to produce fragmented corporate spending disclo-
sure, reported to different jurisdictions in separate reports. Private disclosure 
standards have fixed this problem by requiring companies to consolidate their 
disclosures in a single report. This innovation makes it much easier for citizens 
and investors to obtain a holistic picture of a company’s disclosed expenditures. 
The firm-by-firm approach is important not only to investors, whose economic 
interest in the corporation naturally focuses them on aggregate expenditures, 
but also to citizens concerned about the growing political power of business en-
tities. However, firm-by-firm reporting still presents challenges for voters who 
seek information about campaign funding by candidate; to discover which 
companies financially supported or opposed a candidate, one would have to re-
view the websites of hundreds of corporations. 
Federal and state campaign finance laws have also tended to define catego-
ries of electoral spending that are subject to disclosure in part by the timing of 
the expenditure in relation to the date of an election. For example, a radio or 
television advertisement that discusses a candidate in an upcoming federal elec-
tion is not an “electioneering communication,” subject to specific disclosure re-
quirements, unless it airs within sixty days of a general election.
172
 This tem-
poral cut-off has been widely critiqued for creating a loophole that allows ads 
aired three or four months before an election to evade disclosure.
173
 Proposal 
settlements, however, have overwhelmingly adopted a different approach. 
They require firms to produce comprehensive annual or semi-annual reports 
that disclose all spending intended to influence an election or ballot initiative 
during the period covered by the report, regardless of when the spending oc-
curred in relation to an election. Thus, private disclosure law holds at least the 
promise of more authentically representing all corporate payments to influence 
a given election cycle. 
Yet for the reasons described in the next Section, the potential benefits of 
privately negotiated disclosure have been poorly realized. 
 
172. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(3)(A) (2014). 
173. See, e.g., Keenan Steiner, Under-the-Radar Political Ads: A Guide to Electioneering Communica-
tions, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (May 3, 2012), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2012/05/03
/brief-guide-electioneering-communications [http://perma.cc/9DP8-VWPQ] (providing a 
concise explanation of the loophole). Recognizing that spenders may seek to influence elec-
tions with ads that run before the sixty-day cut-off, scholars have advocated expanding the 
statutory time period. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 149, at 704-05 (advocating an increase 
from 60 days to 120 days before a general election). The proposed DISCLOSE Act that has 
stalled in Congress would have made this change. DISCLOSE Act, H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. 
§ 202 (2010). 
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C. Private Law Comes Up Short 
1. Participation and Transparency 
Proposal settlements that set campaign finance disclosure standards have 
lacked transparency to citizens and corporate stakeholders, have excluded key 
parties from participation, and have invited participation by third parties—
notably proxy advisory services—whose motives are opaque and likely do not 
align with citizen interests. 
Dominance of Institutional Investors. All forty-two of the shareholder 
proposal settlements reviewed for this study were initiated by institutional in-
vestors, who dominate the process to the exclusion of others—shareholders and 
voters—who have a stake in corporate campaign finance disclosure. These oth-
er stakeholders do not participate in settlements, and if they learn of the set-
tlements at all, it is after the process is completed. 
Shareholder proposals are sent directly to the company’s principal executive 
office and, unless they end up in the proxy or a no-action letter request, they 
can leave little trace of their existence.
174
 Neither the public nor other corporate 
stakeholders are notified that a policymaking settlement is underway; the en-
tire process plays out behind closed doors. Depending upon the company’s in-
ternal governance, even the board of directors may play a minimal role in su-
pervising settlements. The lack of transparency ensures minimal participation 
and oversight by parties other than the individual shareholder proponent and 
company management, even though the policy addressed by the proposal must 
be “significant” and concern a matter the SEC has deemed “appropriate for a 
shareholder vote” to survive Rule 14a-8’s exclusions.
175
 The agreement itself, 
even if it is reduced to a written contract signed by both investor and corporate 
management, is not filed with the SEC or disclosed to investors. This makes it 
impossible for the citizenry to know what, precisely, the company has agreed to 





174. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(e) (2016). 
175. SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14E (Oct. 27, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb14e
.htm [http://perma.cc/2GS3-ZM8M]. 
176. Although a settlement agreement typically establishes a corporate policy, the policy itself is 
not always publicly available on the company’s website. Additionally, companies that do post 
policies on their websites generally post current policies and not older versions; thus, it is 
not possible to determine if the company’s posted policy is the same one it agreed to in the 
settlement agreement. For these reasons, the agreement itself is the best evidence of the 
company’s commitment. 
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Settlements raise democratic participation concerns because they are nego-
tiated exclusively between representatives of corporate management and certain 
shareholders. Citizens, civic groups, political scientists, election law experts, 
elected officials, and even a company’s other shareholders, employees, credi-
tors, and additional stakeholders are all excluded from the process. This means 
that a full range of citizen interests is not represented in the standard setting; 
instead, all parties permitted to participate are motivated to advance the corpo-
rate enterprise. There is no meaningful opportunity for ordinary citizens to 
play any role in debating or negotiating the disclosure standards, even through 
a representative. 
Federal securities regulation plays a key role in limiting participation in pri-
vate standard setting. Eligibility requirements in Rule 14a-8 make a shareholder 
eligible to submit a proposal for a shareholder vote only if it has continuously 
held, for at least one year, a minimum of $2,000 or 1% of the firm’s securities 
entitled to be voted at the meeting.
177
 Virtually everyone interviewed for this 
Article, on all sides of the process, characterized this requirement as minimal. 
This view—that a $2,000 stockholding threshold is low and easy to meet—
reflects, of course, the bias of big players in the equity capital markets. Alt-
hough it is difficult to estimate how many Americans could indefinitely set 
aside $2,000 as the cost of participating in private ordering at a single firm, it 
should be clear that the $2,000 threshold excludes a great number of citizens 
from participation. 
Citizen interests might be furthered, at least in theory, by the participation 
of public pension funds, which act on behalf of millions of middle-income 
Americans.
178
 However, this would require legal change. Fund managers are 
fiduciaries acting on behalf of the funds’ beneficiaries, but they do not act in a 
representative capacity. Thus, pension funds do not survey their beneficiaries 
to learn their views on matters of corporate social and environmental policy, 
nor would fund managers be obliged to advance those views through their offi-
cial acts if they did learn of them. Fund beneficiaries are so distanced from pro-
posal negotiations by layers of intermediation that most of them probably have 
no idea that fund managers are haggling over campaign finance disclosure 




177. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b) (2016). 
178. The New York State Common Retirement Fund alone has more than one million members, 
retirees, and beneficiaries. See Pension Fund Overview, OFF. N.Y. ST. COMPTROLLER (Mar. 31, 
2015), http://www.osc.state.ny.us/pension/snapshot.htm [http://perma.cc/G335-CLLT]. 
179. In 2004, the SEC began requiring registered management investment companies to report 
their proxy voting on Form N-PX, reasoning that “increased transparency will enable fund 
shareholders to monitor their funds’ involvement in the governance activities of portfolio 
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Economics shapes the accountability of participants in proposal settle-
ments. Because the costs of private disclosure reform at a firm are borne pri-
marily by the shareholder proponent, large investors are likely to be dispropor-
tionately represented in private deal making. An investment fund will not 
pursue socially beneficial disclosure reforms at a company in its portfolio unless 
its managers believe the benefits to the fund outweigh the costs. Large invest-
ment firms are better able to bear the costs of activism and spread them across 
funds; therefore, such firms are more likely to find activism cost-effective.
180
 
Under some circumstances, the size of a fund’s position in a firm’s stock may 
also factor into the fund’s cost-benefit analysis; a larger position would make a 
beneficial reform more valuable to the fund, and increase the likelihood that 
the fund would initiate deal making. And, of course, because an investor’s bar-
gaining power turns mainly on the proportion of a company’s stock it owns, 
investors with large stockholdings will have greater influence with manage-
ment. A 2015 study—the only comprehensive study of proposal withdrawals to 
date—found that social and environmental proposals had a predicted likeli-
hood of withdrawal of 46.8% if the proponent was an institutional investor, 
but only a predicted likelihood of 12.6% if the proponent was not.
181
 All of this 
suggests that the deeper the pocket of the investor, the greater the economic in-
centives for the investor to pursue proposal settlements. Thus, even among in-
vestors, the settlement of shareholder proposals is a game of elites. And when a 
participant pays the cost for a reform, it may feel justified in seeking private 
gains from the reform. 
Agency problems inherent in intermediary capitalism influence the social 
and environmental standards that are set through proposal settlements. For ex-
ample, the beneficiaries of public pension funds—teachers, firefighters, and po-
lice officers—may have different political interests from the financial services 
 
companies.” Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered 
Management Investment Companies, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564, 6565 (Feb. 7, 2003); see 17 C.F.R. 
§ 270.30b1-4 (2016). Under the new rule, mutual funds must disclose their votes on share-
holder proposals that go to a vote, but are not required to disclose proposal settlement activ-
ity. 
180. See Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United 
States, 19 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 55, 69 (2007) (“[S]ince the active investors incur all the costs 
associated with such activism (while the benefits accrue to all shareholders), only sharehold-
ers with large positions are likely to obtain a large enough return on their investment to jus-
tify the costs.”); Doron Levit & Nadya Malenko, Nonbinding Voting for Shareholder Proposals, 
66 J. FIN. 1579, 1603 (2011) (explaining that blockholders are most likely to submit share-
holder proposals because “their benefits from proposal submission are sufficiently high to 
overcome the associated costs”). 
181. Bauer et al., supra note 6, at 482. 
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professionals who manage the funds. Yet it is a fund’s managers who determine 
the social and environmental agenda for the fund, craft the social and environ-
mental policies demanded in proposals, and agree to a company’s offer of set-
tlement. Since proposals can be bargained away more or less in secret, a fund 
manager might compromise on a disclosure standard in a way that fund bene-
ficiaries would not approve, or even bring a social and environmental proposal 
as a bargaining chip to extract a private benefit from the company. Thus, set-
tlement outcomes may advance the political and personal interests of fund 
managers at the expense of fund beneficiaries. 
Finally, the fact that intra-firm bargaining power is distributed on the basis 
of shareholding means that private lawmaking is more likely to “stick” at firms 
with certain characteristics. Certain types of firms, including those with less in-
sider control and greater institutional shareholding, are more likely to be tar-
geted for shareholder proposals on political spending.
182
 It is likely that such 
firms are targeted because their ownership structures make it easier for activist 
shareholders to build support for their proposals, which gives them greater lev-
erage to settle proposals. But the democratic problem is that firm-by-firm elec-
toral transparency may be determined by a set of company characteristics ra-
ther than by policies in the public interest. 
Influence of Proxy Advisory Firms. An additional set of private actors, 
proxy advisory firms, have played a key role in setting corporate campaign fi-
nance disclosure standards through private ordering. Proxy advisory firms are 
for-profit intermediaries that publish firm-specific information for institutional 
investor clients, including recommendations on how to vote on shareholder 
proposals.
183
 Proxy advisory firms influence private standard setting in two key 
ways: first, by making recommendations about whether shareholders should 
vote in favor of specific campaign finance disclosure proposals and, second, by 
pressuring firms to implement shareholder proposals that receive majority 
shareholder support. 
Proxy advisory firms issue specific recommendations about how their cli-
ents should vote on shareholder proposals regarding corporate campaign fi-
 
182. See, e.g., Min & You, supra note 70, at 18 (observing that companies targeted by shareholder 
proposals on political spending were “less likely to have insider control and more likely to 
have a majority of outstanding shares held by institutions”). More generally, Chidambaran 
and Woidtke found that firms with withdrawn “social issue” proposals from 1989 to 1995 
tended to be larger than control firms and to have outperformed the market prior to the 
proposal. See Chidambaran & Woidtke, supra note 104, at 26 tbl.4. 
183. For more detailed information on proxy advisory firms, see Stephen Choi et al., The Power of 
Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 869 (2010); Sagiv Edelman, Comment, Proxy 
Advisory Firms: A Guide for Regulatory Reform, 62 EMORY L.J. 1369 (2013). 
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nance disclosure. Their influence on vote outcomes is so great that commenta-
tors have characterized institutional investors as “outsourcing” their voting to 
these firms.
184
 Good evidence suggests that a proxy advisory firm’s recommen-
dation to vote in favor of a shareholder proposal, and thus against the position 
of corporate management, can sway the vote by at least 6% and by as much as 
20%.
185
 Thus, a proxy advisory firm’s recommendation that shareholders vote 
in favor of a campaign finance disclosure proposal can significantly move the 
vote toward the 50% mark. 
In the early 2000s, an influential proxy advisory service, Institutional 
Shareholder Services (“ISS”), opposed shareholder proposals on corporate po-
litical spending disclosure as a matter of policy, but then began to support them 
on a case-by-case basis.
186
 In 2012, ISS changed its recommendation to 
“[g]enerally vote for proposals requesting greater disclosure of a company’s po-
litical contributions and trade association spending policies and activities.”
187
 
This policy change has likely contributed to the growing level of shareholder 
voting support for campaign finance disclosure proposals that do come to a 
 
184. See generally David F. Larcker et al., Outsourcing Shareholder Voting to Proxy Advisory Firms, 58 
J.L. & ECON. 173 (2015). 
185. See Jennifer E. Bethel & Stuart L. Gillan, The Impact of the Institutional and Regulatory Envi-
ronment on Shareholder Voting, FIN. MGMT. 29, 30 (2002) (finding that a negative recom-
mendation by ISS was “associated with 13.6% to 20.6% fewer votes cast in favor of man-
agement”); Jie Cai et al., Electing Directors, 64 J. FIN. 2389, 2404 (2009) (finding that “a 
negative ISS recommendation is associated with 19% fewer votes”); Choi et al., supra note 
183, at 906 (“[A]n ISS recommendation shifts 6% to 10% of shareholder votes . . . .”). See 
generally David F. Larcker et al., And Then a Miracle Happens!: How Do Proxy  
Advisory Firms Develop Their Voting Recommendations?, STAN. CLOSER LOOK SERIES  
(Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/files/publication-pdf/cgri-closer 
-look-31-proxy-firms-voting-recommendations.pdf [http://perma.cc/P6AX-GP64] (dis-
cussing the influence of proxy advisory firms on shareholder voting). 
186. ISS is widely viewed as the most influential proxy advisory service in the United States. See, 
e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How To Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing Proposal for 
Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269, 294-96 (2003) (noting that ISS is influential be-
cause it makes its voting recommendations public and because some pension funds believe 
voting in accordance with ISS’s recommendations satisfies ERISA requirements). 
187. Compare 2011 U.S. Proxy Voting Guidelines Summary, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVS. 
63 (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.issgovernance.com/file/files/ISS2011USPolicySummary
Guidelines20110127.pdf [http://perma.cc/43VR-YV95] (recommending case-by-case vot-
ing), with 2012 U.S. Proxy Voting Summary Guidelines, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVS. 
64 (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.issgovernance.com/file/files/2012USSummaryGuidelines
.pdf [http://perma.cc/WJV3-GHWH] (recommending voting in favor). 
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shareholder vote, thus increasing pressure on management to settle.
188
 In 2013, 
the year after ISS’s policy change, 65.9% of shareholders at CF Industries 
Holdings, Inc. voted in favor of a political spending disclosure proposal, a high 
mark in the voting success of campaign finance proposals.
189
 
To arrive at recommendations, proxy advisory firms may engage in private 
discussions with the shareholder proponent and with the target company. Im-
portantly, these discussions take place early in the process, typically before the 
proxy is published—and thus during the window of settlement negotiation.
190
 
During the settlement window, both investors and target firms may be lobby-
ing proxy advisory firms for a recommendation, putting proxy advisory firms 
in a position to effectively approve or disapprove of specific practices.
191
 ISS’s 
2013 guidance stating that it would consider disclosure of payments to trade as-
sociations in its voting recommendations suggests its willingness to endorse 
elements of a disclosure standard on the merits and exemplifies the trend to-




188. Shareholder support for political spending proposals that have gone to a vote rose from an 
average of roughly 25% in 2008 to 34% in 2015. ISS 2015 Proxy Season Review, supra note 6, at 
10 fig.13. 
189. Dina ElBoghdady, Shareholders Press Companies To Disclose More About Political  
Spending, WASH. POST (May 17, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business 
/economy/shareholders-press-companies-to-disclose-more-about-political-spending/2013/0
5/17/ed1392e4-bf34-11e2-97d4-a479289a31f9_story.html [http://perma.cc/8TGA-YJTD]. 
190. The timing of settlement negotiation was disclosed in interviews conducted with partici-
pants acting on behalf of both investors and management. 
191. It is ISS’s explicit policy to recommend a vote against one or more directors of a company 
that omits a shareholder proposal from its ballot without no-action relief from the SEC, un-
less the company has taken “unilateral steps to implement the proposal.” 2015 Benchmark 
U.S. Proxy Voting Policies—Frequently Asked Questions on Selected Topics, INSTITUTIONAL 
SHAREHOLDER SERVS. 5 (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/2015
faquspoliciesonselectedtopics.pdf [http://perma.cc/PG28-LTBD]. If the company takes 
steps to implement the proposal, “the degree to which the proposal is implemented” will 
“factor into the assessment” of whether to recommend a vote against the company’s direc-
tors. Id. In other words, ISS will approve or disapprove a firm’s partial implementation of a 
shareholder’s proposal, potentially giving them standard-setting authority. 
192. 2013 U.S. Proxy Voting Summary Guidelines, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVS. 65 (Jan. 31, 
2013), http://www.issgovernance.com/file/files/2013ISSUSSummaryGuidelines1312013.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/658A-VDSU] (qualifying ISS’s general recommendation to vote in favor 
of electoral spending disclosure: “However, the following will be considered: The compa-
ny’s current disclosure of policies and oversight mechanisms related to its direct political 
contributions and payments to trade associations or other groups that may be used for polit-
ical purposes, including information on the types of organizations supported and the  
business rationale for supporting these organizations; and [r]ecent significant controversies, 
fines, or litigation related to the company’s political contributions or political  
activities”); see Responding to Corporate Political Disclosure Initiatives: A How-To Guide 
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ISS’s approach to campaign finance disclosure proposals has influenced 
deal making in specific ways. For example, ISS evaluates a firm’s disclosure 
practices in comparison to those of other firms in the same industry or peer 
group.
193
 At least in theory, this could cause ISS to recommend a vote in favor 
of specific campaign finance disclosure standards at one company and recom-
mend a vote against the same standards at a different company, depending up-
on the existing practices of peer firms. ISS’s evaluation of disclosure practices 
on an industry-group-by-industry-group basis has led investors and firms to 
give significant weight to the current disclosure practices of other firms in the 
same industry or peer group. As a result, companies in the same industry or 
peer group tend to adopt similar disclosure practices, while differences can be 
found across industries. The emphasis on industry or peer group practices re-
flects the concerns of firms that compete with each other, rather than a broader 
goal to prevent economy-wide rent-seeking by politicians or to promote elec-
toral transparency. It means that, in practice, campaign finance transparency is 
better in some industries and worse in others.
194
 
2. Settlement Terms 
Private ordering of disclosure has formalized the exclusive accountability of 
corporate spenders to investors and within that group mainly to a certain type 
of investor: the large, institutional fund.
195
 Institutional investors have framed 
their primary motivation for seeking campaign finance disclosure in economic, 
not democratic, terms.
196
 Likewise, firm managers negotiate disclosure deals 
 




/LVA7-D2LD] (asserting that ISS’s approval of trade association disclosure “was seen as an 
implicit endorsement of one of the key objectives of political spending disclosure activists—
enhancing disclosure of corporate payments to trade associations”). 
193. See Larcker et al., supra note 184, at 179 (observing that “the algorithms used to determine 
the peer companies . . . are unique to each proxy advisor”). 
194. For example, the CPA provides an index of performance by company sector in its CPA-
Zicklin Index. See 2015 CPA-Zicklin Index, supra note 80, at 22. According to the CPA’s analy-
sis for 2014, the sectors with the highest average ratings for disclosure and accountability 
were Health Care, Materials, and Telecommunications, while the sectors with the lowest av-
erage ratings were Information Technology, Financials, and Consumer Discretionary. Id. 
195. Geltman & Skroback, supra note 101, at 476 (“[T]he financial strength of a proponent is im-
portant in terms of the seriousness with which public registrants consider the proposals.”). 
196. In interviews, representatives of shareholder proponents consistently reported that electoral 
integrity and democratic considerations were secondary, not primary, motivations in their 
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with the goal of maximizing the firm’s interests and not with democratic trans-
parency in mind.
197
 This means that no one participating in the process is pri-
marily concerned with promoting democratic outcomes.
198
 Some companies 
make it clear in the text of their campaign finance disclosure reports that voters 
are not the intended audience.
199
 The disclosure standards produced in this 
context are thus likely to advance the interests of two sets of elites—corporate 
management and institutional investment funds.
200
 
Three aspects of private disclosure standards illustrate this elite bias. Dis-
closure policies set through proposal settlements favor infrequent reporting of 
only very large payments. In addition, they make no distinctions among “dark 
money” payments to influence federal, state, and local elections. In effect, dis-
closure standards have evolved primarily to promote the mutually beneficial 
interests of investors and managers, which include a strong interest in mini-
mizing disclosure costs and a focus on investor materiality. 
Annual Reporting. The emerging private disclosure standard requires a 
single, annual disclosure of corporate spending for the calendar year. The CPA 
promotes semi-annual reporting as a best practice, but the trend in settlements 
reviewed for this Article favored less frequent disclosure. Of forty-two investor-
 
efforts. This view was also reflected in many investor letters to the SEC in support of a 
rulemaking petition demanding mandatory political spending disclosure. See infra notes 
263-267 and accompanying text; cf. Harper Ho, supra note 99, at 654 (“[I]nstitutional inves-
tors have economic incentives to engage in activism that derive both from the prospect of 
reduced risk and the potential for higher returns.”). 
197. For management’s point of view about political spending disclosure, see Matthew Lepore, A 
Case for the Status Quo: Voluntary Disclosure, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 413 (2013). Mr. Lepore 
was, at the time he wrote the article, the Corporate Secretary and Chief Governance Counsel 
of Pfizer, Inc. 
198. This is consistent with studies of corporate environmental reporting, which have found that 
corporate managers view investors—and not community members or the public—as the 
primary audience for corporate environmental disclosures. See Crawford Spence, Social and 
Environmental Reporting and the Corporate Ego, 18 BUS. STRATEGY & ENV’T 254, 255 (2009) 
(reporting that a study of UK companies found that “[i]nvestors and employees were cited 
by [corporate reporting managers] as overwhelmingly the most important audiences” for 
social and environmental disclosures). 
199. For example, Southwestern Energy’s website provides a link to its disclosures with this 
statement: “Southwestern Energy Company makes available to its shareholders and stakehold-
ers a list of all corporate political contributions and contributions made by the Compa-
ny . . . .” SWN’s Political Activities, SW. ENERGY (emphasis added), http:// 
www.swn.com/corporategovernance/Pages/politicalactions.aspx [http://perma.cc/8P99 
-MZXZ]. 
200. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholders and Social Welfare, 36 SEAT-
TLE U. L. REV. 489, 491 (2013) (describing “shareholder politics” as “a contest between two 
elite groups: corporate managers and investment intermediaries”). 
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firm agreements, only fourteen committed firms to report their spending more 
frequently than once per year.
201
 
Such infrequent disclosure promotes the mutual interests of corporate 
management and shareholders, but it falls short of the pre-election reporting 
that the Supreme Court endorsed in Buckley v. Valeo as playing a key informa-
tional role for voters.
202
 Annual disclosure conforms to other corporate report-
ing cycles, such as the preparation of an annual financial statement and an an-
nual Sustainability or Corporate Responsibility Report. Of course, it is less 
costly to the firm to produce a disclosure only once per year. Annual reporting 
also fits nicely with the investment analysis practices of institutional investors, 
which generally review the companies in their portfolios on an annual cycle. 
Yet a single annual report, produced after December 31, is virtually worthless to 
a voter seeking information in advance of a November election. 
High Payment Thresholds. When it comes to corporate payments to 501(c) 
nonprofits, companies’ own disclosure policies are potentially important gap-
fillers: no public campaign finance law requires disclosure of this information. 
However, the emerging private disclosure standard requires disclosure only 
when “dark money” payments exceed a high dollar-value threshold, most 
commonly $50,000.
203
 Of the investor-firm agreements studied, only twenty-
nine of the forty-two specified a reporting threshold for payments to trade as-
sociations.
204
 Of these twenty-nine agreements, twenty used a threshold of 
$50,000 or greater.
205
 Only six firms agreed to a $25,000 threshold, and a mere 
three committed to thresholds below $25,000. This suggests that companies’ 
disclosure policies largely fail as gap-fillers; many large “dark money” pay-
ments are not disclosed under these policies, just as they are not required to be 
disclosed by public law. The use of high reporting thresholds also suggests that 




201. Thirteen agreements committed firms to semi-annual disclosure, while one committed a 
firm to quarterly disclosure. 
202. 424 U.S. 1, 66-67 (1976) (describing voters’ informational interest in campaign finance dis-
closure for “evaluating those who seek federal office”). 
203. See 2014 CPA-Zicklin Index, supra note 47, at 17 (“Many companies use a threshold amount 
(e.g. $25,000 a year) to reduce the burden of reporting and focus on the politically active 
trade associations for transparency.”). 
204. A number of agreements either did not commit the firm to disclose payments to 501(c) non-
profits at all or did not specify a reporting threshold. 
205. One agreement used a $100,000 reporting threshold. 
206. See Sarah C. Haan, Voter Primacy, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2655, 2685-89 (2015) (discussing 
concepts of investor materiality and their implications for disclosure of corporate political 
spending after Citizens United). The word “immaterial” was occasionally used to describe a 
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It is difficult to estimate the volume of electoral spending that remains in 
the dark when companies employ a $50,000 threshold for reporting 501(c) 
spending, but the case of Dow Chemical Company provides one example. Dow 
Chemical Company’s 2013 public website disclosure reported payments only to 
trade associations to which it had contributed $50,000 or more.
207
 The follow-
ing year, it lowered its threshold to $25,000.
208
 When it used the higher 
threshold, it reported payments to twenty-five organizations; when it used the 
lower threshold, it reported payments to thirty-five organizations. It is impos-
sible to know how much spending was not disclosed in the 2013 report that 
would have been disclosed using the lower threshold. However, the total value 
of payments that Dow reported in 2014 to organizations that did not appear on 
its 2013 report, and which did not independently exceed $50,000 (which would 
have made them separately reportable under the $50,000 threshold), was 
$213,307.
209
 Citizens—though probably not shareholders—would consider this 
amount of political spending to be significant. 
One-Size-Fits-All Reporting. A significant aspect of the emerging private 
standards is the use of a one-size-fits-all reporting threshold for “dark money” 
 
company’s political spending in written correspondence between an investor and a company 
reviewed for this analysis, suggesting that materiality concepts were influencing the parties’ 
positions on what should be disclosed. See, e.g., Letter from [company] to [investor] (Jan. 
11, 2013) (on file with author). 
207. Trade Association Lobbying Expenditures for Both Dow and Dow AgroSciences— 
2013, DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY, http://www.dow.com/-/media/dow/business-units 
/dow-us/pdf/2013-trade-association-lobbying-expenditures.ashx [http://perma.cc/6CLK 
-MTAY]. This disclosure appears to have been mandated by a 2009 agreement between 
Dow Chemical and its investor, the Mercy Investment Program. However, that agreement, 
as memorialized in Mercy Investment Program’s withdrawal letter, called for Dow to dis-
close all contributions to trade associations without a dollar threshold. This agreement is on 
file with the author. 
208. Id. (“For 2013, Dow reported information for trade associations and civic organizations to 
which Dow contributed $50,000 or more annually. The threshold was lowered to $25,000 
with the 2014 report.”) In 2014, Dow Chemical reached a second disclosure agreement with a 
small group of investors. This agreement committed the company to greater transparency, 
but, like the 2009 agreement, it did not specify a reporting threshold. Since Dow employed 
a lower reporting threshold thereafter, however, we can surmise that the $25,000 threshold 
may have been an informal part of the deal. The 2014 agreement is on file with the author. 
209. Trade Association Lobbying Expenditures for Both Dow and Dow AgroSciences – 2014, DOW 
CHEMICAL COMPANY, http://www.dow.com/-/media/dow/business-units/dow-us/pdf/2014
-trade-association-lobbying-expenditures.ashx [http://perma.cc/WPY6-HQNC]. This is a 
small fraction of the $5,971,202 total trade association spending that Dow reported in 2014 
using the lower $25,000 threshold. However, it could represent a significant amount of 
money in the context of one or two state or local elections or ballot initiatives. Dow’s disclo-
sure did not provide information about the purpose or purposes of the trade association 
spending. 
the yale law journal 126:262  2016 
320 
payments intended to influence federal, state, and local elections. That is, pri-
vate disclosure law generally commits a corporation to a single disclosure 
threshold for payments to 501(c) nonprofits that will apply whether the com-
pany donates to influence a local board of education election or to support a 
candidate for Congress. In contrast, public election law commonly provides 
different reporting thresholds for different types of elections, with higher 
thresholds for federal elections because they tend to involve greater overall 
spending.
210
 Under the private law approach, a corporation that has adopted a 
$50,000 threshold could donate $49,000 to a 501(c) nonprofit to influence a 
local election with no disclosure obligation at all. While a $49,000 expenditure 
would not stand out in a federal election, it might be very significant in the 
context of a municipal campaign. 
As a result of the common use of one-size-fits-all thresholds, companies 
can have more secret influence on state and local elections than on federal elec-
tions while complying with their “voluntary” disclosure commitments. Over 
time, this may lead companies to channel their political spending—and particu-
larly their controversial political spending—away from federal elections and 
toward state and local elections and ballot initiatives. This may influence busi-
nesses to try to accomplish through a series of state or local campaigns what 
they might otherwise have tried to accomplish through efforts at the federal 
level. The one-size-fits-all threshold thus not only reveals a firm-centered (ra-
ther than election-centered) approach to disclosure, but may have significant 
unintended consequences in terms of channeling corporate political action to 
jurisdictions where influential spending is more easily concealed from voters. 
Private disclosure standards are likely to further evolve in some predictable 
ways. For example, investors’ general disclosure interests focus on risk and its 
relationship to future revenue, while managers are typically concerned with 
compliance and cost control. Virginia Harper Ho has summarized the case for 
“risk-related” shareholder activism, which promotes the adoption of corporate 
systems to identify and manage social and environmental risks and encourages 
disclosure.
211
 The trend toward risk-based disclosure has been observed by 
scholars of voluntary corporate environmental reporting.
212
 As Harper Ho 
 
210. See Indep. Inst. v. Williams, No. 14-1463, slip op. at 21 (10th Cir. Feb. 4, 2016) (“It is not 
surprising . . . that a disclosure threshold for state elections is lower than an otherwise com-
parable federal threshold. Smaller elections can be influenced by less expensive communica-
tions.”). 
211. Harper Ho, supra note 99, at 651. 
212. Rory Sullivan & Andy Gouldson, Does Voluntary Carbon Reporting Meet Investors’ Needs?, 36 
J. CLEANER PRODUCTION 60, 61-62 (2012). See generally Matthew Haigh & Matthew A. 
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points out, evidence suggests that effective management of social and envi-
ronmental risk can improve firm profitability and financial performance, 
providing investors with a motive to pursue risk-based disclosure.
213
 Private 
campaign finance disclosure is thus likely to further evolve (as voluntary envi-
ronmental reporting has) to address the mutually beneficial interests of corpo-
rate managers and investors. Yet voters learn little of value from disclosures tai-
lored to provide information about individual firms’ risk management related 
to political spending. 
One danger is that widespread adoption of private disclosure standards 
could reduce the public’s appetite for public disclosure reform. If the public be-
lieves that corporations have “voluntarily” adopted transparent practices, voters 
may willingly allow disclosure standards to be set exclusively through private 
ordering.
214
 The term “voluntary,” which is often applied to disclosure mandat-
ed by proposal settlements, implies that firms are good corporate citizens who 
have freely chosen to report their spending out of a sense of civic virtue. In fact, 
much of the reporting that is labeled “voluntary” has been forced out of com-
panies through private bargaining and is the product of bargained-for ex-
change. If the public understood how “voluntary” corporate disclosure came 
about, it might be less complacent about the need for public supervision of that 
disclosure. 
Finally, even if public campaign finance laws are reformed to require man-
datory corporate disclosure, established—and flawed—corporate practices may 
be imported into new laws. For example, evidence indicates that “voluntary” 
environmental disclosure standards have had a significant influence on the sub-
sequent development of mandatory standards.
215
 This is further reason to press 
for better participation, transparency, rule content, and enforcement in private 
disclosure standard setting. 
 
Shapiro, Carbon Reporting: Does it Matter?, 25 ACCT. AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 105 
(2012) (discussing the informational needs of investors related to environmental risk). 
213. Harper Ho, supra note 99, at 693. 
214. Cf. Sitaraman, supra note 157, at 803 (noting that the success of private ordering in electoral 
regulation “would bolster an argument that government regulation is unnecessary”). 
215. The carbon disclosure movement “has generated considerable momentum toward the for-
malization of carbon accounting standards, which are crossing over into the regulatory ap-
paratus of agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Environmental 
Protection Agency.” Janelle Knox-Hayes & David Levy, The Political Economy of Governance by 
Disclosure: Carbon Disclosure and Nonfinancial Reporting as Contested Fields of Governance, in 
TRANSPARENCY IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 217 (Aarti 
Gupta & Michael Mason eds., 2014). 
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3. Enforcement 
One of the most intriguing questions about shareholder proposal settle-
ment agreements is whether and to what extent they are enforceable against a 
company. To date, institutional investors have not sought judicial enforcement 
of settlement agreements through civil lawsuits. Instead, to the extent that 
shareholder proponents have engaged in enforcement activity at all, they have 




Proposal settlements are contracts accompanied by an exchange of consid-
eration and thus should be enforceable in court. However, most agreements re-
viewed for this Article commit the company to performance for an indefinite 
term—an ongoing disclosure obligation with no end. This potentially limits a 
court’s ability to enforce the company’s disclosure commitment. Of course, 
courts may imply a reasonable term for a party’s performance. One year would 
certainly be a reasonable implied term for a disclosure commitment in a pro-
posal settlement, since the investor has made a complimentary one-year com-
mitment: it has given up its one annual opportunity to bring a proposal to a 
vote. Because Rule 14a-8 also limits the ability of the investor to submit subse-
quent proposals—for example, if the company is deemed to have “substantially 
implemented” a policy reform, perhaps in a previous settlement—a longer term 
might also be reasonable.
217
 At any rate, a simple change to the agreements to 
specify the length of the company’s disclosure commitment would remedy po-
tential enforceability problems. 
The fact that investors have not sought to write airtight contracts or to en-
force breaches in court suggests several possibilities. First, it is possible that, 
even in the absence of legal enforcement mechanisms, shareholder proponents 
and management will engage in cooperative settlements they view as mutually 
beneficial. This requires shareholders to trust management to fulfill its obliga-
tions—perhaps in reliance on legally or socially framed obligations of corporate 
management to its shareholders, including those, like fiduciary duties, that 
have unclear application to proposal implementation. Some legal scholars, no-
tably Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout, have explored cooperative patterns of be-
 
216. In background interviews, several investors stated that they had renewed a proposal or 
threatened to renew a proposal as a means to enforce a social or environmental settlement 
agreement. The investors were not speaking specifically of campaign finance disclosure set-
tlements. 
217. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(10) (2016) (allowing a company to exclude a shareholder proposal 
“[i]f the company has already substantially implemented” it).  
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A different possibility is that shareholder proponents ascribe greater value 
to the achievement of the settlement than they do to the company’s compliance 
with the settlement’s terms. The shareholder proponent bears all the costs of 
drafting the proposal and negotiating the settlement; when settlement is 
achieved, the SRI fund or public pension fund may issue a press release to an-
nounce its success in getting some company to adopt a social or environmental 
policy. At this point, the investor has achieved a reputational benefit. It has lit-
tle incentive to take on future costs of monitoring or enforcement. Not only 
will the investor likely have to shoulder these costs alone, but the discovery that 
a company has violated a settlement agreement arguably diminishes the value 
of the settlement and, therefore, the investor’s reputation. In interviews, some 
investors stated that they monitored firms’ compliance with the agreements 
but others said they did not monitor them and instead relied on the media and 
on the nonprofit CPA to report disclosure problems.
219
 The fact that some 
shareholder proponents admitted that they did not monitor the agreemnts 
suggests that compliance was not the goal of the deal. 
The main tool investors have used to enforce private campaign finance dis-
closure standards is the threat to reinitiate the shareholder proposal process. 
Because the shareholder proposal process occurs once per year, investors tend 
to evaluate companies on an annual basis that conforms to the SEC’s timeline 
for filing shareholder proposals. In fact, the CPA’s annual CPA-Zicklin Index of 
Corporate Political Spending Disclosure and Accountability, which ranks S&P 
500 companies based in part on their disclosure practices, may serve a key 
monitoring function for shareholder proponents of campaign finance disclo-
sure settlements. The CPA-Zicklin Index is published annually in the fall, per-
fectly (or perhaps coincidentally) timed to provide investor activists with in-
formation in advance of proxy season.
220
 
Enforcement of settlement agreements is hobbled by yet a second problem: 
Rule 14a-8 imposes eligibility requirements for shareholder proponents that, in 
some cases, prevent them from reinitiating proposals. Shareholders consider-
ing reinitiation must hold the requisite amount of stock for a year before the 
 
218. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foun-
dations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735 (2001). 
219. Cf. Harper Ho, supra note 99, at 652 (“What is undisputed is . . . that most institutional in-
vestors do not actively monitor portfolio firms.”). 
220. See, e.g., 2015 CPA-Zicklin Index, supra note 80. 




 this imposes what amounts to a never-ending requirement 
of continuous ownership on shareholders wishing to monitor and enforce their 
settlements. A fund that sells the company’s stock after the initial settlement 
will be ineligible to reinitiate the proposal if the company stops complying with 
the agreement. Meanwhile, other shareholders who meet the eligibility re-
quirements may not be aware of the agreement, are unlikely to have been mon-
itoring the company’s compliance, and will not know that the shareholder pro-
ponent has sold its shares. Other shareholders also will not have access to the 
settlement agreement unless the original shareholder proponent gave it to 
them. The original shareholder proponent may have moved on long ago, how-
ever, retaining no interest in the target company’s policies. Thus, the eligibility 
requirements of Rule 14a-8 present serious enforcement problems for share-
holder proponents who actively manage their investments. 
In fact, public companies have failed to honor their disclosure commit-
ments in a significant proportion of the campaign finance settlements reviewed 
for this Article. The Article’s analysis focused on forty-two agreements from 
2009 to 2015 in which a public company committed to specific campaign fi-
nance disclosure practices in exchange for the withdrawal of a shareholder pro-
posal. In ten cases, or roughly 24% of settlements, the firm either never com-
plied with the agreement or had ceased complying with it—by disclosing less 
than it had promised to disclose in the agreement—by January 2016. Four of 
the ten non-complying companies appear to have simply stopped reporting.
222
 
Three companies published reports that provided less information than they 
had committed to report in the settlement agreement. And three of the non-
complying companies had gone through a merger or acquisition since the set-
tlement was finalized. In each case, following the change in control, the com-
pany had removed its archive of disclosure reports from its website and had 
ceased making new disclosures. 
For example, in 2012, Safeway, Inc., then an S&P 500 company trading on 
the New York Stock Exchange, settled a shareholder proposal brought by the 
New York State Common Retirement Fund (NYSCRF) on campaign finance 
disclosure.
223
 In that deal, Safeway, Inc. agreed to make annual campaign fi-
nance disclosures on its public website. In January 2015, Safeway merged with 
 
221. Rule 14a-8 requires a shareholder to have continuously held the requisite amount of the 
company’s securities for at least one year prior to the date the proposal is submitted. 17 
C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b)(1) (2016). 
222. A company was considered to have ceased reporting if, at the time of review, its last semi-
annual report was more than six months overdue. 
223. Documents memorializing this agreement are on file with the author. 
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the Albertsons supermarket chain and went private;
224
 it subsequently removed 
its campaign finance disclosures from its website and ceased reporting on its 
political spending. The acquisition effectively ended Safeway’s campaign fi-
nance disclosure commitment under the settlement agreement. 
In January 2015, Valero Energy settled a shareholder proposal brought by 
the NYSCRF on campaign finance disclosure. The agreement committed Vale-
ro to publish a semi-annual political contribution report on its website. Valero 
initially complied with its commitment by posting a report for the period of Ju-
ly 2014 through December 2014.
225
 As of mid-February 2016, this was still the 
last report Valero had posted on its website. For all intents and purposes it ap-
pears to have stopped complying with the agreement. 
In February 2014, Peabody Energy reached a campaign finance disclosure 
agreement with the Philadelphia Board of Pensions and Retirement that led to 
the withdrawal of the pension fund’s shareholder proposal. As part of this 
agreement, Peabody committed to publishing an annual disclosure report on 
its website. Indeed, Peabody’s 2014 Corporate and Social Responsibility Report 
references “an itemized list of the 2014 Peabody [political] contributions,” 
which “can be found under the ‘Corporate Responsibility’ tab on the home 
page of PeabodyEnergy.com.”
226
 However, in October 2015, the most recent 
campaign finance disclosure reports posted on Peabody’s website were for cal-
endar year 2013.
227
 Between October 2015 and January 2016 (after this author 
questioned representatives of both the investor and the company about Pea-
body’s compliance with the settlement agreement), Peabody posted a disclo-
sure report for calendar year 2014.
228
 That is, Peabody appears to have initially 
 
224. See Brent Kendall, FTC Clears Safeway-Albertsons Merger, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 27, 2015,  
4:18 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ftc-clears-safeway-albertsons-merger-1422383063 
[http://perma.cc/3H2H-MACJ]. 
225. See Policy on Political Contributions, Lobbying and Trade Associations, VALERO ENERGY  
CORP. (Jan. 5, 2015), http://www.valero.com/en-us/Documents/VALPAC/Political
%20Contributions%20Disclosures.pdf [http://perma.cc/W96G-C6GQ] (including em-
bedded links to reports). 
226. Advanced Energy: 2014 Corporate and Social Responsibility Report, PEABODY  
ENERGY 26, http://mscusppegrs01.blob.core.windows.net/mmfiles/files/corpresponsibility 
/2014_csrr.pdf [http://perma.cc/6CBH-N8XT]. 
227. See Political and Lobbying Activities, PEABODY ENERGY (Oct. 7, 2015), http://web.archive
.org/web/20151007044525/http://www.peabodyenergy.com/content/506/Political-and-Lob
bying-Activities [http://perma.cc/EUB5-2ZXT]. A screenshot is also on file with the author. 
228. Peabody has since removed the 2014 disclosure report from its “Political and Lobbying Ac-
tivities” webpage, replacing it with a 2015 disclosure report. See Political and Lobbying  
Activities, PEABODY ENERGY, http://www.peabodyenergy.com/content/506/political-and 
-lobbying-activities [http://perma.cc/PDL8-YEWW]. Peabody’s 2014 disclosure report is 
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complied with the agreement by posting a 2013 disclosure report and then to 
have stopped complying with the agreement until a third party raised questions 
in late 2015. 
The high rate of settlement failure suggests that investors’ financial incen-
tives are a strong force in shaping post-settlement monitoring and enforce-
ment: because the costs of monitoring and enforcement may not be cost-
justified for an individual shareholder proponent, investors have engaged in 
little monitoring and weak enforcement. 
In a few cases, a shareholder proponent has taken a step that may increase 
the likelihood of compliance: requesting a notice in the proxy statement that 
acknowledges new disclosure practices and connects them to investor activism. 
For example, the Boeing Company’s 2013 Proxy Statement, which was filed 
with the SEC, provided the following notice to shareholders: 
Investor Voice submitted a shareholder proposal for the Annual Meet-
ing requesting that the Board report semi-annually describing Boeing’s 
policies, procedures and expenditures related to political contributions 
and third-party activities. Boeing considered the proposal and Boeing’s 
“Statement on Federal, State and Local Political Expenditures” address-




Similarly, in its 2015 Proxy Statement, Cardinal Health included this more 
oblique statement: “After considering feedback received from shareholders in 
recent years, we have . . . enhanced our disclosure on Board oversight of politi-
cal contributions, and beginning in calendar year 2016 will post an annual re-
 
on file with the author, who downloaded it from Peabody’s website on January 15, 2016. 
Peabody is one of many companies that does not archive past years’ disclosure reports on its 
website. 
229. Boeing Co., Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange  
Act of 1934 (Schedule 14A), at 65 (Mar. 15, 2013). When the link was visited by the author 
on September 22, 2015, it directed the author to a webpage entitled “Political Expenditures”  
that did not specifically reference Investor Voice or Newground Social Investments,  
but which provided links to Boeing’s voluntary reports on political spending. Other  
companies whose proxy statements have mentioned withdrawn shareholder proposals from 
Investor Voice on the subject of campaign finance disclosure include Starbucks Corp. (2009) 
and Cisco Systems, Inc. (2015). See Starbucks Corp., Proxy Statement Pursuant to  
Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Schedule 14A), at 13  
(Jan. 22, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/829224/000095013409000847
/v50962dedef14a.htm [http://perma.cc/VSH8-PL2C]; Cisco Systems, Inc., Proxy State-
ment Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Schedule 14A), at 4 
(Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/858877/000119312515333996
/d95056ddef14a.htm#toc95056_10 [http://perma.cc/M7RP-KE8S]. 
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port on political contributions on our website.”
230
 In fact, both companies had 
negotiated an agreement with a shareholder that committed it to specific cam-
paign finance disclosure practices in exchange for the shareholder’s withdrawal 
of a shareholder proposal.
231
 
Most issuers’ proxy statements do not contain such notices. Possibly, proxy 
notices are undesirable from the managers’ point of view because they could 
create liability. The publication of a materially false or misleading statement in 
a proxy statement violates federal securities law. Although it is not established 
that a broadly worded statement like those quoted above would satisfy materi-
ality in the absence of a related vote by shareholders, a firm may be more likely 
to comply with an agreement to begin posting an annual campaign finance dis-
closure report on its website if it has committed to do so in its proxy statement. 
In light of the significant barriers to enforcement, corporate campaign fi-
nance disclosures are of questionable quality. Firms can violate their disclosure 
commitments with impunity. The literature has long documented qualitative 
problems with “voluntary” corporate environmental reporting.
232
 For example, 
 
230. Cardinal Health, Inc., Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (Schedule 14A), at 11 (Sept. 15, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data
/721371/000072137114000214/cah-2014xdef14a.htm [http://perma.cc/R46P-FS7X]. 
231. The Boeing Company settled a political spending proposal with Investor Voice on behalf of 
Newground Social Investment in or around December 2012. Documents related to this set-
tlement are on file with the author. The Cardinal Health settlement, negotiated with the In-
ternational Brotherhood of Teamsters between August and November 2015, left almost no 
public trace. The Teamsters had brought political spending proposals to a vote at Cardinal 
Health in prior years, garnering 41% shareholder approval in 2014 and 40% in 2013. The 
Teamsters’ 2015 Shareholder Season Report omits any mention of the 2015 proposal or its 
outcome. Compare 2015 Shareholder Season Report, TEAMSTERS, http://teamster.org/2015 
-shareholder-season-report [http://perma.cc/D6R5-JJDX] (“Teamster Funds filed share-
holder proposals at 19 companies voted on by investors this year on a range of topics.”) with 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters General Fund/TAPP/GCC 2015 Shareholder Season Re-
port, TEAMSTERS, http://teamster.org/sites/teamster.org/files/12222015shareholderrpt.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/6PK9-E9Z8] (listing the voting outcomes for eighteen proposals). See 
generally Cardinal Health, Inc., supra note 230 (providing the language quoted in the text 
but no proposal); Press Release, Sustainable Invs. Inst., New Analysis: Mixed Results for 
2015 Proxy Season on Social & Environmental Issues 3 (Aug. 19, 2015), http://siinstitute.org
/press/2015/Si2_Press_Release_Proxy_Review__Aug__2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/YS8D 
-D4XJ] (containing a pending shareholder proposal at Cardinal Health from the Team-
sters). 
232. See, e.g., Carol A. Adams, The Ethical, Social and Environmental Reporting-Performance Por-
trayal Gap, 17 ACCT. AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 731, 749 (2004) (identifying “lack of 
‘completeness’” as a “particularly concerning feature” of the non-financial reporting of a 
large, multinational company in an in-depth study); Andrea Liesen et al., Does Stakeholder 
Pressure Influence Corporate GHG Emissions Reporting: Empirical Evidence from Europe, 28 
ACCT. AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 1047, 1056 tbl.11 (2015) (finding that an average of 
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studies have shown that companies choose to disclose good environmental data 




Corporate political spending disclosure has been the subject of less empiri-
cal research, but similar concerns have emerged. Studies in both 2011 and 2014 
found that many companies that claimed to have policies banning election-
related spending actually engaged in such activity.
234
 For example, the 2014 
study found that Ford Motor Company made payments to five 527 organiza-
tions between 2011 and 2013, although it had stated in its 2010 and 2011 proxy 
statements that it had a policy not to make contributions to political organiza-
tions.
235
 The 2011 study found similar discrepancies by comparing companies’ 




15% of 431 E.U. companies that voluntarily disclosed greenhouse gas emissions from 2005 to 
2009 made complete disclosures). 
233. For example, an empirical analysis found that corporate participants actually increased 
greenhouse gas emissions over time while reporting reductions. See Eun-Hee Kim & Thom-
as P. Lyon, Strategic Environmental Disclosure: Evidence from the DOE’s Voluntary Greenhouse 
Gas Registry, 61 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 311, 312 (2011). According to the researchers, the 
“sharp disconnect between actual and reported [emissions] suggested that . . . [corporate] 
participants took advantage of the program’s loose reporting requirements, selectively re-
porting on successful projects while remaining silent about any actions that increased emis-
sions.” Id. at 320. 
234. See Heidi Welsh & Robin Young, Corporate Governance of Political Expenditures:  
2011 Benchmark Report on S&P 500 Companies, IRRC INST. 26-27 (Nov.  
2011), http://www.irrcinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Political_Spending_Rep
ort_Nov_10_20111.pdf [http://perma.cc/WAC7-RWJ5] (“Out of the 57 companies . . . that 
have policies apparently prohibiting political spending, only 23 companies actually did not 
give money to political committees, parties, or candidates.”); The Myth of Corporate  




235. The Myth of Corporate Disclosure Exposed, supra note 234, at 27. 
236. Welsh & Young, supra note 234. The IRRC Institute 2011 study found, for example, that H.J. 
Heinz Company (“Heinz”) made $10,000 in contributions to 527 groups in contravention of 
a specific policy banning donations to 527 groups. Id. Heinz was taken private in June 2013 
by an investment consortium that included Berkshire Hathaway, one of the lowest-scoring 
companies on the Index. See Press Release, KraftHeinz, Berkshire Hathaway and 3G Capital 
Complete Acquisition of H.J. Heinz Company (June 7, 2013), http://news.heinz.com/press 
-release/finance/berkshire-hathaway-and-3g-capital-complete-acquisition-hj-heinz-comp 
any [http://perma.cc/72JR-K8S7]. Once private, Heinz removed all of its political spending 
disclosures from its website; as a result, the company’s spending in election year 2012 was 
never disclosed. 
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Similarly, in 2012, Aetna revealed—accidentally—in a filing to the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) that in 2011 it had made pre-
viously undisclosed payments totaling $3.3 million to a politically active 
501(c)(4) nonprofit, the American Action Network.
237
 That year, Aetna had de-
clined to disclose (c)(4) payments in its voluntary corporate disclosure; it later 
revised the NAIC filing to remove the payment. Aetna’s CEO took the position 
that disclosure of the money was not required because it was spent on “educa-
tional activities.”
238
 Aetna’s potentially misleading disclosures led a shareholder 
to file a securities fraud lawsuit against the company in 2013, and the complaint 
in the case details serious discrepancies between the voluntary disclosure re-
ports that Aetna published on its website and information provided to the IRS 
by nonprofits that claimed to have received payments from Aetna.
239
 These 
documented problems with disclosures by Ford Motor Company, Aetna, and 
other firms suggest that “voluntary” disclosures may not be worthy of public 
trust. 
4. Citizen Sovereignty 
Private disclosure law undercuts citizen sovereignty in the regulation of the 
political process itself, thereby potentially delegitimizing disclosure as a tool to 
promote electoral integrity. Privatizing campaign finance disclosure law com-
pletely cuts citizens out of the disclosure rulemaking process as stakeholders, 
relegating them to a subordinate role in their own self-government. It also 
shifts a measure of election oversight to the SEC, removing campaign finance 
from the domain of election experts and judges and placing it within the au-
thority of regulators whose prime objective is the protection of investors. 
 
237. The 2013 CPA-Zicklin Index of Corporate Political Accountability and Disclosure, CTR. FOR POL. 
ACCOUNTABILITY 30 n.28 (Sept 24, 2013), http://www.iccr.org/sites/default/files/resources
_attachments/2013%20CPA-Zicklin%20Index%20Final.pdf [http://perma.cc/CY56-HFJC]; 
Press Release, Ctr. for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash., Aetna Hides $7 Million in Political 
Spending; CREW Calls for Greater Disclosure (June 14, 2012), http://secure
.citizensforethics.org/press/entry/aetna-political-spending-american-action-network 
-chamber-of-commerce [http://perma.cc/5K3N-QKYH]. 
238. See Letter from Mark T. Bertolini, Chairman, CEO & President, Aetna, to Melanie Sloan, 
Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. (June 14, 2012), http://s3.amazonaws 
.com/storage.citizensforethics.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/20022528/6-14-12_Aetna
_Letter_to_CREW_Mark_T_Bertolini_Response.pdf [http://perma.cc/2XS6-J8MJ]. 
239. See Complaint ¶¶ 27-29, Silberstein v. Aetna, Inc., 2014 WL 1388790 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2014) 
(No. 13 CV 8759). 
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In fact, because the Constitution specifically grants Congress the power to 
regulate federal elections,
240
 the privatization of election law potentially upsets 
the Constitution’s thoughtful delegation of regulatory authority. When the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Citizens United removed a whole domain of electoral 
spending—corporate independent expenditures—from substantive regulation 
by the state, it shifted disclosure regulation closer to the core of Congress’s re-
maining authority to regulate elections.
241
 In light of the Founders’ express 
grant of power to Congress to regulate federal elections and the Supreme 
Court’s endorsement of and reliance on disclosure as central to that power, the 
privatization of disclosure law compromises vital design elements of our politi-
cal process. Congress’s failure to reform campaign finance disclosure in the face 
of strong citizen demand for reform
242
 has created a regulatory vacuum for pri-
vate actors to fill, altering not only the source of disclosure law for corpora-
tions, but also the identities and allegiances of the institutions that shape elec-
toral processes and outcomes. A key danger is that privatizing disclosure 
regulation may erode public confidence in the free-functioning of the electoral 
process.
243
 In short, privatized election law is a remarkably undemocratic way 




240. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators 
and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the 
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of 
chusing Senators.”); see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 13 (1976) (“The constitutional power of 
Congress to regulate federal elections is well established . . . . ”); United States v. Classic, 313 
U.S. 299, 310 (1941). 
241. See Richard L. Hasen, Chill Out: A Qualified Defense of Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws in 
the Internet Age, 27 J.L. & POL. 557, 559 (2011) (“[D]isclosure laws remain one of the few re-
maining constitutional levers to further the public interest through campaign finance law.”). 
242. A New York Times/CBS News poll in May 2015 found that 75% of respondents believed that 
outside spending groups should be required to publicly disclose their contributors, a reform 
that would reveal the corporate political spending that is currently undisclosed. See Ameri-
cans’ Views on Money in Politics, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com
/interactive/2015/06/02/us/politics/money-in-politics-poll.html [http://perma.cc/ZH6X 
-DWRL]. 
243. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982) (“[I]n 
Buckley v. Valeo, we specifically affirmed the importance of preventing . . . the eroding of 
public confidence in the electoral process through the appearance of corruption.” (citation 
omitted)); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789 (1978) (affirming the state’s 
interest in “[p]reservation of the individual citizen’s confidence in government”); see also 
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 354 (1995) (“Required disclosures about 
the level of financial support a candidate has received from various sources are supported by 
an interest in avoiding the appearance of corruption.”). 
244. This Article has not analyzed the small number of instances in which an activist investor has 
used the settlement of civil shareholder litigation to reform corporations’ campaign finance 
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Proposal settlements are an example of how securities regulation takes on a 
“quasi-constitutional dimension” when the subject of the settlement has a 
strong constitutional flavor, as electoral regulation does.
245
 The reform of cor-
porate campaign finance disclosure through proposal settlements suggests that 
securities regulation may be ill-fitted for such a quasi-constitutional purpose. 
This is due to two main factors. First, securities regulation has evolved over 
decades to serve other goals and thus lacks the attributes we would seek in a 
regulatory regime serving constitutional ends. There is no reason to believe 
that the shareholder proposal mechanism, designed to facilitate shareholder 
voice for corporate governance purposes, will serve as an effective mechanism 
for generating disclosure law that promotes electoral integrity. Second, the 
goals of securities regulation, such as efficient capital formation, are important 
in their own right. These aims would be vulnerable to dilution or compromise 
if securities regulation morphed into a tool of campaign finance disclosure re-
form. 
As Elizabeth Pollman has argued, the Supreme Court errs when it relies on 
corporate private ordering mechanisms to protect values and goals that are 
constitutional or quasi-constitutional in nature.
246
 Pollman points out, for ex-
ample, that corporate law focuses on shareholders’ and managers’ interests to 
the exclusion of the interests of other corporate stakeholders. Corporate law’s 
blinkered focus highlights the misfit between corporate law doctrine and the 
constitutional or quasi-constitutional work the Supreme Court seems to want 
 
disclosure policy. However, such cases suffer from the same transparency problems that 
plague proposal settlements. In 2013, the NYSCRF sued Qualcomm, Inc. in Delaware Chan-
cery Court after the company failed to comply with the investor’s books-and-records request 
under Section 220 of Delaware’s General Corporation Law. See Complaint ¶¶ 8-11, N.Y. St. 
Common Ret. Fund v. Qualcomm, Inc., 2013 WL 28623 (Del. Ch. Jan. 2, 2013) (No. 8710). 
Qualcomm quickly settled the suit by agreeing to new disclosure practices, which were re-
portedly memorialized in the settlement agreement. See Dan Strumpf, Qualcomm Settles Dis-
closure Suit with New York, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 22, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles
/SB10001424127887323549204578320500077425818 [http://perma.cc/BUN9-G8YB]; Press 
Release, Office of the N.Y. State Comptroller, Qualcomm Implements Industry-Leading Po-
litical Spending Disclosure Policy; DiNapoli Commends Action (Feb. 22, 2013), 
http://osc.state.ny.us/press/releases/feb13/022213.htm [http://perma.cc/7CYR-P7KG]. Also 
in 2013, News Corp. settled a derivative lawsuit brought by shareholders in the wake of the 
British phone hacking scandal; the settlement agreement set campaign finance disclosure 
policies for the company. See Ning Chiu, A Range of Support for Shareholder Proposals on Polit-
ical Contributions, DAVIS POLK: BRIEFING: GOVERNANCE (May 2, 2013), http://www
.briefinggovernance.com/2013/05/a-range-of-support-for-shareholder-proposals-on-politic
al-contributions [http://perma.cc/G494-75GE]. 
245. Elizabeth Pollman, Constitutionalizing Corporate Law, 69 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) 
(manuscript at 4) (on file with author). 
246. See id. (manuscript at 4, 28). 
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corporate law to perform.
247
 This insight also applies to proposal settlements 
that set corporate campaign finance disclosure standards because the focus of 
Rule 14a-8 on shareholders’ and managers’ binary interests disenfranchises 
nearly everyone else from setting disclosure standards. 
iv. the future of corporate campaign finance disclosure 
The future of corporate campaign finance disclosure may rely heavily on 
private ordering. This Article has explored the strengths and weaknesses of 
achieving disclosure reform through shareholder proposal settlements, the 
main tool of investor activists under our existing securities regulatory regime. 
Disclosure reforms wrought through settlement may have partially filled some 
gaps in public disclosure law, but the reforms have primarily advanced the mu-
tually beneficial interests of corporate shareholders and managers. In doing so, 
they have defeated important citizen interests, such as pre-election disclosure. 
Settlements also raise thorny questions about the role of shareholders in influ-
encing corporate social and environmental policy, about agency costs, and 
about agency capitalism. 
Two points are worth underscoring. First, the emergence of “voluntary” 
corporate campaign finance disclosure does not mean that public companies are 
volunteering to reveal information about the money they spend to influence 
elections. Citizens must understand this point to make sense of corporate cam-
paign finance disclosure data, and to exercise citizen sovereignty over the elec-
toral process. One goal of this Article has been to pull back the curtain on “vol-
untary” corporate campaign finance disclosure to reveal it as the product of a 
bargained-for exchange between shareholders and managers. Another has been 
to identify parties with outsized influence on reform outcomes, such as for-
profit proxy advisory firms, and parties excluded from participation altogether, 
such as citizens and most corporate stakeholders. 
Secondly, shareholder proposals and proposal settlements play out entirely 
in the shadow of federal securities regulation. The SEC is indirectly regulating 
the reform of corporate political spending disclosure through Rule 14a-8, and 
its regulations and no-action guidance are influencing the substance, format, 
and timing of real-world disclosure standards. This year, the public went to the 
polls to elect federal and state officials with little information about public 
companies’ spending to influence their votes. This information deficit was 
traceable not only to gaps in public disclosure law, but also to private disclosure 
 
247. Id. (manuscript at 4, 28-29). 
shareholder proposal settlements  
333 
rules that institutional investors and corporate managers have established 
through a settlement mechanism shaped in all material respects by SEC rules. 
One solution might be to completely proscribe the settlement of sharehold-
er proposals. This might be done, for example, with a simple rule prohibiting 
withdrawal of a proposal. Under such a rule, a company that received a qualify-
ing proposal would have to publish it in the proxy and allow a shareholder 
vote. If the company was persuaded to support the proposal, it could simply 
publish a statement in support of the proposal in the proxy and ask sharehold-
ers to approve it. 
This Article does not propose such a rule because shareholders and manag-
ers would likely find a way to circumvent a prohibition on withdrawal.
248
 Also, 
a rule prohibiting settlement might have the undesirable collateral effect of cut-
ting off quick and cost-effective resolutions of uncontroversial policy reforms. In 
an era of agency capitalism, small investors’ channels of informal activism may 
be limited, causing them to rely more heavily on the shareholder proposal 
mechanism to get the attention of corporate managers. 
This Part argues that rather than prohibiting settlement of proposals in 
every situation, private actors and the SEC should fix transparency and en-
forcement problems that characterize existing settlement practices. Settlement 
transparency could be improved tomorrow if investors and firms chose to 
adopt transparent practices. Federal securities regulation can be amended to 
meaningfully enhance both transparency and enforceability of investor-firm 
settlements. This Part describes a range of private practices and regulatory re-
forms that can improve the use of the proposal settlement to make social and 
environmental change at public companies. 
Regardless of the adoption of these reforms, this Part contends that corpo-
rate campaign finance disclosure presents an urgent case for public law reform. 
The privatization of campaign finance disclosure is a uniquely undemocratic 
way to regulate the democratic process. Here, the method of privatization vir-
tually ensures that certain parties’ interests will be advanced, while citizen in-
terests are defeated. This Part offers a set of factors for law- and policymakers 
to use to determine when the scope of a social or environmental shareholder 
activism campaign exceeds what we should reasonably expect from private or-
dering. Campaign finance disclosure satisfies all of these factors, suggesting not 
 
248. For example, the SEC’s rules require that the shareholder proponent appear at the annual 
meeting to present the proposal for a vote; if the proponent fails to appear, the vote may be 
canceled. This and other procedural requirements provide opportunities for investors and 
managers to comply with the letter of a prohibition on withdrawal while still achieving a de 
facto settlement. 
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only that the time is ripe for Congress or a federal agency to act, but that inac-
tion by public institutions may have serious consequences. 
Scholars, policymakers, and commentators all tend to frame the issue of an 
SEC political spending disclosure mandate in simple terms: should the SEC 
get involved in regulating campaign finance disclosure? Many have answered in 
the affirmative. 
One of the key insights of this Article, however, is that this frame is mis-
leading. The SEC is already involved in regulating how corporate electoral ex-
penditures get disclosed to the public. In fact, SEC rules and no-action guid-
ance have governed the most significant reform of corporate campaign finance 
disclosure since the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 were 
passed.
249
 Investors’ efforts to use private ordering to reform disclosure should 
not surprise us; private regulation of corporate political speech and disclosure 
was endorsed by a five-Justice majority in Citizens United.
250
 But if SEC rules 
determine everything from who participates in disclosure standard setting to 
the number of words in disclosure policies that shareholders can approve, we 
should not pretend that the SEC has remained above the fray. This Part en-
courages a more nuanced discussion about the role of the SEC in governing 
private reform of corporate social and environmental policy, given that it is do-
ing this already, and particularly a more honest discussion about how SEC 
rules and policies have influenced what campaign finance information is availa-
ble to voters. 
A. Reforming Mechanisms of Private Ordering 
1. Increasing Transparency and Enforceability of Settlement Agreements 
The private actors who make, monitor, and enforce proposal settlements 
can and should use private ordering to enhance transparency and enforceability 
of settlements. In addition, a number of corporate law and securities regulation 
reforms could address problems of democratic transparency, participation, and 
enforcement, as well as agency costs, when proposal settlements are used to set 
corporate social and environmental policies. 
 
249. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.). 
250. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 361-62 (2010) (rejecting the 
“shareholder-protection interest” in reliance on “the procedures of corporate democracy”); 
id. at 370 (discussing “[s]hareholder objections raised through the procedures of corporate 
democracy” in support of disclosure). 
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Private Solutions to Transparency Problems. Put simply, investor activists 
and corporations can address transparency problems by choosing to make pro-
posal settlements more transparent. Investors could do this, as some already 
have, by posting proposals and settlements on the internet and by publicly re-
porting the dispositions of proposals. Firms could increase transparency by do-
ing the same thing or by publishing information about proposals and settle-
ments in the proxy statement. Firms could also adopt bylaws to govern their 
settlement practices and related transparency issues. 
Securities Regulation Reforms To Address Transparency Problems. Legal 
reform could either make investor-firm settlement agreements fully transparent 
or merely increase transparency of the existence of settlement activity (without 
requiring the public filing of agreement documents themselves). For example, 
Regulation SK, which requires a firm to attach all “material” contracts as exhib-
its to its quarterly and annual reports, could be interpreted to require compa-
nies to publicly file agreements that settle shareholder proposals.
251
 Alterna-
tively, the SEC could amend its proxy rules to require a company to list in the 
proxy statement for the annual meeting all qualifying shareholder proposals it 
has received, along with information about their dispositions. 
Separately, the SEC could require a company to file a Form 8-K when it 
reaches an agreement with an investor that commits the company to particular 
action in consideration for the investor’s withdrawal of a shareholder pro-
posal.
252
 Requiring a firm to file a Form 8-K, thereby revealing an otherwise 
secret agreement, would inform the firm’s other shareholders, the market, and 
the public that private ordering has occurred. This would improve allocative 
efficiency and provide information to interested third parties. An 8-K could re-
veal the specific conduct, standards, and/or reporting obligations that the firm 
 
251. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.601(a)(4) (2016) (“If a material contract . . . is executed or becomes 
effective during the reporting period reflected by a Form 10-Q or Form 10-K, it shall be filed 
as an exhibit to the Form 10-Q or Form 10-K filed for the corresponding period.”). 
252. The SEC could treat such an agreement as a “material definitive agreement” under Item 1.01 
of the Rule, or it could separately designate such agreements as triggering events. The SEC’s 
rules require a Form 8-K triggered by a “material definitive agreement” to be filed within 
four business days of the execution of the contract. This short timeframe would add to the 
pressure on firms dealing with multiple shareholder proposals and other concerns in the 
lead-up to finalizing the proxy statement, and it could probably be relaxed. The SEC last in-
creased the number of events that trigger a Form 8-K in 2004. See Additional Form 8-K Dis-
closure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date, 69 Fed. Reg. 15,594 (Mar. 25, 2004) 
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 230, 239, 240, 249). 
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has adopted, reducing the likelihood of opportunistic settlements.
253
 Bringing 
the practice into the light may encourage shareholders with means—and other 
corporate stakeholders with management’s ear—to demand a seat at the nego-




Private Solutions to Enforcement Problems. There are few enforcement 
solutions for investors and firms to adopt, but shareholder activists would do 
well to treat settlement agreements as enforceable contracts—by, for example, 
specifying a reasonable duration for a company’s policy commitment—and to 
enforce them in court if the company breaches the agreement. However, share-
holder activists lack financial incentives to enforce agreements in many circum-
stances. 
Securities Regulation and State Law Reforms to Address Enforcement 
Problems. To address the serious enforceability problems that plague settle-
ment agreements, state courts or legislatures could clarify that a corporation’s 
board of directors or officers violate their duty of loyalty when they cease com-
plying with a settlement agreement that served as consideration for an inves-
tor’s decision to withdraw a shareholder proposal. In such a case, management 
has essentially cheated the shareholder proponent out of a statutory right and 
disenfranchised other shareholders by preventing a vote on the proposal.
255
 
Clarification that the board’s fiduciary duties require it to honor settlement 
agreements would improve the quality of corporate campaign finance report-
ing, increase the value of settlements, reduce monitoring costs on investor ac-
tivists, and foster trust between shareholders and managers. 
In addition, the SEC could amend Rule 14a-8 to suspend the continuous-
ownership requirement of subsection (b). This amendment would allow a 
shareholder to reinitiate a proposal that it had previously withdrawn in reliance 
 
253. Because this is true, if the SEC were to treat investor-firm agreements as triggering events 
for Form 8-K, it should not routinely afford confidential treatment to investor-firm agree-
ments on CSR subjects. 
254. One consequence of treating an investor-firm agreement on campaign finance disclosure as a 
triggering event for Form 8-K is that termination of the agreement may also require a Form 
8-K filing, thus signaling to the shareholder proponent and to the public that the company 
has ceased complying with its disclosure obligations under the agreement. Item 8.01 allows 
a firm to file a Form 8-K for events that do not otherwise trigger a filing but which the firm’s 
management believes would be important to its shareholders. The author is aware of no 
firm that has filed a Form 8-K under Item 8.01 to disclose a campaign finance disclosure 
agreement with an investor. 
255. Cf. Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17, 26 (Del. Ch. 1982) (noting that courts will police vote-
buying agreements for evidence of a purpose to “defraud” or “disenfranchise the other 
stockholders”). 
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on the company’s commitment to take certain action, if the company failed to 
comply with its commitment. Thus actively managed funds could enforce their 
agreements with firms, even if they had sold and repurchased the company’s 
stock in the year preceding the next shareholder meeting. 
Alternatively, the SEC could change Rule 14a-8 to allow any shareholder to 
renew a proposal that was settled on the ground that the company failed to 
honor the settlement. 
2. Objections to Increasing Transparency and Enforcement 
It is likely that enhanced transparency and enforcement of settlements will 
discourage parties from settling. From corporate management’s point of view, 
if it cannot negotiate a proposal away in secret, it may be better off opposing 
the proposal at the annual shareholder’s meeting. From the shareholder propo-
nent’s point of view, it may prefer to resist settling for watered-down social and 
environmental policies if it knows the settlement will be subject to public scru-
tiny. Transparency and enforcement reforms will increase the costs of settle-
ment, imposing costs on firms and changing the cost-benefit analysis for cor-
porate management considering a policy reform. 
Socially responsible investors may therefore oppose greater transparency 
and enforcement of settlements on the ground that these changes would reduce 
the ability of shareholder activists to succeed in achieving socially beneficial re-
forms. However, this shift may not be a great loss. 
First, this Article has shown that in the case study of campaign finance dis-
closure, policies adopted through proposal settlements have improved corpo-
rate transparency in some respects, but have not succeeded in making corporate 
electoral spending transparent to voters in advance of elections. Thus, privately 
negotiated disclosure law may not be as socially beneficial as its proponents 
contend. We should not simply assume that institutional investors and corpo-
rate managers have the ability to reach socially beneficial outcomes. Investors 
have bargained away important features of electoral disclosure, such as low re-
porting thresholds and pre-election reporting. Moreover, the emergence of 
shareholder proposals opposed to corporate social responsibility suggests that 
secret proposal settlements may not always advance progressive causes. 
Second, the shareholder vote may be superior to settlement as a mechanism 
for advancing activists’ goals. Greater participation by a range of shareholders 
makes it more likely that corporate policy reforms will reflect a range of inter-
ests. Public scrutiny will make it difficult for participants to bargain away poli-
cies that most shareholders favor, and it will ensure that policy reforms, when 
they are achieved, are reflected in stock prices. 
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Enhancing transparency and enforcement of settlements will tend to in-
crease the proportion of social and environmental proposals that go to a vote, 
potentially turning the end of a company’s annual shareholder meeting into a 
referendum on its social and environmental policies. Admittedly, voting impos-
es costs on the company. However, the process would remain shareholder-
driven, meaning that shareholders themselves will decide what subjects to raise 
in proposals, and shareholder interest will determine how much time at the 
annual meeting will be spent on a social or environmental issue. Rule 14a-8’s 
“3% rule”—prohibiting a shareholder proposal from renewal within three years 
if it was proposed once within the previous five years and failed to garner at 
least 3% shareholder approval—will filter out fringe proposals.
256
 Transparent 
processes with full shareholder participation may reduce agency costs, oppor-
tunism, and information asymmetries that threaten shareholder interests under 
current settlement practices. 
Recent history shows us that proposals can win at full votes. The increasing 
number of socially conscious investors and the growing effectiveness of non-
profit organizations, such as the CPA, that coordinate institutional investor ac-
tivists and reduce the costs of their activism, reveal that social and environmen-
tal activism can succeed through shareholder voting. It is no longer unheard-of 
for social and environmental proposals to win majority shareholder support at 
the annual meeting, as evidenced by the four proposals on campaign finance 
disclosure that succeeded in 2013 and 2014.
257
 
B. The Case for Public Law Reform: Rulemaking on Corporate Campaign 
Finance Disclosure 
Transparency and enforcement solutions are a starting point, but in some 
cases they may not go far enough to produce corporate policy reforms that are 
optimally socially beneficial. Corporate campaign finance disclosure is in this 
category, and it presents an urgent case for public law reform. Three factors 
suggest this is true. First, the subject of the social policy reform—electoral 
transparency—is uniquely significant to the public interest. Second, sharehold-
er interests and citizen interests in electoral transparency substantially diverge, 
such that excluding citizen interests from the private regulatory regime subor-
dinates citizen interests in important and demonstrable ways. Third, signifi-
 
256. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(12) (2016). 
257. ISS 2015 Proxy Season Review, supra note 6, at 5 fig.5. This is a real change from just fifteen 
years ago, when Roberta Romano observed that “no social responsibility proposal has ever 
passed.” See Romano, supra note 104, at 186. 
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cant shareholder activism on campaign finance disclosure signals popular sup-
port for a public law solution, as well as the potential for private ordering to 
move swiftly down a path that confuses voters and obscures spending. 
This Section focuses on corporate campaign finance disclosure, but its 
analysis is relevant to other corporate social and environmental policy issues. If 
all three factors are satisfied for a particular social policy reform, it is likely that 
Rule 14a-8 and the SEC’s no-action guidance will have begun to shape the sub-
stance of policy reforms in a way that subordinates important third-party inter-
ests to the interests of shareholders and managers. In that case, the SEC will 
already be regulating reform of an important corporate policy, but through a set 
of rules designed for other purposes. Law- and policymakers should recognize 
that, at this point, the social policy issue is ripe to be addressed by public law. 
This Article has argued that, among subjects addressed at the corporate lev-
el by shareholder activists, electoral transparency involves uniquely significant 
public interests. The Constitution itself commits federal electoral regulation to 
public, not private, actors, and the Supreme Court has long recognized a criti-
cal role for campaign finance disclosure in promoting electoral integrity. Citi-
zens United increased the stakes by moving disclosure regulation closer to the 
core of Congress’s authority to regulate federal elections and by increasing the 
money spent by companies to influence elections. The very concept of citizen 
sovereignty would seem to foreclose our dependence on private electoral regu-
lation to solve major campaign finance problems. Public polls consistently re-
veal great public interest in campaign finance and great support for electoral 
transparency. Gaps in the transparency of private disclosure law may substan-
tively affect the behavior of corporate spenders by channeling corporate treas-
ury dollars toward state and local elections. 
Citizen interests in corporate campaign finance disclosure boil down to vot-
ers’ informational needs in advance of elections, combined with their interest in 
deterring and detecting corruption and in deterring circumvention of spending 
limits. The emerging private law compromises those interests while serving in-
vestors’ and managers’ interests in risk management, compliance, and cost 
control. The focus on annual reporting of expenditures after elections, and on 
only very large expenditures to dark money organizations, suggest that citizens 
cannot count on institutional investors to promote disclosure reforms that 
meaningfully advance citizen interests. Shareholder proposal settlements will 
never facilitate broad participation of corporate stakeholders or the public. The 
process is hardwired to produce disclosures that skew against citizen interests. 
The groundswell of shareholder activism on campaign finance disclosure 
has reflected popular support for disclosure reform, but it has channeled re-
form through a securities law mechanism that lacks the procedural safeguards 
necessary to promote First Amendment values. This is a problem if the public 
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must rely only upon this type of disclosure to reveal how public companies fi-
nance elections. 
The SEC’s key role in policing corporate social policy reform through the 
proposal mechanism suggests that the SEC may be the logical source of a pub-
lic disclosure mandate. In August 2011, a committee of ten law professors sub-
mitted a rulemaking petition asking the SEC to mandate disclosure of corpo-
rate political spending.
258
 In a law review article elaborating on the petition, 
Lucian Bebchuk and Robert Jackson argued that shareholders’ interest in polit-
ical spending information had reached a tipping point that made it appropriate 
for the SEC to issue a disclosure mandate.
259
 The rulemaking petition went on 
to garner more supportive comments on the SEC’s website than any other 
rulemaking petition in the agency’s history.
260
 After initially signaling that it 
might promulgate a political spending rule,
261
 the SEC reversed course and 
dropped the issue from its regulatory agenda.
262
 The petition has been renewed 
several times since 2011 with no action by the Commission.
263
 
The SEC’s resistance to a political spending disclosure rule is rooted in the 
idea that the whole subject falls outside the proper province of securities regu-
lation and the SEC.
264
 In 2013, a Wall Street Journal editorial described SEC 
 
258. See Letter from Comm. on Disclosure of Corp. Political Spending to Elizabeth M. Murphy, 
Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 3, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011
/petn4-637.pdf [http://perma.cc/5ZRF-NZJG]. 
259. Bebchuk & Jackson, Jr., supra note 4. 
260. See Yin Wilczek, SEC Nominees Should Support Political Spending Transparency, Groups  
Say, BLOOMBERG BNA (June 12, 2015), http://www.bna.com/sec-nominees-support 
-n17179927912 [http://perma.cc/S2VV-JBW7] (reporting the number of comments as 1.2 
million). 
261. See Lucian Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., SEC To Propose Rules on  
Corporate Political Spending by April 2013, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE &  
FIN. REG., http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/01/09/sec-to-propose-rules-on-corporate 
-political-spending-by-april-2013 [http://perma.cc/LM8S-6Q4H]. 
262. The matter was removed from the SEC’s regulatory agenda in November 2013. See U.S. Sec. 
& Exch. Comm’n, Disclosure Regarding the Use of Corporate Resources for Political Activities, 
REGINFO.GOV (2012) http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId
=201210&RIN=3235-AL36 [http://perma.cc/75GQ-9FV9]. 
263. See Letter from 44 U.S. Senators to Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n  
(Aug. 31, 2015), http://www.merkley.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/20150831_SECLetter 
.pdf [http://perma.cc/7FZA-XPLR]; Letter from 58 Members of Congress to Mary Jo  
White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Oct. 22, 2015), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu 
/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/10262015-house-of-representatives-letter-support-petition-4 
-637.pdf [http://perma.cc/N5KU-7C4H]. 
264. The transcript of an SEC meeting on August 5, 2015 addressing this issue reveals some of the 
concerns behind the SEC’s resistance. See Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
 
shareholder proposal settlements  
341 
pushback against the proposed rule and reported the SEC staff ’s view that “it’s 
not their job to regulate political speech.”
265
 These and other sources suggest 
that individuals within the SEC believe the agency should not stray into new 
territory by regulating political-spending disclosure. 
In fact, however, this Article has shown that the SEC’s existing rules already 
provide the governing framework within which the private ordering of corpo-
rate campaign finance disclosure plays out. The SEC is indirectly regulating 
disclosure reform. This point has been lost in the debate over the proposed 
SEC disclosure mandate. 
The private disclosure regime has been heavily shaped by the legal frame-
work of Rule 14a-8 and the SEC’s no-action guidance. What is more, existing 
SEC regulation incentivizes settlement of shareholder proposals, requires vir-
tually no transparency, and hobbles enforcement of the resulting disclosure 
commitments. Under Rule 14a-8, participation in standard setting is severely 
limited, standards mainly serve the interests of participants, and corporate 
management ignores its own disclosure commitments. This results in increased 
agency costs for firms, the loss of shareholder prerogatives, and the subversion 
of the justifications for the shareholder proposal mechanism. Another result is 
suboptimal social policy reforms that are fragile and, at many companies, 
short-lived. In sum, the SEC is regulating the disclosure reform process now, 
and it is doing the job badly. 
Firm-by-firm private ordering is not an efficient way to establish disclosure 
policies at hundreds of public companies—particularly because disclosure poli-
cies are most beneficial, even for investors, when they are consistent and widely 
adopted. A public disclosure mandate that applies to all public companies 
would cost less than efforts to achieve the same outcome through settlements 
at hundreds of companies. In private ordering, the costs of negotiating cam-
paign finance disclosure policies again and again, firm by firm, are largely 
borne by institutional investors and by the companies. A public disclosure 
 
Comm’n, Dissenting Statement at an Open Meeting To Adopt the “Pay Ratio” Rule (Aug.  
5, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/statement/dissenting-statement-at-open-meeting-to 
-adopt-the-pay-ratio-rule.html [http://perma.cc/BPU9-A8PT] (describing the CEO Pay 
Ratio Rule as “a nakedly political rule that hijacks the SEC’s disclosure regime to once again 
affect social change desired by ideologues and special interest groups”); Michael S. Piwowar, 
Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Dissenting Statement at Open Meeting on Pay Ratio 
Disclosure (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/statement/dissenting-statement-at 
-open-meeting-on-pay-ratio-disclosure.html [http://perma.cc/TJ9P-46PY] (“What will 
come next? Perhaps it will be political spending disclosure.”). 
265. The Other Targeting Scandal, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 6, 2013, 7:26 PM), http://www.wsj.com
/articles/SB10001424127887324783204578624014097139822 [http://perma.cc/6V6Y-6677]. 
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mandate would not only lower the overall costs of disclosure reform, but it 
would also spread the costs more fairly across the beneficiaries of disclosure. 
Of course, a move by the SEC to address the influence of its existing regu-
latory framework on campaign finance disclosure would fit squarely within the 
SEC’s congressional mandate to regulate in the public interest.
266
 Many schol-
ars have written about the public interest mandate and have criticized the SEC’s 
reluctance to put it into action.
267
 Here, the SEC’s failure to mandate corporate 
political spending disclosure, coupled with its failure to mandate transparency 
of proposal settlements, amounts to something other than inaction: these fail-
ures are regulatory design choices that keep the public and corporate stake-




Private ordering has become a shadow front in the battle to regulate Ameri-
can elections. It is reshaping corporate campaign finance disclosure, the means 
through which American voters learn about sources of candidate funding and 
the influence of corporations on the political process. This Article has explored 
the settlement of the Rule 14a-8 shareholder proposal as a mechanism to re-
form corporate social and environmental practices, focusing on corporate cam-
paign finance disclosure as an important and timely case study. 
Proposal settlements have produced new campaign finance disclosure rules 
at a significant and growing number of S&P 500 companies. The resulting dis-
closures are not “voluntary,” as they are often mislabeled. Instead, they are the 
product of a bargained-for exchange between institutional investors and corpo-
rate managers. The new disclosure standards are memorialized in mostly secret 
agreements that are not transparent to other corporate stakeholders, capital 
markets, or voters. Through an analysis of forty-two settlement agreements 
reached between 2009 and 2015, this Article has documented how the emerging 
private disclosure standards make limited improvements on public disclosure 
law. However, the analysis also revealed that the new standards defeat citizen 
interests in pre-election disclosure, employ sky-high reporting thresholds, and 
may channel corporate spending away from federal elections to state and local 
elections. This is because proposal settlements produce private rules that ad-
 
266. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2012) (authorizing the SEC to require 
proxy disclosure “as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors”). 
267. See, e.g., Russell B. Stevenson, Jr., The SEC and the New Disclosure, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 50, 
58 (1977); Williams, supra note 40, at 1235-37. 
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vance the mutually beneficial interests of parties that negotiate the rules: insti-
tutional investors and corporate managers. 
Even if the private settlements were producing meaningful corporate dis-
closures, they have proved fragile. They are sometimes nullified with no public 
notice following a change in shareholding or a merger. Companies have often 
failed to comply with their commitments in these private deals, likely because 
investors have weak economic incentives to monitor and enforce settlements, 
and because Rule 14a-8 itself creates challenges for enforcement. 
The widespread use of proposal settlements to set corporate campaign fi-
nance disclosure policies raises questions of democratic process, given the sig-
nificant citizen interests at stake in electoral regulation. Important parties—
citizens and most shareholders—are excluded from private rulemaking, while 
other parties, including for-profit shareholder advisory services, wield outsized 
influence. The role of institutional investors in submitting and settling cam-
paign finance disclosure proposals raises questions of intermediation in agency 
capitalism: most fund beneficiaries probably know little about the transparency 
deals negotiated on their behalf by fund managers. 
Shareholder proposal settlements are also concerning from a corporate 
governance point of view. Settlements undercut the economic and noneconom-
ic justifications for the shareholder proposal itself and potentially impose agen-
cy costs on public companies. The agency costs are not outweighed by benefits 
to the company, whose management would otherwise have opposed the policy 
change. And they are not outweighed by benefits to society in general, since the 
private rules settlements produce only weakly advance citizen interests. 
Changes to federal securities regulation would enhance the transparency 
and enforceability of proposal settlements, and would likely discourage settle-
ment. This Article has recommended a range of potential reforms. They would 
not cure all the problems attributable to proposal settlements, but they are po-
tential steps in the right direction. 
Corporate campaign finance disclosure presents a uniquely strong case for 
public law reform, not only for the reasons highlighted by other legal scholars, 
but also for new reasons set out in this Article. The Article has highlighted 
three factors that suggest when a social or environmental policy reform may be 
poorly suited for private ordering through the proposal settlement mechanism. 
These are: (1) when the subject of shareholder activism is uniquely significant 
to the public interest, (2) when shareholder interests and citizen interests in the 
subject substantially diverge, and (3) when a groundswell of shareholder activ-
ism signals the potential for private ordering to impose a solution powerfully 
motivated by shareholder interests. These three factors are certainly satisfied 
for campaign finance disclosure. 
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Finally, one of the key insights of this Article is that the SEC is already regu-
lating the reform of corporate campaign finance disclosure, albeit indirectly, 
through Rule 14a-8 and its no-action guidance. To date, the SEC has resisted 
calls to mandate corporate campaign finance disclosure, and opponents of a 
disclosure rule commonly argue that the SEC should not get involved in regu-
lating elections. To have a clear-eyed understanding of the consequences of ac-
tion or inaction by the SEC, lawmakers and the agency itself must recognize 
the agency’s current role in shaping private electoral reform. Ultimately, the 
case study presented in this Article casts doubt on whether the proposal settle-
ment, in its current form, can be harnessed to advance citizen interests in elec-
toral transparency through corporate policy reform. 
 
